Trinity Fort and the defences of the second Anglo-Dutch war at Gravesend in 1667

TRIN I TY FORT AND THE DEFENCES OF THE SECOND ANGLO-DUTCH WAR AT GRAVESEND IN 1667 VICTOR T.C. SMITH, B.A., F.S.A. INTRODUCTION Research in 1993-94 by the New Tavern Fort Project and the Kent Defence Research Group has discovered evidence of a previously unknown fort at Milton-next-Gravesend. This was 'Trinity Fort' which was constructed with great speed as a temporary measure during the period of the Dutch Raid on the Thames and Medway in 1667. It was armed with 39 of the more powerful guns then mounted in coastal and riverine forts and was additional to, and distinct from, the pre-existing defences at Gravesend which had a smaller and lighter armament. This paper considers the evidence for the fort within the context of the general preparations for defence against the Dutch at Gravesend and Tilbury. THE DUTCH RAID The Dutch raid was a disastrous, traumatic and humiliating experience for England. It came towards the end of the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-67) which was, in large measure, an attempt to settle commercial rivalry by force of arms. England had begun to acquire a mercantile-led colonial role overseas which, as well as furthering business interests, became important in terms of national prestige. This had placed England in conflict with the similar ambitions of the Dutch. Relations had earlier become strained by the effect of England's Navigation Acts and her interpretation of maritime law. There was intense competition with the Dutch for access to the resources and commercial opportunities of Africa, North America and the East Indies. The war was characterised by naval engagements and by the attack and 39 VICTOR T.C. SMITH capture of places which were important to the interests of the protagonists. By early 1667, the English considered that they had gained a position of advantage over the Dutch. This and the problem of shortage of funds for maintaining the whole of the Royal Navy in service allowed King Charles to be persuaded that it was safe to decommission most of the fleet. Its ships were then laid up in the Medway anchorage. The result was that England came to be dependent upon the existing coastal and riverine defences of sometimes doubtful powers of resistance and upon a reduced number of warships which remained in service. The Medway anchorage in particular was inadequately protected by land-based defences and naval forces. The willingness of the Dutch to enter into peace negotiations had seemed justification for this, as it turned out, naive policy. There were, however, some anxious and dissenting voices among the King's advisers, such as the Duke of Albemarle (known during the Commonwealth when he served Parliament as General Monck) who was conscious of the possible dangers and commended caution.I Apparently well aware of the weakness of the English situation, the Dutch then sent their fleet across the North Sea on a raid in force. Its orders were to attack the ships of the Royal Navy in the Medway and to destroy the dockyard facilities at Chatham. In this enterprise the Dutch focussed their efforts against the instruments of sea-power which had underpinned the unwelcome commercial challenge to them which they so resented. At the same time, the Raid can only have served to reinforce their position in negotiating the terms of peace with the English. The Dutch fleet was commanded by Admiral de Ruyter who had served against the English during the first Anglo-Dutch War (1652-54). It consisted of over 70 vessels which had been collected and provisioned from Dutch ports since the 25th May.2 The fleet arrived in the Thames estuary on the 9th June. This area of water was, with the Nore, to be the tactical pivot for the Dutch operations against the Medway which was the main objective from the start and, later, albeit abortively against Landguard Fort at Felixstowe. Although the Thames itself was of less importance than the Medway in this enterprise, de Ruyter also had orders to take any opportunity which presented itself to attack, destroy or capture mercantile shipping moored at Gravesend or higher up. Indeed, with the rich prizes to be had in this, the commercially most important river in the country, the English assumed and expected that such an attack would take place. The Dutch presence 1 H.A. James, The Dutch in the Medway, Chatham, 1967, 5. 2 Ibid., 8. 