Defending Chatham 1939-1941

[pg1]A Kent Defence Research Group Project 2022-2024 undertaken by Jay Curtis, Keith Gulvin, Clive Holden, Andrew Kershaw and Martin Laws.

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[fg]1941 1:25,000 map of the Chatham Garrison area outlining its Boundaries of Responsibility[/fg]

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Introduction

In 2022 members of the Kent Defence Research Group began a project to record the remaining Second World War defence structures in the Chatham area. The base document for this project would be the 1941 ‘Chatham Garrison Plan to Defeat Invasion’. A small team was formed to conduct field trips and to then write up their findings. The result is this report which is designed with a register which can easily be added to in the future as more surviving structures are discovered or reported as they are bound to be.

The report is divided into two parts: Part 1 is the main text commencing with a historical background and narrative; the latter taken mostly from War Diaries and other contemporary documentary sources. The report then concludes with an outline of the ‘Garrison Plan to Defeat Invasion’ which is the main base document for the report. Part 2 of the report details the fieldwork, and the methodology used for it.

The report concludes with its three Appendices. A complication arose with Appendix I which consists of extracts from the original 1941 ‘Plan to Defeat Invasion’ appendices which are referred to multiple times in the report’s main text. To avoid confusion, when referring to these 1941 appendices in the report, they are stated in italics i.e. Appendix “M”. For additional clarity, the report’s appendices have been titled in Roman Numerals as opposed to alphabetically as in the 1941 Plan.

Appendix II, the Register of Recorded Features contains single low-resolution images of each feature. High-resolution and additional feature images are available as one of the report’s digital downloads listed with links in Appendix III. The other downloads listed are an ‘Excel’ spreadsheet detailing the structures recorded. This includes map links for each one. When you ‘click’ on the link the location will open in Google Maps. The spreadsheet has two tabs: ‘Referenced’ for those structures referenced in the Garrison Plan to Defeat Invasion, and ‘Unreferenced’ for all other recorded structures. There is also a ‘KMZ’ file that can be downloaded for use as an overlay in the desktop version of Google Earth. The overlay consists of ‘pins’ for each recorded structure.

The ‘Defending Chatham’ project proved to be an interesting and enjoyable venture for the team members involved in it. Jay Curtis, Keith Gulvin, Andy Kershaw, and Martin Laws gave up their time to join myself in bringing individual skills and knowledge to the project and it is now hoped that other KDRG members will be encouraged to join similar projects in the future.

Clive Holden – Chair, Kent Defence Research Group, October 2024

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Part 1 – Historical Narrative

Prologue

Chatham lies on a bend of one of the lower reaches of the River Medway in Kent, about twelve miles from its confluence with the Thames. For over four hundred years it played a crucial role in the defence of Britain.

In 1547, the last year of Henry VIII’s reign, a storehouse was rented alongside the banks of the Medway at Chatham to store the ropes, masts and other equipment of the king’s warships that had, for some years, been using the river as a safe anchorage during the winter months. The acquisition of this building marked the genesis of one of the nation’s greatest and most important naval dockyards.

Of course, Chatham will always be most famous for its connections with the Royal Navy, but the Army also maintained a strong presence here, initially to provide defence for the dockyard and later to become one of the country’s largest military garrisons and an important training establishment.

The development of Chatham over the centuries into a major naval and military base extended beyond the town itself. Following the huge expansion of Chatham Dockyard in the last half of the 19th century a far greater area of the yard lay within the boundaries of Gillingham than Chatham itself. The defences also expanded way beyond the town, into neighbouring Rochester and Gillingham and across the Medway onto the Hoo Peninsula.

By first decade of the 20th century the ‘Medway District’, as it became known to the naval and military authorities, was firmly established with the expanded dockyard, the gun wharf, the fortifications of the Chatham Lines, the inner and outer ring forts, numerous barracks and the naval ordnance depots at Chattenden, Upnor and Lodge Hill. It could even boast its own railways. The Dockyard branch line, built in the 1877 connected the extensive rail networks within the dockyard and gun wharf to the London, Chatham and Dover Railway’s mainline at Gillingham, whilst over on Hoo the Admiralty operated the Chattenden & Upnor Railway and the Chattenden Naval Tramway.

Chatham also became the headquarters of the Royal Navy’s Nore Command which oversaw naval operations in the North Sea along the East coast of Britain, guarding against invasion and protecting trade. The Commander-in-Chief of the Nore Command was always a senior admiral who, from the early 1900’s, maintained a grand residence on the Lower Lines at Gillingham.

As well as thousands of service personnel, the military establishment at Chatham employed almost as many civilian workers, the vast majority drawn from the local population of the Medway Towns. When electric trams came to Chatham and Gillingham in the early 20th century they revolutionised the commute for the local population. The tram network eventually extended into [pg5]Rainham, Rochester, Strood and Borstal. Fares were deliberately kept low to suit the huge volume of servicemen and dockyard worker passengers.

Chatham’s contribution to the nation’s efforts in the two World Wars can never be forgotten. The dockyard built, repaired, and re-fitted hundreds of vessels of all types which went on to serve with the various fleets of the Royal Navy and thousands of servicemen received their basic training here before being posted to theatres of war around the globe.

At the outbreak of the First World War, it appeared possible that Germany could attempt an amphibious landing in Kent and attack the Royal Navy’s facilities at Chatham. Preparations were soon put in hand to counter any such attack. Coastal defences were upgraded and extended on Grain and Sheppey and, to defend against a landwards advance from the south and east a trench system was excavated just in front and between the ‘Outer Ring’ of Victorian-era forts. A major entrenched ‘stop line’ was also constructed between the Swale and the high ground north of Maidstone. Known as the Chatham Land Front, it formed part of a larger ring of fortifications defending London. Some of the pillboxes that formed part of the stop line can still be seen around Detling Hill and Stockbury and were even considered for re-use during the next invasion scare almost two decades later

The Great War, as it became known, also saw the introduction of military aviation on a grand scale. Air-raids by Zeppelin airships and Gotha bombers were countered by anti-aircraft guns and fighter aircraft. The country’s first ‘fixed’ anti-aircraft batteries had been built just before the war to defend the Lodge Hill and Chattenden naval ordnance depots from air attack and by 1916 the Medway District had gained several more. The Royal Naval Air Service had been established on 1 July 1914 and was charged with the air defence of Chatham Dockyard and its environs, operating from airfields at Detling and Grain.

Despite the establishment of these defences, the Medway District still suffered a most devastating attack when, on 3 September 1917, four German Gotha bombers attacked Gillingham and Chatham. A practice alert had been carried out earlier in the day within the towns, and when the aircraft were finally spotted and an alert sounded, many people ignored the warning believing it to be another practice drill. A total of forty-six bombs were dropped on the towns including two that smashed through the glass roof of the Drill Shed at the Chatham Royal Naval Barracks, shattering it into thousands of deadly shards, showering the hundreds of helpless seamen below, before exploding on the solid floor. Many of those who were not killed or injured in the explosion were cut to shreds by the flying glass. One-hundred and thirty men were killed and over ninety injured; the most casualties in Britain caused by bombs on a single target during the war. Further casualties were suffered from bombs that fell on the Dockyard and the Great Lines.

[pg6]The end of the First World War saw a rapid decline of Chatham’s military and naval establishment. The Dockyard, which by 1918 was employing over 11,000 people was particularly badly affected with the cancellation of orders for the building of many ships and submarines no longer required leading to the laying-off of thousands of workers.

Chatham’s Army garrison was also greatly run-down as thousands of conscripts were demobbed, Local forts and defences were abandoned, and barracks emptied. However, there was some new investment at the Chatham Infantry Barracks where many of the original 18th century buildings were demolished to be replaced with modern barrack accommodation. The barracks were taken over by the Royal Engineers and re-named as Kitchener Barracks in honour of the late Minister of War and former student at the Chatham School of Military Engineering, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener who had drowned at sea in the Great War. Fort Pitt Military Hospital was closed in 1919 and in the 1930s work began on the demolition of much of the original fort to make way for the construction of a new Girls Grammar School.

When war eventually broke-out again in 1939, many of the old Napoleonic and Victorian era forts were adapted for new roles. Fort Luton became the Gun Operations Room for the 27th Anti-Aircraft Brigade covering the Thames and Medway District; the gun emplacements at Fort Borstal were converted to house the 4.5-inch guns of the 166 City of Rochester Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery; Fort Horsted also mounted anti-aircraft guns; Fort Bridgewoods became a secret out-station of Bletchley Park intercepting coded German wireless transmissions and the tunnels at Fort Amherst were taken over by the Civil Defence for use as their Medway Headquarters. The dockyard boasted its own battalion of the Home Guard membership of which eventually became compulsory for all male dockyard workers making it the largest single battalion in Kent. The old defence works of the Chatham Lines were augmented with new gun positions, trenches, anti-tank obstacles and pillboxes and a comprehensive anti-invasion plan was drawn-up for the Chatham Garrison. The Chatham and Rochester Home Guard battalions were an integral part of this plan and were tasked with manning most of the area’s 600 plus roadblocks as well as anti-tank and anti-aircraft gun positions.

These later anti-invasion measures have been the subject of recent research by members of the Kent Defence Research Group which has involved fieldwork to discover and record the sites and any remains of the defences, and research of the War Diaries of the Chatham Garrison and other relevant documents stored at the National Archives at Kew and the Royal Engineers Library and Museum at Brompton. The results of this research are recorded in this report.

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Prelude to War

When Britain declared war on Germany in September 1939, it came as no surprise to most people in this country. Such a conflict had been predicted, feared and expected ever since Hitler came to power in 1933. Following the military re-occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, the British Chiefs-of-Staff began planning for a war with Germany which they assumed might break-out in the latter apart of 1939. The risks of a seaborne invasion of Great Britain were regarded to be negligible but the great fear was that the country could be defeated by air attack alone. The ‘Munich Crisis’ of 1938 prompted an increase in Civil Defence, as well as military anti-aircraft, activity. Within Medway district this saw the establishment of some public air raid shelters in open spaces near to housing estates, town centres, military sites and the Dockyard, together with the arming of the anti-aircraft gun battery sites. The aircraft manufacturer, Short Bros., also began the construction of a huge network of air-raid shelters, tunnelled into the cliffs behind its seaplane works along the Medway in Rochester, to protect its workforce there in the event of air-raids.

In April 1939, a contract was awarded to the Francois Cementation Company for the construction of a ‘bomb-proof’ underground Chatham Area Combined Headquarters on the Lower Lines at Gillingham, for the use of all three Services in wartime. Construction work commenced in May 1939 and was completed in December 1939 at a total cost of £25,000[fn1.1]TNA, ADM 1/10956, Admiralty – Chatham Area Combined Headquarters: estimate of costs, Vice-Admiral, The Nore to Secretary of the Admiralty, 4 Apr 1939.[/fn].

With bitter memories of the 1917 Drill Shed bombing at the Chatham Royal Naval Barracks still fresh in the minds of the naval commanders, the decision was taken to dig a series of tunnels into the chalk cliff-face under Cumberland Road, to the rear of the seamen’s barrack blocks. The excavations were carried out by Welsh miners and on completion formed three interconnected tunnels which would serve to protect the barrack population from air-raids. Similarly, a ‘Deep Refuge’ was constructed underneath Dock Road, to serve the Royal Marines Medway and Melville Barracks.

As a result of the Munich Agreement of September 1938 Germany annexed the Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia without a shot being fired. Hitler had stated that to be his last territorial demand. However, in March 1939, with the Czech frontier defences now in German hands, Hitler’s forces marched into Prague unopposed and absorbed the rest of the country into the Greater German Reich. The Nazi dictator’s eyes now turned to Poland. The Versailles Treaty of 1919 that formally ended the Great War had seen the restoration of the Polish nation as an independent state at the expense of Russia, Germany, and the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. It had however left several anomalies particularly with many German nationals now finding themselves left living in a ‘foreign’ land. The ancient former German port of Danzig had become a ‘Free City’ under the care of the League of Nations but stranded within a corridor of now Polish territory separating the bulk of Germany from the state of East [pg8]Prussia which had voted to remain part of Germany as the result of a plebiscite held in 1920. Poland had insisted on its right to the corridor to allow it access to the Baltic Sea, without which it could not consider itself truly independent. This division of the German nation was something Hitler could not tolerate, and he used the inevitable unrest of the German population of Danzig as a pretext to threaten Poland.

European tensions increased in the last weeks of August 1939 as it became apparent that war was imminent. In Chatham, military preparations were already well in hand with the army’s Area HQ, based at Kitchener Barracks, opening its War Diary on 22 August in which, two days later, it records guards from the Royal Engineers Training Battalion being posted to several ‘Vulnerable Points’ (VP’s) in the area including, the new Combined HQ on the Lower Lines, the RAF 16 Group HQ on Black Lions Field, Gillingham, Rochester Bridge, and the Chatham and Gillingham railway tunnels. Then on 25 August, as an indication of the growing crisis, a message was received at the Chatham Area HQ from the Commander-in-Chief of The Nore Command, Admiral Sir Henry Brownrigg: ‘Information has been received that orders have been given for Coast Defences to be placed on War footing’. On 31 August another message from Admiral Brownrigg informed Area HQ that the Fleet had been mobilized. That same day the War Office decided to mobilize the whole of the Regular Army Reserve.[fn1.2]TNA, WO 166/1195, War Office – Home Forces- War Diaries – Chatham Area Headquarters, August 1939.[/fn]

On Friday 1 September, Germany invaded Poland. Chatham Area HQ immediately moved from Kitchener Barracks to a more protected location in the Caveyard tunnels at Fort Amherst, from where it issued orders to all stations and units in the Chatham Area to put full P.A.D. [Passive Air Defence] measures into operation ready to minimize the effects of any enemy air attack. Orders were also given for the evacuation of all military married families from Chatham to commence which was completed by the following day.[fn1.3]Ibid, September 1939.[/fn]

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[fg]Kitchener Barracks, and the Caveyard within the area of Fort Amherst (KCC Heritage Maps)[/fg]

At 1100, on Sunday 3 September Britain declared War on Germany. Earlier that day the Air Ministry had ordered the permanent manning of all anti-aircraft defences and just 25 minutes after the Declaration of War they were ready for action in Chatham when a ‘Red’ air-raid warning was received.[fn1.4]Ibid.[/fn] Fortunately, the warning proved to be a false alarm but this was just the first of hundreds which would be received in Chatham over the following few years, most of which would prove to be anything but false and as many feared could even signal the prelude to an invasion which could soon see the Medway Towns under attack from enemy ground forces.

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Chatham’s ‘Phoney War’ (September 1939 - April 1940)

The outbreak of war signalled the commencement of a period of frenetic activity in the various naval and military establishments at Chatham. Reservists arrived at their depots where they were assigned to various units and postings, home and abroad, Naval reservists reporting for duty at HMS ‘Pembroke’, the RN barracks and manning depot for the Nore Command, were sent on to their ships or shore stations and the Royal Marines at their Medway and Melville Barracks on Dock Road were assigned likewise. The School of Military Engineering (S.M.E.) at Brompton Barracks also served as the Royal Engineers Depot, with sappers now arriving there from all over the country.

As well as the reservists, Chatham had to cope with thousands of new recruits called up under the National Service Act which had come into force on the outbreak of war. The rapid influx of all these men put a severe strain on the existing barrack accommodation. To relieve this situation, temporary hutted camps sprang up all around the military and naval estates. One such camp was built just off Medway Road to accommodate personnel working in the nearby underground Combined Headquarters on the Lower Lines while at the Royal Naval barracks, the East Camp, which had been constructed as temporary barrack accommodation in the First World War was completely rebuilt to serve a similar purpose in the new conflict. Wartime aerial photographs also show huts at St Mary’s Barracks and on the parade ground at Kitchener Barracks.

[fg]1946 aerial view (Google Earth / KCC)[/fg]

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Although there were these multitude of men arriving in Chatham, most of them were only ‘passing through’ on their way to their various postings or, as with the new recruits, undergoing basic training before leaving to join to ships or units around the country. It may seem surprising that such an important military and naval base as Chatham had no resident regular infantry battalion for its defence. On 3 September 1939, the Chatham Garrison consisted of the Depot Battalion of the Royal Engineers at Brompton and whichever men could be spared from the Royal Army Service Corps (R.A.S.C.) at Southill Barracks, the Royal Army Ordnance Corps (R.A.O.C.) depot at the Gun Wharf, and the Royal Marines barracks.