40 THE DEFENCES OF THE SECOND ANGLO-DUTCH WAR AT GRAVESEND in the estuary became a virtual blockade of the Thames and of London for a period of six weeks. THE DEFENCELESSNESS OF THE THAMES When the Dutch fleet appeared in the estuary the only defences for the Thames which then existed were the Gravesend and Tilbury blockhouses which had originated in Henry VIII's programme of defence construction of 1539/40. These were sited in a cross-fire position at the western end of Gravesend Reach where the river narrows to 800 metres. Here they not only guarded the river approaches to London and the large amount of mercantile shipping upstream, but secured the strategic ferry crossing between Gravesend and Tilbury. A weakness in the defensive arrangements was the absence of forward gun positions downstream at the eastern end of Gravesend Reach. Such defences which had originally been provided by Henry VIII in the form of the blockhouses at East Tilbury in Essex and at Higham in Kent were abandoned in 1553. A fifth blockhouse in marshland 600 metres east of the Gravesend Blockhouse had been abandoned at the same date and, in 1558, was ordered to be demolished.3 The Gravesend Blockhouse was a D-shaped building of brick and stone. Within this were casemates for guns to fire through ports in its semi-circular front. There were positions for more guns in open embrasures on its roof. However, the extent to which the blockhouse itself had continued to be so fully used as a gun platform, as provided for in the original Tudor arrangements, is unclear, but continuing use of the roof positions seems indicated. The main firepower appears to have been deployed behind ground-level ramparts along the river bank on the western and eastern sides of the blockhouse. The remains of part of the blockhouse may be seen in the riverside lawn of the building now known as the Clarendon Royal Hotel. At the time of the Raid the latter was the quarters for the Governor, Sir John Griffith. It had been built in 1665 to provide accommodation for the Duke of York (later James II) as Lord High Admiral. This addition to the site had evidently been ordered by the king himself. The Tilbury Blockhouse was similar in form to Gravesend, also with gun positions on ramparts along the riverbank on either side which returned to enclose the rear. Nothing of that blockhouse is visible but its remains might exist as archaeological features. Both blockhouses must have been purposefully observed from 3 V.T.C. Smith, 'The Artillery Defences at Gravesend', Arch. Cant., lxxxix (1974), 141-68. 41 VICTOR T.C. SMITH trading vessels from the Netherlands in peacetime and the Gravesend blockhouse was several times sketched by Dutch artists.4 The decayed and ill-armed blockhouses at Gravesend and Tilbury were in no condition to resist the powerful Dutch naval forces, which had assembled in the lower reaches of the river. These seemed liable to attack upstream at any moment and might well have tried with more determination to do so at the outset had they become aware of the weakness of the defences. Samuel Pepys, who was Surveyor-General of the Victualling Office for the Navy, visited Gravesend on the 10th, and reported all he saw in a letter to Sir William Coventry.s In his diary, Pepys also noted that when Sir John Griffith asked for local volunteers to assist with defence 'there was not twelve men to be got in the town.' 6 The Duke of Albemarle was placed in command of the approaches to the capital. Pepys was dismissive of the military force which Albemarle had initially brought to Gravesend, referring to it as consisting of 'a great many idle Lords and Gentlemen, with their pistols and fooleries and the bulwark not able to have stood half an hour, had they (the Dutch) come up.'7 Moreover, against the background of distant gunfire from the Dutch fleet, a state approaching panic appears to have set in at Gravesend, a number of whose inhabitants were in the process of removing themselves and their more portable property away from the town and out of possible harm's way.8 The excitement of the time attracted wide interest and the proceedings in the Thames and Medway were recorded by a number of observers and commentators other than Pepys, such as John Evelyn and Ralph Josselin. Of his visit to Gravesend, the Duke of Albemarle later wrote that 'I found the fort on the Kent side, with few guns, and that on the Essex side, had not above two in it mounted. I therefore gave order to Sir John Griffiths, the Governor to mount as many guns as he could, and to repair the fortifications, to be able to make the best resistance he could, in case the Dutch should advance further up the river, part of them being sailed to the Lower Hope. I also appointed Sir William Jennings to command the men of war and fire ships that lay by the fort, till his Royal Highness (The Duke of York, Lord High Admiral) should further direct in that particular. And in regard I found so few guns in the forts mounted, and seeing the Dutch fleet on Tuesday morning, with their topsails loose, in sight 4 lbid. 5 Reproduced in R.P. Cruden, History of Gravesend, Gravesend, 1843, 551-2. 