[fg]The Dock Road, & Melville RM Barracks, the Gun Wharf, and Kitchener (Chatham) Barracks. (TNA ADM 269/28)[/fg]

The garrison Commanding Officer or ‘Officer Commanding Troops, Chatham’, at that time was 59-year-old Colonel Ernest Mackintosh R.E., who had been called out of retirement on the outbreak of war and appointed Commandant of the S.M.E.[fn2.1]TNA, WO 199/77, War Office – Home Forces - General Headquarters – Defence of Special Installations – Defence of Naval Establishments (Mar 1941-Jun 1942) – Appendix, Chronological summary of changes in Military Command at Chatham [Aug 1939 – Mar 1941].[/fn] Mackintosh had originally retired from the Army in 1933 and had taken up the post as a Director and Secretary of the Science Museum. When war broke out in September 1939 the Science Museum closed leaving Mackintosh free to resume his Army career.[fn2.2]Mackintosh, Colonel Ernest Elliot Buckland – Who’s Who & Who Was Who online (https://doi.org/10.1093/ww/9780199540884.013.U240203).[/fn]

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[fg]Colonel Ernest Mackintosh as Secretary of the Science Museum in 1937 (NPG x22911)[/fg]

The Chatham Garrison was responsible for the defence of Chatham Sector which also included, Gillingham, Rochester and Strood. The Sector was part of the Chatham Area of the army’s Eastern Command. Chatham Area encompassed all the Medway towns, the Isle of Sheppey, the Hoo Peninsula, and both sides of the Thames Estuary as far as Gravesend and Tilbury. The Area was commanded by another 59-year-old officer who had been brought out of retirement, Major-General Arthur Goschen R.A.[fn2.3]TNA, WO 199/77, Ibid.[/fn] One of Goschen’s first acts was to separate the Garrison HQ from his own at the cramped Caves at Kitchener Barracks, and moving it to the Main Building at S.M.E. The Garrison HQ functioned there as a separate office but under Goschen’s watchful eye.[fn2.4]TNA, WO 166/1195, War Office – Home Forces - War Diaries – Chatham Area Headquarters, September 1939.[/fn] Then on 4 October, Goschen moved his Area HQ to more comfortable accommodation at the Married Quarters at Kitchener Barracks.[fn2.5]Ibid, October 1939[/fn]

[fg]Maj-Gen Arthur Goschen (NPG x167892)[/fg]

[pg13]On the 7 October, Chatham received some much-welcomed infantry reinforcements when the 120 men of ‘B’ Company, No, 3 Group, National Defence Companies were transferred from Maidstone to Chatham, where they were accommodated at the Drill Hall on Boundary Road.[fn2.6]TNA, WO 166/1214, War Office, Home Forces – War Diaries – Home Counties Area Headquarters, October 1939.[/fn] The National Defence Companies (N.D.C.) were established in 1936 as part of the Territorial Army Reserve, the companies were formed on a county or city basis, each being linked to their local Territorial battalion. Enlistment began on 1st September 1936 and was open to ‘ex-members of His Majesty's Forces, normally between the ages of 45 and 60 years’. Their role was stated to be ‘to protect important points in Great Britain when war is threatening or has actually broken out, but members of the force will not be called up until these conditions arise, nor will they be called up on account of civil disturbance’. At the outbreak of the war No. 3. Group, which was linked with the East Surrey Regiment, had been assigned by Home Counties Area HQ to Maidstone. In November 1939 the N.D.C. were formed into Home Defence battalions attached to their local regiments. No.3. Group then became the 8th (H.D.) Battalion, East Surrey Regiment. [A very good and well researched explanation of the organisation and role of the N.D.C. can be found here: https://ww2talk.com/index.php?threads/national-defence-companies-territorial-army-reserve.70149./]

With the surrender of Poland in early October 1939, the war on land came to pause. The German forces needed time to recover, re-group and re-arm before embarking on any new major offensive in the West and any action against the Allies would have to be restricted to aerial bombing, U-boat action, and possible limited ground attack raids. Although such raids from the sea had not been ruled out. the main threat to the UK at this time was perceived to be from airborne landings with paratroopers seizing and securing airfields ready for further troop reinforcements to be flown in and fanning out to attack and destroy ‘Vulnerable Points’ before returning to the captured airfield to be flown back home. On 28 October Chatham Area HQ received a warning from the Royal Navy’s C-in-C of the Nore Command that such an attack in the immediate future was ‘a strong possibility’.[fn2.7]TNA, WO 166/1195, Ibid.[/fn] Two days later, after receiving further warnings of parachute landings by enemy forces from the Area Combined HQ,[fn2.8]Ibid.[/fn] Chatham Area HQ issued instructions for two platoons (about 50 men) of Royal Marines to secure the Short Bros. aerodrome at Rochester where they would be under the orders of Commander, Chatham Garrison.[fn2.9]Ibid - Appendix ‘B’, Operation Instruction No.1, 30 May 1939[/fn] Fortunately this ‘scare’ was short-lived and, although warnings and reports of approaching enemy aircraft continued to be issued throughout November and December, Chatham managed to survive 1939 relatively unscathed.

The early months of 1940 continued the period that had become known in Britain as ‘The Phoney War’. Although there was some action at sea, there was little activity on land and, surprisingly to many, little activity in the air.

[pg14]However, on the home front, Britain was braced for an all-out German air attack. In Chatham, as in the rest of the country, air raid precautions were rigorously imposed and, although the much-feared danger of massed aerial attack did not immediately materialise, people still had to abide by a host of government restrictions. Conscription, food rationing and the use of public transport for military purposes combined to make the 'Phoney War' a time of discomfort and anti-climax for many residents.

During January, February and March, despite numerous warnings being received, the expected heavy air-raids failed to materialise over Chatham. Other reports of sightings of strange flashes and signals emanating from across the area, and encounters with suspicious characters proved to be of no consequence, but were good indications that tensions were still high.

On 3 April 1940, the War Office approved a separate establishment for Headquarters, Chatham Garrison which would proceed to function from then on with its own Garrison Adjutant, Garrison Sergeant-Major, three civilian clerks and an Orderly. The Commandant of the S.M.E., Brigadier Mackintosh, continued as Officer Commanding Troops Chatham and Major Norman Finlinson of the South Staffordshire Regiment was appointed Garrison Adjutant.[fn2.10]TNA, WO 166/1338, War Office – Home Forces – War Diaries – Chatham Garrison Headquarters, April 1940.[/fn]

On 9 April Germany invaded Norway and Denmark, opening a new front in the war. Some British units that were destined to join the British Expeditionary Force in France were hastily re-deployed to fight in Norway, thus signalling the end of the ‘Phoney War’.[pg15]

Braced for Invasion (May - December 1940)

Early threats

On 3 May 1940, with Allied forces still engaging the German invaders in Norway, Chatham Garrisson welcomed a new commander: Colonel Douglas ffrench-Mullen R.E. relieving Brigadier Mackintosh as Officer Commanding, Troops Chatham.[fn3.1]TNA, WO 199/77, War Office – Home Forces - General Headquarters - Defence of Special Installations – Defence of Naval Establishments (Mar 1941-Jun 1942) – Appendix, Chronological summary of changes in Military Command at Chatham [Aug 1939 – Mar 1941].[/fn] Mackintosh remained as Commandant of the S.M.E.

On 10 May German forces invaded Holland, Luxembourg and Belgium and began their advance through the Ardennes to cross the border into France. The B.E.F. in France immediately began its pre-arranged move from its defensive positions in France to confront the Germans in Belgium. There was now genuine concern that the Germans could also now mount a surprise assault on Britain, using airborne forces flying in from captured Dutch airfields.

The German attack on Holland had included landings by parachute troops, some of whom had worn Dutch uniforms to confuse their opponents. Fearing a repeat of this tactic using paratroopers dressed in British uniforms, Eastern Command HQ issued a warning, received at Chatham Garisson HQ by teleprinter on the morning of the 11 May, that:

… any men so dropped should be treated as Enemy and engaged by nearest troops with all available weapons and with the utmost ruthlessness. … All troops will act as if in contact with the Enemy, maintaining constant vigilance, and standing to act at Dusk and Dawn.[fn3.2]TNA, WO 166/1338, War Office – Home Forces – War Diaries – Chatham Garrison Headquarters, May 1940.[/fn]

The same day, Garrison HQ ordered all roadblocks to be made-ready, for all guards on ‘Vulnerable Points’ to be warned to keep a ‘special look out’ for enemy parachutists, and that all troops ‘earmarked for action’ should standby at two-hours’ notice. In addition to these measures, all Ranks were confined to barracks until further notice.[fn3.3]Ibid.[/fn]

Further measures were put into place the following day: all leave was cancelled and personnel already on leave were recalled to barracks. Garrison HQ also ordered that all ranks travelling in private vehicles outside the Garrison area were to be in possession of either a rifle or pistol, and ammunition.[fn3.4]Ibid.[/fn]

Tensions increased over the following days, as the German forces completed their conquest of Holland and continued their advances into Belgium and France. On the evening of 14 May, Secretary of State for War Anthony Eden gave a radio broadcast announcing the formation of the Local Defence Volunteers (L.D.V.) and calling for volunteers to join the force. In the official radio announcement, Eden called on men between the ages of 17 and 65 years in Britain who were not in military service but wished to defend their country against an invasion to enrol in the L.D.V. at their local police station.