6 Diary of Samuel Pepys, 10th June, 1667. 1 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 42 THE DEFENCES OF THE SECOND ANGLO-DUTCH WAR AT GRAVESEND of Gravesend, I gave orders, that when the train of artillery [from the Tower of London] should come to Gravesend, they should stay there till further orders; for I was in hopes to find Chatham better provided than it was. ' 9 The artillery train was eventually redirected to the Medway. The defenceless state of the Gravesend and Tilbury blockhouses, which had fallen into disrepair, was their usual condition between periods of emergency. It does, however, seem remarkable that no refurbishment had been undertaken earlier, given that a heightened risk of attack must have existed since the war began in 1665. Many at the time of the Raid were not slow in voicing their concern and condemnation of the Office of Ordnance for their neglect.10 The warships off Gravesend to which Albemarle referred were evidently in part formed of a naval squadron which had originally been deployed at the Lower Hope when the Dutch first appeared. These had been almost immediately withdrawn to form a defensive line between the two blockhouses, perhaps in the manner of floating batteries.11 This decision was criticised by Pepys as 'a ridiculous thing', although this was probably more a judgement on its timing when the Dutch had withdrawn to attack the Medway rather than a criticism of the intrinsic value of such a measure as a tactical device.12 Both Pepys and his informant Sir William Batten reported that the defensive line included blockships, a not unusual method of attempting to physically bar a channel or a harbour to enemy navigation. 13 Batten observed that although the river had been blocked, this was done ' . .. in the greatest confusion possible. Good ships, full of supplies and valuable cargo, had been commandeered on the Council's order and sunk while empty hulks had been ignored.' Arrangements had also been made for blocking the river higher up at Blackwall.14 PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE ON LAND The preoccupation of de Ruyter with his attack on Sheerness and the decommissioned naval shipping in the Medway gave time for the English to re-establish and increase their land-based defences in the Thames, against a still present threat which might return into Gravesend Reach, if de Ruyter saw fit. It was during this period that 9 Journal of the House of Commons, 31st October, 1667. 10 Diary of Samuel Pepys, 10th June, 1667. 11 lbid. 12 C. Abernethy, Mr. Pepys of Seething Lane, London, 1958, 297 and 303. 13 lbid. 14 Ibid. 43 VICTOR T.C. SMITH Trinity Fort came to be built. However, whatever logistical or material resources were available to or asked for by Griffith and Albemarle at the start of the emergency, it was not until the 15th June that efforts to prepare for defence were becoming more organised. On that date the king wrote to Sir William Rider, Henry Johnson and Sir John Griffith commanding them to repair the two blockhouses and to build 'batteries near Gravesend ' as well as ordering the supply of labourers to carry out the work.51 The preparations involved action and assistance by a number of bodies: On the 16th June, the Corporation of Trinity House was ordered under Royal Warrant to provide six captains from among their Elder Brethren who were to take 20 seamen each to Gravesend to assist with the supervision and construction of defensive works.61 One of their captains was disciplined for failing to appear.17 On the same date a second warrant was issued to the Corporation of Shiprights at Redriff (Rotherhithe) to send 50 carpenters to Gravesend 'for speedy carrying on of the works there, following the orders of Sir John Griffith and Sir William Rider.'18 The Navy Commissioners were asked by Sir William Coventry to send 'a couple of sea captains to assist ... in mounting guns and making batteries ...' 19 and Sir William Rider asked Williamson for '50 great guns, and old plank to lay the platforms '. 20 He also pointed out that an old ship drifting in the river at Woolwich would provide suitable materials for the platforms and save money, but added his complaint that there was a 'great want of all things to set people at work.'21 The Ordnance Commissioners were required to supply carriages for the guns and a large number of spades and pick-axes for the carrying on of works.22 Immediate expenses at Gravesend were to be met with an imprest of £300 and more frigates and fire-ships were to be sent downstream to join the vessels already present.23 Fire-ships were a potent offensive device but when these additional vessels arrived, they were found to be very defective in men and stores.24 By 27th June, 80 guns were reported to have been emplaced on both sides of the river at Gravesend and Tilbury. Four companies of infantry is Cal. S.P. Dom., 1667, 193. 16 Guildhall Library, Trinity House Court Minutes, 16th June, 1667 in Ms 30, 004/2 fol. 99. 11 Ibid., fol. 115/6. 1s Cal. S.P. Dom., 1667, 196. 19 Ibid., 194. 20 Ibid., 202. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid., 196. 23 Ibid., 194-5. 24 Ibid. 44 THE DEFENCES OF THE SECOND ANGLO-DUTCH WAR AT GRAVESEND were also stationed at Gravesend.25 On the 8th July, Griffith complained to Williamson of hearing of scandalous reports prejudicing his reputation and wished 'the world disabused' by the insertion of a note in the next issue of the [London] Gazette reporting his present condition 'viz. that in 14 days the fortifications of Tilbury Fort are made all new, and all things else well provided; the same of the fort of Gravesend, and of the new made line'. He added that on both sides of the river sufficient guns were planted to hinder a Dutch advance and that the king (who had visited Gravesend on the 14th of June) was satisfied with his actions.26 Yet, two days later, on the 10th July, Sir Godfrey Lloyd felt constrained to ask Lord Arlington for help in obtaining 590 palisades for the Tilbury blockhouse, and 50 standards and 25 supporters of wood to secure the magazine at Gravesend with 700 feet of list wood to bind them together. He also recommended that the blockhouse itself should be 'lined with earth 12 feet broad and 6 feet high.'27 TRINI TY FORT The Griffiths apologia to Williamson, and the command of the king on 15th June, implied the construction of fresh works at Gravesend as well as referring to repairs to the existing blockhouses. However, the name, location and other details of any new works were not indicated until the discovery of a manuscript in the collection of the National Maritime Museum which provided more information. In this document, inventories of guns for June and July, 1667, included a Trinity Fort among the defensive works of the Thames:28 Demi-cannons Culverins Demi-culverins Sak:ers Minions 24-pounders 12-pounders 25 Ibid., 201. 26 Ibid., 278. 27 Ibid., 285. Gravesend Trinity Fort 22 8 17 I 3+1 3+2 18 39 28 National Maritime Museum, Ms. CAD C/9 fol. 5 and 6. 45 Tilbury 3 I 6 9 4 I I 25 82 guns VICTOR T.C. SMITH Trinity Fort was described as being in Milton with an ordnance storehouse at 'New Taverne'. This is the earliest known reference to that place-name which related to an inn as well as to its immediately surrounding area. No other details of location were given. The 'new made line' referred to by Griffith can only have been one and the same as Trinity Fort. This would have been close to the riverbank, starting somewhere to the east of the gun lines of the Gravesend Blockhouse. The lateral space suitable for the working and firing of 39 guns in a prepared battery situation would have been about 230 metres. If, for example, Trinity Fort had been a simple straight line extending from the end of the eastern gun lines of the Gravesend Blockhouse, this would have reached the site, which was later to become New Tavern Fort, within the parish of Milton-next-Gravesend. It may be that the defensive potential of this site was in some measure recognised 110 years before Thomas Hyde Page planned a fort there in 1778.29 Although the site was then lower than it presents today, it was the beginning of the first dry and rising ground on the south bank of the Thames upstream of the extensive marshlands to the east. This site was more easily adapted for defensive purposes so that guns could both bear downstream and across the river, especially in a cross-fire with the Tilbury blockhouse. It would have been logical and likely either for any line starting from the west to have been angled inland at this point to take advantage of the ground - or, for the whole, or most of the fort to have been made there. However, no plan or description of Trinity Fort has yet been found and we do not know whether it was a continuous or discontinuous work. Yet with an armament of 39 guns it must have been of considerable size. Reconstitution of the old and demolished Henrician Milton Blockhouse, a further 200 metres to the east and on a slightly lower and wetter site (now the Canal Basin) seems a less likely alternative for the positioning of Trinity Fort. It would also have been inconsistent with the reference to 'New Taverne'. Trinity Fort had the largest and heaviest armament, all of which was mounted upon wooden ships carriages. A treatise of 162830 gives the Demi-cannon a bore of 155 mm. firing a shot of 12.2 kg. weight to a range of 1700 m. and the Culverin a bore of 120 mm. firing a shot of 6.8 kg. to 2100 m. Both these weapons were in the upper power range of guns used in coastal and riverine forts. The Demi-cannon in particular could have inflicted severe damage on a wooden warship. Although the smaller and lighter armaments of the Gravesend and 29 British Library, K. Top. XVII.16 b. 30 From a table in William Eldred, The Gunner's Glasse, London, 1646. 