Just before midnight on 14 May, Chatham Area HQ warned that an airborne assault on the UK ‘May happen to-night’. Although no assault materialised that night, the state of alert remained high, with Area HQ re-iterating previous[pg16]orders for Garrison troops to be ready to man roadblocks, and for all P.A.D. and anti-gas precautions to be ‘…at a high state of readiness’. In addition, Area HQ ordered Garrison HQ to ‘Make sure all mobile units are ready to move out at immediate notice’.[fn3.5]Ibid.[/fn]

Meanwhile the organisation of the L.D.V. in Kent gathered pace. On 16 May, Admiral Sir Studholme Brownrigg, the recently retired former C-in-C The Nore, accepted an invitation from the L.D.V. Kent Zone Organiser to set-up a North Kent L.D.V Group which would include the Chatham Military Area. Within a matter of days, the L.D.V. had over 1,000 armed men on duty throughout Kent, with many of them in the Medway Towns.[fn3.6]Gulvin, Keith – Kent Home Guard, (North Kent Books, 1980)[/fn]

By 17 May, with all the Dutch ports now in German hands and Antwerp looking likely to fall within days, the UK now faced the additional threat of a seaborne assault. Chatham Area HQ had responsibility for a number of ports including Northfleet and Queenborough and the fear was that German agents may already be hiding within their boundaries ready to aid attempts to seize them either direct by seaborne assault or by glider-borne troops. Area HQ instructed the Customs authorities to make searches of all the ports in the area and for Garrison HQ to provide armed parties to assist in the searches. Garrison HQ were also ordered to send recce parties out to report on any open spaces large enough to be used for landing, by enemy aircraft, within a five-mile radius of a port.[fn3.7]TNA, WO 166/1338, Ibid.[/fn]

By the 22 May, Belgium too was on the brink of surrender and German forces had broken through the French defences at Sedan and were now heading for the Channel ports. The B.E.F. were now in danger of being cut off in their forward positions in Belgium. To forestall this, the B.E.F. began to withdraw to the French border. Meanwhile in the U.K. Eastern Command HQ issued a warning that ‘… special vigilance is necessary for Air and all Sea invasion’.[fn3.8]Ibid.[/fn]

By the 25 May, the majority of the B.E.F. had fallen back on Dunkirk from where its evacuation would begin the next day. That night, Chatham Area HQ ordered all the roadblocks in its area to be put into position with free access allowed to civilian vehicles only after they had been examined and their drivers’ bona fides checked. Orders were also given for 50 percent of all side roads to be prepared for ‘cratering’ and for all open spaces considered suitable for ‘air landings’ to be obstructed.[fn3.9]Ibid.[/fn]

Colonel ffrench-Mullen vacated his short-lived post as Commander, Troops Chatham on 27 May.[fn3.10]TNA, WO 199/77, Ibid.[/fn] Instead, a new ‘Chatham Sub-Area’ was created with Brigadier Mackintosh as its temporary Commander and ffrench-Mullen as his assistant. At the same time the R.E. Depot Battalion was also re-organised into three separate battalions.[fn3.11]TNA, WO 166/1338, Ibid.[/fn]

On 31 May Chatham Area HQ reported that the:

Chiefs of Staff consider attack on this Country imminent. All defences should be manned during hours of darkness. Works on defence to be accelerated. Enemy may employ large fleet[pg17]fast motor boats up to 200 carrying about 100 men each for seaborne raid on large scale. These boats could make passage of North Sea during hours of darkness and considerable force could be landed at many points on coast simultaneous with airborne raids inland.[fn3.12]Ibid.[/fn]

To counter such raids Chatham Area HQ ordered that ‘…all ranks shall stand to at dawn and dusk.’[fn3.13]Ibid.[/fn]

By the 3 June the evacuation of the B.E.F. from Dunkirk was almost complete. However, they had left behind in France all their motor transport, armour, field artillery and most of their anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns together with masses of stores, ammunition and other equipment. With Germany in control of almost all the Channel Ports, Britain now faced the threat of a full-scale invasion, something it was ill-prepared and poorly equipped to face.

XII Corps had been formed in early June, under the command of Lt. Gen Andrew Thorne, to provide troops for the defence of Kent and Sussex. Its major formations comprised of just two infantry divisions and three artillery regiments whose main elements were positioned nearer the coast to counter a sea-borne invasion, leaving little spare to defend inland areas.

In Chatham, the S.M.E. and R.E. Depot were now deemed to be a ‘fighting organisation’ with defence considerations to be given priority in all respects. The Headquarters, S.M.E., Headquarters, Troops Chatham, and the office of Commandant S.M.E and R.E. Depot were completely merged into a single Sub-Area HQ, under the command of the Commandant of the S.M.E., Brigadier Mackintosh14 To counter an enemy attack the only troops in the garrison available to Mackintosh were the three newly formed R.E. Depot battalions all of which included men still undergoing training, and even these were not full-strength battalions in the traditional sense. A Regular army infantry battalion in the Second World War would normally consist of just over 800 ‘Other Ranks’. Of the three R.E. battalions available to Mackintosh: No.1. (S.M.E.) Battalion had just 50, including five ‘untrained’; No.2. (Field Branch) Battalion had 184, including 109 ‘untrained’; and No.3. (Lines of Communication) Battalion had 490 but 410 of these were ‘untrained’. So, in total there were only 724 men readily available for the defence of Chatham in early June.[fn3.14]TNA, WO 166/1272, War Office – Home Forces – General Headquarters – War Diaries – Chatham Sub-Area Headquarters, June 1940.[/fn] Other than these Mackintosh would need to rely on whatever R.A.S.C., R.A.O.C., R.N. and Royal Marines personnel were available at that time.

The R.E.’s were also responsible for preparing the various ‘defence works’ that were now hastily being undertaken. These included the digging of trenches and anti-tank ditches, construction of pillboxes and gun emplacements, the provision of roadblock and anti-tank obstacles, preparation of roads for cratering and bridges for demolition, and the strengthening of some houses and other structures to convert them into ‘fortified buildings’. Some of this work would obviously entail accessing private property which would have to be handled with some sensitivity. On 4 June, Chatham Area HQ issued instruction to all units involved:[pg18]… that if it is necessary to enter [a] private house to establish defensive work, as little inconvenience as possible must be caused to occupants and in all cases police should be consulted and accompany officer wishing to enter house.[fn3.16]Ibid.[/fn]

Consideration also had to be given to denying the enemy the use of railway lines as an alternative route for tanks avoiding roadblocks. The Southern Railway’s Chief Engineer was requested to keep permanently on a siding close to Rochester Bridge, six wagons each filled with 20 tons of ballast and, when a state of emergency was declared, to make arrangements for an engine to be kept with ‘steam-up’ ready to shunt them onto Rochester Bridge where, on receipt of the codeword ‘BLOCK’, they would be tipped over to block the up and down lines to any movement from the direction of Chatham.[fn3.17]Ibid, Appendix ‘B’.[/fn]

Some of the numerous roadblocks that were being constructed would be specifically designed as anti-tank obstacles, with a pillbox to provide covering fire. Unfortunately, with most of the Army’s anti-tank guns left abandoned in France, this covering fire would have to come from Bren guns and ‘Boys’ A/T rifles; the latter having already proved ineffective against German armour.

[fg]Men of the 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers practise firing their Boys anti-tank rifles on the beach near Etaples, France 6 February 1940 (IWM F2441)[/fg]

On 5 June, the Commander Chatham Area, Maj-General Goschen, issued an instruction that these pillboxes should be designed so they were capable of housing a 2-pounder A/T gun should any become available at a later date.[fn3.18]Ibid, Appendix ‘F’.[/fn]

With the shortage of infantry troops. and field and A/T artillery causing great concern, attention was soon drawn to the comparatively rich resources of AA Command. The 3.7-inch anti-aircraft gun had already demonstrated its anti-tank[pg19]value in France and the Bofors LAA gun could also be used with anti-tank ammunition.[fn3.19]Dobinson, Colin – AA Command, (Methuen, 2001), p.204-206.[/fn] In addition to the gun crews themselves there were also searchlight battery crews and HQ staff who could be found alternative fighting duties in an emergency.

There were several gun batteries and associated units of the 6th Anti-Aircraft Division based in the Chatham Area that, when not engaged in their primary roles, were instructed to act under the instructions of Sub-Area Commanders for duties in connection with action against enemy ground forces. While the gun crews engaged tanks and other ground targets, the searchlight crews and HQ staff would form mobile columns to assist with the manning of some of the roadblocks in their vicinity.[fn3.20]TNA, WO 166/1272, Ibid, Appendix ‘J’.[/fn] These units included the HQ of the 28th (Heavy) Brigade R.A., based at Fort Luton, and the HQ of the 55th (Heavy) Regiment R.A. based at ‘Watlynge’, a house in Rede Court Road, Strood. The 55th Regiment as comprised of three gun batteries including 163 Battery with its two gun sites at Tower Hill and Fenn Street in Strood and its HQ also at Tower Hill, and 166 (City of Rochester) Battery with its HQ at Fort Clarence and gun sites at Fort Borstal, and at Oak Road, Strood. Each battery was also equipped with four Lewis guns and twenty-four rifles for use against enemy parachutists.[fn3.21]Ibid, Appendix ‘S’.[/fn]

[fg]Fort Borstal, 166 (City of Rochester) HAA Battery [Google Earth / KCC][/fg]

The threat of imminent invasion prompted urgent work to prepare each AA battery and searchlight site as defensive positions with slit trenches, barbed wire cordons, and pillboxes, converting each site into a self-contained strong point.[fn3.22]Dobinson, Ibid.[/fn]

Further reinforcements were made available to Chatham Sub-Area when, on 11 June, the Headquarters and all personnel of the 8th Battalion East Surrey[pg20](HD) Regiment who were employed on guarding V.Ps in the Chatham Area under the control of Area HQ, were transferred to the command of Officer Commanding Troops, Chatham.[fn3.23]TNA, WO 166/1272, Ibid, Appendix ‘K’.[/fn]

On 13 June, Colonel ffrench-Mullen, who was now Acting Commander, Chatham Sub-Area following Brigadier Mackintosh’s return to his post at the Science Museum, issued ‘Operation Instruction No. 4.’, which was a basic defence plan for the Sub-Area. It outlined the units that came under the command of O.C. Troops, Chatham which were the three R.E. Depot Battalions, and the 8th (H.D. Battalion, East Surrey Regiment. In addition, about 1,000 boys of the Army Technical School (A.T.S.) at Fort Darland, Gillingham were put under his command.[fn3.24]Ibid, Appendix ‘’N’.[/fn] These were boys aged between 14 and 18 who were at the school learning trades before joining the Royal Engineers. The boys were selected from successful competitors at an entrance examination held twice a year under arrangement by the War Office and were enlisted as apprentice tradesmen for a term of eight years with the Colours and four years with the Reserve. When they reach the age of 18 years, the boys were posted to the ranks of the Royal Engineers as sappers, joining a training battalion to be trained in drill, musketry, and field works.[fn3.25]The Times - Training Tradesmen for the Army, 26 Jul 1939.[/fn] It is unclear just what role these young men were expected to play in resisting a German attack!

The troops of the Chatham Garrison were to be supported by the artillery units of the 6th AA Division based in the Sub-Area which, when not engaging enemy aircraft, would provide effective ground fire against enemy forces. Additional support would come from Royal Navy ships at sea and personnel on land, while the RAF would provide air cover over the whole Sub-Area. The newly formed L.D.V. units would also play an important part in the defence plan.[fn3.26]TNA, WO 166/1272, Appendix ‘N’.[/fn]

The intention of the troops was stated to be:

a) To hold centres of resistance and to defend vital areas within the SUB-AREA until other formations arrive to assist in the defeat of the enemy.

b) To attack the enemy as soon as he lands by sea or air with such mobile forces as it is possible to organise.[fn3.27]Ibid.[/fn]

Guards from the R.E. Depot Battalions and the 8th East Surreys were to be mounted on all the V.Ps in the Sub Area which included Chatham Post Office, Fort Bridgewoods (the fort had been operating as a Military Wireless Interception Station, part of the ‘Y’ Service, since 1926 and was now a vital out-station of the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park), Rochester Bridge, the Naval W/T Station at Beacon Hill, and railway tunnel vents on the Great Lines.[fn3.28]Ibid.[/fn]

Roadblocks were to be established on the Brompton Road in Gillingham, the Sally Port at Brompton, at Church Hill and Luton Arches in Chatham, on Rochester Bridge, and at the gates leading to Fort Bridgewoods.[fn3.29]Ibid.[/fn]

Three ‘Mobile Groups’ drawn from the R.E. Depot Battalions were earmarked to go to the defence of Rochester Airport, with its Short Bros aircraft factory,[pg21]and the Shorts seaplane landing area and its adjacent factory by the River Medway at Rochester.[fn3.30]Ibid.[/fn]

[fg]Short Bros Seaplane Works (Shorts Archive)[/fg]

The ‘Inner Defence’ of Chatham would be based on the line of the 18th and 19th Century ditch fortifications that extended from the River Medway at the Gun Wharf, around to the Eastern end of the Dockyard. The line would act as an ideal A/T obstacle and would be prepared for defence to form a ‘last ditch’ behind which the Garrison would defend the Dockyard and Naval Barracks area. The bridges across the ditch at the R.E. Electrical School and on Khyber Road would be prepared for demolition as part of the defence plan.[fn3.31]Ibid.[/fn]

[pg22]

[fg]The bridges (highlighted) over the A/T Ditch at the R.E. Electrical School and Khyber Road (KCC Heritage Maps)[/fg]

The following day, 14 June, General Instructions were issued for the siting, construction and manning of roadblocks:

1. SITING AND CONSTRUCTION

a) SITING

Blocks must be sited so that a vehicle approaching a block cannot easily get off the road and round the block. They should, where possible, be sited round a corner or bend so that the approaching vehicle does not see the block until it is close to the block and under the fire of the defences.

b) COVERING FIRE

Blocks must be sited so that they can be covered by fire whatever the position of the approaching vehicle. The covering fire must be from the flank at a distance beyond that which a hand grenade thrown from the vehicle can reach. The covering fire positions must be concealed from air and ground observation as far as possible.

c) BUILDINGS

When possible the block should be sited between buildings where the enemy vehicle cannot get off the road and where the “Molotov” bomb party can be posted on the enemy side of the block.

d) CONSTRUCTION

(i) The blocking material will be stagger for ed to allow the passage of vehicles at a slow pace when the block is open for “searching”. A space of 50 ft. will be left between the two barriers.

(ii) Material must be available at hand at one, or preferably both, barriers when it is required to close the block completely for defence.

2. MANNING

Manning comes under two headings.

a) SEARCH BLOCK[pg23]When the road is only half closed for stopping vehicles and pedestrians for investigation.

b) DEFENCE BLOCK

When the road is fully closed, on receipt of orders code-word, as defence against enemy attack in lorries and light A.F.Vs [A.F.Vs – Armoured Fighting Vehicles] penetrating behind our forward lines.

3. ORDERS RE MANNING OF SEARCH BLOCK

a) Sentry posts will be established on each side of the block. They will consist of not less then two men. Under no circumstances will a single sentry be put out. While one sentry is identifying the person the other will stand by to take action should there be any signs of hostile action by the individual undergoing questioning.

b) All vehicles and pedestrians will be stopped by challenge and by using warning light (or other local arrangements) for vehicles.

c) Identification Cards for all pedestrians and drivers and passengers of vehicles will be examined and they will be questioned as to their movements. For public service vehicles i.e., buses and coaches, only drivers’ and conductors’ Identification Cards need be examined but passengers should be checked over.

d) A rapid search will be made of all vehicles for articles of a military or suspicious nature.

e) If there is no doubt about the bona fides of any person or vehicle they wil be allowed to proceed.

f) If there is any doubt about any individual he will be held by force if necessary and a message sent to Headquarters of the Unit and, if possible, to local police. He will not be released until authority has been given by Unit Headquarters.

g) Any pedestrians or vehicle failing to stop on challenge will be fired on.

4. ORDERS RE MANNING OF DEFENCE BLOCKS

a) On receipt of orders or code-word the block will be closed right across the road.

b) METHOD OF DEFENCE

(i) Small arms and A/Tk. Rifles

Positions will be sited so that fire will be brought to bear from the flank at close range but not within grenade throwing range.

(ii) “Molotov” Bombs

A small party should be sited in a well concealed cover, e.g., on first floor of building, on one or both sides of the road on the enemy side of the block. Positions should be chosen so that when the enemy A.F.V. stops at the block, the “Molotov” bottles can be thrown on to the rear of the tank.

c) UN-IDENTIFIED VEHICLES OR PERSONS

(i) On approach, any vehicle or pedestrian, un-identifiable as hostile at once, will be challenged. Should they not halt at once fire will be opened.

(ii) Pedestrians will be told to put their hands up and approach the barrier for identification.

(iii) Vehicles – Drivers and all passengers will be told to dismount and approach the barrier singly with their hands up for identification. After identification of passengers, the vehicle will then be examined. The guard will keep the vehicle and barrier under observation the whole time ready to fire at any sign of hostile intention.

[pg24](iv)

Passage through barrier – No vehicle will be allowed through the barrier without a written permit from Headquarters.

d) HOSTILE VEHICLES AND PERSONS

Vehicles or men identified as, or suspected of being, hostile, i.e., by their opening fire or failing to stop when challenged, will be engaged with vigour by the defence. Light A.F.V. (armoured cars or light tanks) will be attacked with “Molotov” bombs and by fire at close range.

Fire will not be opened, thereby disclosing the position, until the A.F.V. is close to the barrier. Small Arms Fire against A.F.Vs. is effective, causing the tank to be closed up, partially “blinding” the crew. Bullets, and also their splash when they hit, can enter loop-holes etc., and bullets should also be fired at the tracks of the tank to damage and jam them.