46 THE DEFENCES OF THE SECOND ANGLO-DUTCH WAR AT GRAVESEND Tilbury blockhouses contained some useful guns in heavier classes such as the Demi-Cannon, Culverin, Demi-Culverin and the 24-pr., their Sakers and Minions were small, ineffectual and almost frivolous weapons against the scale of attack possible from the Dutch fleet. They were, however, suitable for firing bring-to rounds for the customs control of shipping in peacetime and for salutes. Trinity Fort was clearly the mainstay of the land-based defences during the period of the Raid. The formation of temporary batteries was a usual feature of periods of wartime emergency. However, that Trinity Fort had been built and with such a powerful armament, emphasised, and was caused by, the insufficiency of the permanent defences which had existed when the emergency began. Stores at New Tavern included 97 wheel-barrows, 180 spades, 97 shovels and 91 pick-axes31 presumably left over from the construction of works. This may suggest the nature of the fort as an extemporised earthwork battery, which the evidence of Griffith would imply had been made in just two weeks. There would have been some timber work as part of the structure, with timber revetting, framed embrasures - unless the guns were to fire en barbette - and platforms. Such work would probably have been undertaken by the carpenters ordered to be supplied by the Corporation of Shipwrights. To work the guns of the fort required a great quantity and variety of stores and equipment. The inventories list 1390 roundshot for the guns, 333 double-headed shot, many barrels of gunpowder and canvas and paper cases to form cartridges. There must have been at least rudimentary laboratory facilities on the site or nearby for the making up of charges. There were also stocks of sundry gun carriage parts, beds and spare quoins which were used to control the elevation of the guns at their breech end when being laid on to target. For the loading and firing of the guns there were large numbers of powder ladles, rammers, sponges, wad hooks, linstocks, match and other necessary items. Ropes were stored for general purposes as well as for breeching tackles, and there were hides, lanterns, Muscovy lights and a miscellany of other items such as 23 great pulley s and tin cases of musket shot.32 The storehouse at 'New Taverne' would have provided a necessary protection against the weather and theft for many of these items. But it would have required compartmentalisation, not only to keep the stores sorted into ty pes, but to separate the dangerous gunpowder from other items. Was the medieval Milton Chantry, subsequently identified with the New Tavern 31 NMM, Ms. CAD C/9, fol. 10. 32 Ibid. 47 VICTOR T.C. SMITH inn and eventually becoming the barracks of the later New Tavern Fort requisitioned during the period of the emergency and was it used as a storehouse? The name given to the fort can only have derived from Trinity House having been involved with a large part of the effort to form the defences. Details of the arrangements for the operation of Trinity Fort have not survived, but seamen almost certainly provided most or all of its gunners. Over 250 of them would have been required if all of the guns had needed to be manned and fought at the same time. This is exclusive of the needs of the Gravesend and Tilbury blockhouses. The Corporation of Trinity House had, at the outset, declared themselves prepared to send gunners to Gravesend, if needed. Much of the cost of the work was met by the Corporation of London which had a vested interest in preventing an advance of the Dutch towards the capital.33 The Dutch fleet did probe upstream to or from the Lower Hope on three occasions, on the 9th June when it first arrived in the Thames and on the 27th, as well as the 23rd July and there were encounters between naval vessels when an exchange of fire took place. The Dutch advance on the 23rd July resulted in a short but fierce battle in the Lower Hope in which fire-ships were used.34 However, the Dutch appear never to have