Other locally made devices such as: -

(i) Blankets soaked in petrol and set on fire

(ii) Jamming tank tracks from the side with a piece of strong iron rail, or

(iii) Home-made bombs are also effective.[fn3.32]Ibid, Appendix ‘O’.[/fn]

[fg]Home Guard setting up a roadblock ‘somewhere in England’ 1940 (IWM H15191)[/fg]

On 14 June 1940 Brigadier Rawdon Briggs R.E., acting as the designated Commander of Chatham Sub-Area, and Officer Commanding Troops, Chatham, issued ‘Operation Instruction No.5.’ which set out arrangements for the defence of Rochester Airport, Shorts Seaplane Works at Rochester, Rochester Bridge[pg25]and Aylesford Bridge. Responsibility for the latter had recently been transferred from Maidstone Sub-Area. Defence of the three Rochester sites was to be the responsibility of No.3. (Line of Communications Branch) Depot Battalion R.E., with additional troops allotted from No.3. Troop, 220 Searchlight Battery along with two naval units consisting of one troop of two officers and fifty ratings equipped with two 12-pounder guns and four Lewis guns, and one troop of one officer and sixty ratings equipped with two 4-inch guns and three Lewis guns. Both naval units would be transported by the R.A.S.C. Whilst the 4-inch gun troop were detailed to the defence of Aylesford Bridge, the primary role of the 12-pounder gun troop would be the defence of Rochester Airport and its Short Brothers bomber factory from a base at Fort Horsted, while its alternative role would be the defence of Rochester Bridge from sites within the grounds of Rochester Castle.[fn3.33]Ibid, Appendix ‘P/2’.[/fn]

[fg]1946 aerial image of Rochester Airport the Shorts aircraft factory and nearby forts (Google Earth / KCC)[/fg]

The naval units would supplement the existing defence arrangements currently being carried out at Rochester Airport by a detachment of 126 Electrical & Mechanical Company R.E. and a detachment of No.3. Troop, 220 Searchlight Battery, with four Lewis guns between them. These detachments were also tasked with providing a security guard for the Fort Bridgewoods ‘Y’ Station. Another detachment from the Searchlight Troop was detailed to defend the Short Bros Seaplane Works alongside the River Medway at Rochester.[fn3.34]Ibid.[/fn]

Detailed defence schemes for all the sites were to be prepared detailing the garrison required, orders for occupation, and plans for defence. The schemes[pg26]would be sufficiently comprehensive to allow them to be handed over to any unit called upon to undertake the defence, with the minimum of explanation. Arrangements were to be immediately made for the manning of all defensive positions, not already manned, from those units responsible for that purpose.[fn3.35]Ibid.[/fn]

The following day, 15 June, work commenced on strengthening the defences of the Inner Lines at Brompton. The work, including the construction of gun emplacements to be manned by RN personnel, was expected to take up to ten days to complete. Orders were also issued for all ‘tank-proof’ roadblocks, once completed, to be half-closed and manned each night.[fn3.36]TNA, WO 166/1272, War Office – Home Forces – General Headquarters – War Diaries – Chatham Sub-Area Headquarters, June 1940.[/fn]

On 17 June, Brigadier Briggs was officially appointed Commander, Chatham Sub-Area, Officer Commanding Troops, Chatham, and Commandant of the S.M.E. and R.E. Depot, Chatham.[fn3.37]TNA, WO 199/77, Ibid.[/fn]

[fg]Brigadier Rawdon Briggs R.E.[/fg]

That same day Briggs issued ‘Operation Instruction No.6.’ which detailed the code words and procedures issued by Chatham Area HQ which were to be used for the activation of road and railway blocks in an emergency. For roadblocks, on receipt from Area HQ of the code word “GRACIE”, the blocks would be put into position, but the roads would not be completely blocked thus allowing legitimate traffic to proceed; on receipt of the code word “FIELDS” the roads were to be completely blocked by felling trees, the use of barbed-wire concertinas, or any other means except cratering.[fn3.38]TNA, WO 166/1272, Ibid, Appendix ‘Q/1’.[/fn]

Instructions were also issued for the execution of orders to demolish the bridges on the Ravelin at the S.M.E. Electrical School and on Khyber Road. The explosives earmarked for these demolitions were currently stored in the[pg27]S.M.E. Explosives Store at Fort Amherst where the Chief Instructor for Fieldworks (C.I.F.) would divide the stores up into the packets required for each demolition. The C.O. of the No.1. Depot Battalion R.E. would then arrange for the explosive packets required for the destruction of the Ravelin bridges to be stored under guard at sites nearer the bridges, and for the demolition parties and their transport to be available at two hours’ notice to execute their missions.[fn3.39]Ibid.[/fn]

On 19 June, Briggs issued ‘Operation Instruction No.8.’ on the ‘Manning of Defences’. Briggs began this Instruction conceding that ‘It was improbable that a serious attack will be made on this country while the Germans are engaged on their present operations in France.’ However, he countered that statement by warning that measures against an ‘unexpected attack’ were still necessary and instructing that preparations of defences and training to counter such an attack should still be prioritised whilst also ensuring that all ranks obtained as much rest as possible during this period.[fn3.40]Ibid, Appendix ‘T’.[/fn]

Briggs highlighted three periods of the day during which he thought likely a surprise German attack could take place:

A. From one hour before Sunrise to Sunset. This period applies equally to both sea-borne and air-borne attacks.

B. At any time during the hours before dawn when there is sufficient moonlight.

C. From Sunset to one hour after Sunset. This period applies to air-borne attacks only, probably confined to attacks on our aerodromes

The Instruction added rather presumptuously, that: ‘Until further orders an attack at any period of the day other than the above need not be considered’.[fn3.41]Ibid.[/fn]

To ensure the troops still received ‘as much rest as possible’, during the danger periods, Briggs ordered that the degree of manning should not exceed one-third the number of troops allotted to any particular task’. These tasks included the defence of Rochester Airport and the Shorts Seaplane Works which would be manned at one-third scale during periods ‘A’ and ‘C’, and only when applicable, period ‘B’. Local roadblocks were to be manned at one-third capacity during period ‘A’ only. In addition, a varying number of roadblocks would also be ‘lightly manned’ for one- or two-hour periods, at various times in order to give any “Fifth Columnists” a sense of insecurity. The Instruction also stated that mobile ‘anti-parachutist’ patrols in the form of one Mobile Group from No.1. Depot Bn R.E. would sleep fully armed and equipped, ready to move out at half-hours’ notice to confront enemy parachute landings.[fn3.42]Ibid.[/fn]

With the above measures in place, should the situation deteriorate to the point where an invasion appeared imminent, the only additional measures that would ned to be taken would be to ‘fully-man’ the defences at Rochester Airport and Shorts Seaplane Works, and to man the roadblocks on main roads throughout the night. Steps would also be taken to ensure that the roadblocks could be [pg28]extended across the entire width of the road in a matter of two to three minutes.[fn3.43]Ibid.[/fn]

Meanwhile, the Local Defence Volunteers were growing in strength, with Admiral Brownrigg’s Chatham L.D.V Company now comprising eight platoons of men. These included platoons based in Chatham itself, Gillingham, Rochester, Rainham, and Strood. In addition, some large local firms had begun to raise platoons of their own for local defence duties. Short Brothers had raised its own platoon which included a one-hundred-strong ‘mobile’ group which could move between its factories as required. Other platoons being raised included one’s from the Kent Electric Power Company, and the Borstal Institute. All these L.D.V. units regularly manned defence posts throughout their respective localities.[fn3.44]Ibid, Appendix ‘U’.[/fn] The Southern Railway also raised their own L.D.V. units, based on major depots and stations, to ‘provide a trained body of its own men to give military protection to all points of importance on the railway network’. The SR engineering department provided ‘strong points’ and rail blocks for use as defence posts by the L.D.V. which could be closed when the signal came through that an invasion had begun. However, these blocks would remain open until the last possible moment so as not to hinder legitimate troop movements over the railway system.[fn3.45]Gulvin, Keith, Ibid.[/fn]

By 23 June, work on the line defending the Dockyard and barracks area at Chatham was progressing well, under the supervision of the R.E. Chief Instructor of Fieldworks. The work was based on the old Ravelin Ditch fortifications of the Chatham Lines running from the Gun Wharf in the South-West, to Gillingham Pier in the North-East. The ditch was being made into a complete anti-tank obstacle throughout its length supplemented with barbed-wire obstacles wherever the ditch itself was not a complete obstacle to infantry. ‘Fields of Fire’ from across the ditch had been cleared and weapons pits and concrete pillboxes and gun emplacements constructed. Roadblocks had also been established and bridge demolitions prepared.[fn3.46]TNA, WO 166/1272, Ibid, Appendix ‘A.1’.[/fn] In conjunction with this work, the G.O.C. Chatham Area, Maj-Gen Goschen, authorised the opening up of the long-sealed former Naval Magazine tunnels that led from the Gun Wharf to the Caveyard at Fort Amherst.[fn3.47]Ibid, War Diary 20 Jun 1940.[/fn]

The plan for the manning of this line was for the Royal Navy to undertake the defence of the portion from the Lower Lines to Gillingham Pier, and for the Royal Marines and No.3. Depot Bn R.E. to defend the line from the Gun Wharf to Fort Amherst. No.1. and No.2. Depot Bns R.E. would undertake the defence of the rest of the line. Reserves would be found from: whatever personnel were available from the three R.E. Depot Battalions after other defence commitments had been met; personnel under the command of O.C. Troops, Chatham who were carrying out defence duties outside the perimeter of the Inner Defence line, who would be withdrawn to within the perimeter when necessary; and all able-bodied officers and men available under command of the Commandant of the[pg29]Army Training School at Fort Darland, who would be withdrawn from the Fort to Brompton Barracks when the situation demanded.[fn3.48]Ibid, Appendix ‘A.1’.[/fn]

‘The Ironside Line’

Following the evacuation of the B.E.F. from Dunkirk and the eventual Fall of France earlier in the month, General Sir William Edmund Ironside, Commander-in-Chief, General Headquarters (GHQ), Home Forces had the un-enviable task of preparing Britain’s anti-invasion defences. To aid his task he was given additional powers and made Chairman of the Home Defence Executive which enabled him to communicate directly with Government departments.

Ironside drew up a plan of defence which was submitted to the War Cabinet on the 25 June 1940. Amongst the plan’s proposals were for the inland areas to be divided into zones consisting of a series of ‘stop’ lines. Despite their name the purpose of these lines was to delay rather than stop German forces allowing time for reinforcements to arrive in sufficient strength to engage the enemy with some reasonable chance of success. Ironside’s plan included a ‘G.H.Q.’ stop line extending, in the south, from Bristol to Maidstone, and in the east from Maidstone through Cambridge to the Wash, and onwards to Richmond in Yorkshire.[fn3.49]Macleod, Col. R. & Kelly, Dennis – The Ironside Diaries 1937-1940, (Constable & Co. Ltd, 1962)[/fn] The G.H.Q. line consisted of observation posts [O.P.s], roadblocks, anti-tank obstacles, pillboxes, barbed wire entanglements, static anti-tank gun emplacements and, where suitable, minefields. This inevitably soon became known as the ‘Ironside Line’. It was also deemed necessary that the fullest use be made of natural obstacles such as waterways. Their bridge crossings were to be heavily defended and prepared with demolition charges to prevent their use by the enemy. Part of the Newhaven to Hoo section of the G.H.Q. Line incorporated the entire length of the River Medway, which was considered a ‘natural’ anti-tank obstacle.

In the event of an invasion, extraordinary powers of arrest, known as ‘Powers of Arrest in Defence of the Realm’, would be granted to the Armed Forces when acting in the course of their duty. Instructions on the use of these powers were issued to all units in the Chatham Sub-Area on 24 June:

a) Powers to arrest without warrant and to detain pending enquiries any person who fails to satisfy the questioner as to his identity or to the purpose for which he is in the place where he is found, provided the member of H,M. Forces has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is about to act in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or Defence of the Realm.

b) No person shall be detained for a period exceeding twenty-four hours except with the authority of an officer of the Police of a rank not lower than that of Inspector, who may authorise up to a period not exceeding forty-eight hours.

c) If such, and an officer of the Police is satisfied that the necessary enquiries cannot be completed within forty-eight hours, a Chief Officer of the Police may authorise further detention for an additional five days.[pg30]d)

Any person detained under this regulation shall be deemed to be in legal custody, and may be detained in any prison, police station, or similar place authorised by the Secretary of State.[fn3.50]TNA, WO 166/1272, Ibid, Appendix ‘A.2’.[/fn]

Further instructions clarifying the grounds and procedure for the arrest of civilians were received HQ Eastern Command on 28 June:

Units and formations report from time to time suspicious persons coming into contact with troops. Reports on such persons may be divided broadly into two categories.

Firstly individuals whose acts, sentiments or antecedents cause their proximity to, or contact with, military personnel to be considered undesirable.

Secondly strangers to the locality who act in a suspicious manner.

With regard to the first category such persons are frequently inhabitants of the locality, and are not likely to attempt to leave it. The Police should, therefore, be consulted and the suspicious acts explained to them before any arrest is made. If the opinion expressed by the Police conflicts with that of the Commander of the Unit or Formation a report should be forwarded immediately to higher authority.

As regards the second category such persons should be arrested at once and handed over to the Civil Police.[fn3.51]Ibid, Appendix ‘A.8’.[/fn]

That same day Brigadier Briggs announced changes in responsibility for the defence of Rochester Bridge and Shorts Seaplane Works. Responsibility for the defence of the bridge would be transferred from No.3. Depot Bn R.E. to No.3. Tunnelling Group R.E. as from 1 July, and responsibility for the defence of the seaplane works would be assumed by the 8th East Surreys from the same date. For operational purposes, these two defences would come under the command of Lt. Col. A. Leadley R.E., who would be responsible for co-ordinating the two defences so that they would become mutually supporting. Briggs also announced that the detachment from the 8th (H.D.) Bn of the Royal West Kent Regiment, which had been defending Rochester Airport, would be withdrawn on 1 July to be replaced by a detachment of similar strength from 126 Electrical & Mechanical (E & M) Company, Royal Engineers.[fn3.52]Ibid, Appendix ‘A.10’.[/fn]

The defence of Rochester Bridge was to be strengthened by some much-welcome reinforcements that had recently allotted to Briggs’s command in the form of a detachment of 15/17 Medium Battery, Royal Artillery consisting of 25 men with two 6-pounder anti-tank guns. Pending the construction of concrete emplacements, the guns would be put into position on temporary mountings at sites selected by the XII Corps Commander, Medium Artillery.[fn3.53]Ibid.[/fn]

On 29 June. Brigadier Briggs completed organising the Sub-Area reserves and reinforcements, which included the formation of three ‘Anti-Parachutist Patrols’, each consisting of one Officer and twelve Other Ranks. These patrols would act as a mobile reserve available to be called-out at one-hours’ notice. In addition, Chatham Area HQ could make available two Platoons and two Machine-gun Sections of Royal Marines ready to be transported at one-hours’ notice to support the defence of Rochester Bridge, Rochester Airport, and the[pg31]Chatham ‘Inner Defences’. XII Corps HQ had also made available a motorised Machine-Gun unit of the 16/5 Lancers, then based at Ightham, to support if required, the troops defending Rochester Airport and Rochester Bridge. Briggs could also call upon support from the armed Royal Navy Motor Patrol Vessels which patrolled the River Medway day and night.[fn3.54]Ibid, Appendix ‘A.12’.[/fn]

When the situation demanded, the ‘Skeleton’ garrison of Rochester Bridge would be reinforced at two-hours’ notice by four Officers and 200 hundred men from No.3. Tunnelling Group, R.E. Also, if necessary, the two mobile Naval 12-pounder anti-tank guns defending Rochester Airport could also be moved to reinforce the troops at the bridge.[fn3.55]Ibid.[/fn]

On 1 July, 179 Tunnelling Coy, R.E. (part of No.3. Tunnelling Group) was moved out from Chatham to Rochester to take over the defence of the bridge and to work on defences. The whole company remained at Rochester for a week, occupying billets in the town whilst they undertook their duties. On 9 July most of the Company returned to Chatham to undertake normal garrison duties, leaving behind a party of 50 men which, along with 40 men and two Officers of the 8th East Surreys, would comprise Rochester’s ‘Skeleton’ garrison, under the command of Lt. Col. Leadley.[fn3.56]TNA, WO 166/3655, War Office - Home Forces – War Diaries – Royal Engineers – 179 Tunnelling Company, Jul - Aug 1940.[/fn]

On 27 July Lt. Col. Leadley was posted away, and Lt. Col. D.M. Thomson took Command of the Rochester Bridge Defences. Throughout July and August, the main bulk of 179 Coy was taken out to Rochester to man the bridge defences during periods considered to be suitable for an enemy invasion, while back in Chatham they continued the work at the Gun Wharf and on an underground shelter at the back of the Company's billets at Pasley Road.[fn3.57]Ibid.[/fn]

Back on 21 July, General Ironside had replaced as C-in-C Home Forces by General Sir Alan Brooke who had his own views on how the ground defence of the United Kingdom should be conducted. He was completely opposed to the concept of static stop-lines situated far inland and placed far more importance on building up strong reserves for mobile operations. These views were reinforced by the fact that the urgency with which many of the stop-lines had been constructed and the use of civilian contractors lacking any military experience meant that many of the pillboxes were sited incorrectly or where they could serve no purpose. Within weeks of his appointment Brooke discarded Ironside’s conventional approach of a linear defence in depth in favour of swift offence with mobile reserves placed well forward near the coast. However, fully implementing these new plans would take considerable time. Not least of the problems facing Brooke was the shortage of high standard motor transport necessary to carry the ‘mobile’ reserves to where they would be needed. Therefore, Brooke had to work with what was already in place, at least in the short-term.