advanced quite as far as Gravesend itself, although there is anecdotal evidence of roundshot, allegedly of Dutch origin, having been found in the West Street area after the Second World War.35 The Dutch did land on Canvey Island in Essex and caused some damage and local tradition at East Tilbury insists that the church there was hit by Dutch gun-fire.36 The centre of the action during the raid was the Medway where the recently started fort at Sheerness was captured and decommissioned. English warships were burnt or seized. Apparently unknown to the commanders of the English and Dutch fleets because of the slowness of communications, a peace treaty had been signed in Breda on 21st July, two days before the battle in the Lower Hope. When the news of peace was received the Dutch fleet withdrew from the Thames,37 but on the 29th money was still being requested 'to perfect those parts of the work [at Gravesend] that are of present necessity, and without which what is done will be of little service.'38 33 Cal. S.P. Dom., 1667, 310. 34 V.T.C. Smith, 'The Dutch in the Thames, 1667', Gravesend Historical Society Transactions (1973), 14-20. 35 Personal comments to the writer, 1965. 36 V.T.C. Smith, Coalhouse Fort and the Artillery Defences at East Tilbury, Thurrock, 1985, 5. 37 Ibid., note 34. 38 Cal. S.P. Dom., 1667, 339. 48 THE DEFENCES OF THE SECOND ANGLO-DU TCH WAR AT GRAVESEND THE DISCON TINUATION OF TRINITY FORT An inventory of the Thames defences dated August, 1667, still included Trinity Fort.39 That for September is missing from the record, but the one for October4° does not mention the fort or its stores. This indicates that following the emergency the fort was discontinued and its stores removed. In October, 1667, the armament of Gravesend and Tilbury blockhouses was: Gravesend Tilbury Demi-cannons 13 12 Culverins 16 15 Demi-culverins 12 Sakers 9 6 3-pounders 2 4 40 49 89 guns The armament was the same in April, 1669, which is the date of the next surviving inventory with the addition of two Minions at Gravesend.41 The larger and more powerful armaments at both places must mean that the opportunity had been taken to learn from the experience of the weakness of the fire-power at the start of the Dutch Raid. This may also have in part been achieved by the redeployment of some of the weapons which had been mounted at Trinity Fort. The 40 guns at Gravesend could have been mounted in the space offered by the western and eastern gun lines of the blockhouse, perhaps with some guns mounted on the blockhouse itself. The same comment applies to the Tilbury blockhouse. Nevertheless, on the Gravesend side of the water the inadequate design of the blockhouse fort with its poor development of down-river fire was retained. There had been a proposal of Sir Bernard de Gomme, the King's Chief Engineer, in February, 1667, to construct a large and expensive four-bastioned fort around the blockhouse. This was estimated to cost £15,728, exclusive of the purchase of necessary extra land.42 Although this was not proceeded with, de Gomme's similar project for a larger and more expensive bastioned fort at Tilbury, which enclosed the blockhouse there, was started in 1670. This had powerful river-facing batteries.43 39 NMM, Ms. CAD C/9, fol. 14. 40 Ibid., fol. 18. 41 Ibid., fol. 20. 42 Ibid., fol. 24. 43 A.D. Saunders, 'Tilbury Fort and the Development of Artillery Fortification in the Thames Estuary', Antiq. Journ., xl (1960), 154-74. 49 VICTOR T.C. SMITH Before the end of the century, the Gravesend blockhouse itself had become a magazine only and the western gun lines were disarmed. This left the reduced fire-power of the fort exclusively on its eastern gun lines.44 END COMMENT The discovery of the documentary reference to Trinity Fort is an important addition to our knowledge of the defences in the Thames at the time of the Dutch Raid. But this has posed some tantalising questions about the exact siting and form of this work. The fort must have left traces for some time after abandonment but these do not seem to have been recorded by any observer or marked upon a map. It is possible that some vestiges remain archaeologically, particularly if a ditch of any kind was cut in front of the rampart. However, there might have been later and obliterating interventions, especially if the site was indeed that of the later New Tavern Fort. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The writer would like to thank Mr A.D. Saunders, M.A., ES.A., and Mr E.R. Green, for their comments on the first draft of this paper. He would also like to express his gratitude to Mr E.W. Tilley, for access to his notes on Gravesend during the Dutch Raid. 44 Ibid., note 3. 50