The month of July also saw a change in the name and organisation of the Local Defence Volunteers. Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, been concerned about reports of poor morale and lack of discipline within the L.D.V. These[pg32]problems had been exasperated by the lack of proper uniform and effective weapons being supplied to the volunteers. In the eyes of the War Office and element within the Army, the L.D.V. were nothing more than an ‘armed constabulary’, fit only to man roadblocks and guard V.Ps. Such attitudes clashed with those of most of the volunteers who themselves were veterans of the Great War and saw themselves still as ‘fighting soldiers’ acting in a much more aggressive role. Churchill very much agreed with them and blamed some of the problems on the ‘uninspiring’ name of the L.D.V., and insisted it be changed to ‘The Home Guard’, and on 22 July it was officially renamed as such.[fn3.58]MacKenzie, S.P. - The Home Guard: A Military and Political History, (Oxford University Press, 1995).[/fn] Churchill also saw to it that the Home Guard should actively resist any invading German forces and receive the necessary training and equipment to do so.

The Kent Home Guard units were reorganised into twenty-four ‘general service’ battalions, based on localities, and four ‘utility battalions’: the Kent Bus Battalion, the Kent Electrical Battalion and battalions from the Post Office and the Southern Railway. These battalions had the same organisation as battalions in the Army with each battalion being organised into companies and platoons. Each battalion was eventually numbered with the Chatham battalion designated 12th Kent (Chatham) Bn., Home Guard, and the Rochester battalion 13th Kent (Rochester) Bn., Home Guard. Chatham Dockyard also had its own Home Guard battalion, formed from a Territorial Army AA battery and personnel not called-up for full-time military service. Local aircraft manufacturer, Short Bros. also eventually formed its own HG battalion from workers at its Rochester and Strood factories.[fn3.59]Gulvin, Keith, Ibid.[/fn]

On 12 August, XII Corps HQ issued a new report in line with General Brooke’s preferment for a ‘defence in depth’ scheme for Kent and Sussex. The basis of the scheme was that before any invading force could reach the GHQ Line, they would first need to overcome the beach defences and then they would be confronted by forward Corps and Divisional stop lines. The stop lines were, in turn, interspersed by various defensive ‘fences’ known as ‘Grid Lines’. Such was the enclosed nature of rural Kent with its many rivers, streams, mass of woods, winding roads, and railways running through deep cuttings and over high embankments; that it offered considerable natural barriers to check any rapid German armoured penetration into the inland areas of the county and confine their advances into definite areas where they could be destroyed. The grid line fences were designed to bound these areas and to delay the enemy from crossing into them until reinforcements could arrive to deal with them effectively.[fn3.60]TNA, WO 166/344, War Office – Home Forces – War Diaries – XII Corps HQ – General Staff, ‘Defence in Depth, Grid System’, 12 Aug 1940.[/fn]

The grid lines would also make use of already identified defended localities known as ‘anti-tank islands’ or Nodal Points. These were towns or villages located on major road and / or rail junctions which would be fortified with roadblocks, wire entanglements, pillboxes, and anti-tank gun emplacements. They were classified as either ‘Category A’ or ‘Category B’ Nodal points.[pg33]Category ‘A’ Nodal Points were expected to hold out for seven days in the event of attack, while Category ‘B’ Nodal points were expected to hold out for at least three days. They were provided with sufficient ammunition, food and supplies to last accordingly. Nodal Points also received an increased scale of Civil Defence Services. These services covered:

(1) The supply of water for drinking and firefighting

(2) Fire-fighting apparatus and personnel

(3) ARP personnel and parties

(4) Shelter or trenches for the whole population

(5) The supply of petrol for the fire-fighting appliances

(6) Food supply.[fn3.61]TNA, WO 199/544. War Office – Home Forces – General Headquarters – Keeps and Fortified Villages, Nodal Points, Anti-Tank Islands – Nodal Points, 2 Jun 1941.[/fn]

Because of its strategic and tactical importance, Chatham was designated as a Category ‘A’ Nodal Point. Other examples of Category ‘A’ Nodal Points in Kent included Maidstone, Tonbridge, Ashford, and Canterbury.[fn3.62]Ibid.[/fn]

The ‘Battle of Britain’ was now in full swing with waves of German bombers appearing daily in the skies above Kent. On 9 August, Rochester Airport was bombed, bit little damage was done. However, the bombers returned six days layer and inflicted severe damage on the airfield’s Short Bros. bomber factory, causing production there to be halted for several days.[fn3.63]TNA, WO 166/1195, War Office – Home Forces- War Diaries – Chatham Area Headquarters, Aug 1940.[/fn]

There were fears that an invasion was now imminent, and with his meagre resources stretched to the limit, Maj. Gen. Goschen wrote to XI Corps HQ on 15 August:

… pointing out that the S.M.E and R.E. are gradually resuming their normal functions and that further troops are required for the defence[s] of the Area if they are to be adequately manned.[fn3.64]Ibid.[/fn]

Goschen followed this up two days later reporting his concerns about the GHQ line running through his area, to Corps HQ stating:

… that it was not possible by the erection of Road Blocks to stop all the gaps in the line and that the only way of closing such gaps was by digging anti-tank ditches, as mine-fields would be unsuitable.[fn3.65]Ibid.[/fn]

Obviously, the digging of these anti-tank ditches would be an extra burden on Goschen’s limited resources, which he could ill-afford but it was still one that would be vital to the defence of his Area.

Meanwhile, the bombing continued, causing Goschen to move his HQ back to the Caves at Kitchener Barracks. Then, on 19 August, the Dockyard was bombed. Although little damage was caused, three dockyard workers lost their lives with another two wounded. Brompton Barracks was also bombed, causing some slight ‘material damage’ along with three soldiers being slightly wounded.[fn3.66]Ibid.[/fn][pg34]On 27 August the Medway Towns suffered one of their worst bombing attacks of the war. During the night high explosive (H.E.) and incendiary bombs were dropped on Chatham, Rochester and Gillingham, causing considerable damage and severe casualties include twenty-one killed and nineteen seriously wounded. The following night the Dockyard was bombed again along with the Naval Barracks. Twelve bombs fell on the Dockyard but with no casualties or serious damage. The Short Bros bomber factory at Rochester Airport was also attacked but all the bombs fell wide of their target.[fn3.67]Ibid.[/fn]

The bombing continued into September. There was another heavy attack on the Shorts bomber factory on 4 September. Little damage was caused to the factory, but the nearby greyhound stadium and the Davis housing estate were both ‘plastered’, and the City Way was closed to traffic because of cratering. Two days later the airport was hit by fifty H.E. and 100 incendiary bombs which caused remarkably little ‘military damage’.[fn3.68]Ibid, Sept 1940.[/fn]

“Cromwell”

The whole nation was braced for what was now considered an inevitable and imminent invasion. On 7 September, the British Chiefs of Staff considered a report on possible German action against the United Kingdom. This report indicated that German preparations for invasion were so advanced that it could be attempted at any time. Considering the German air attacks, which were at that time concentrated against aerodromes and aircraft factories, the Chiefs of Staff agreed that the possibility of invasion had become imminent, and that the defence forces should stand by at immediate notice. At GHQ, Home Forces, there was then no machinery by which the existing eight hours' notice for readiness could be adjusted to a state of readiness for "immediate action" by intermediate stages. The code word "Cromwell" signifying "invasion imminent" was therefore issued by GHQ, Home Forces that evening to the Eastern and Southern Commands.[fn3.69]Hansard, HC Deb 18 November 1946 vol 430 cc52-7W – German preparations for invasion in 1940.[/fn] Meanwhile, at Chatham Area HQ reports about “Cromwell” being issued were coming in from various sources but nothing had been heard from XII Corps HQ. At 2145 a telephone call was made to Corps HQ in Tunbridge Wells asking whether “Cromwell” had been received by them. The reply was that it had but that the Corps Commander did not want it passed on and that no action was to be taken by Chatham Area. As a precaution Maj. Gen. Goschen ordered all leave to be cancelled in the Area, but those already on leave were not yet to be recalled. At 2320 Corps HQ telephoned Chatham Area HQ ordering “Cromwell” to apply fully to all troops but not to the Home Guard. Ten minutes later “Cromwell” was passed on to Chatham Sub-Area HQ and Officer Commanding Troops, Chatham. The latter was already trying to take in the news received earlier in the day that the S.M.E. was to move from Chatham to Ripon in North Yorkshire, thus reducing his already meagre troop levels even further.[fn3.70]TNA, WO 166/1195, Ibid.[/fn] The tensions within the various HQ’s that night can only be imagined[pg35]now but they must have certainly been intense at the time. Despite the drama, the night passed without reports of any German landings.

At 0710 the next morning, Chatham Area HQ made another call to XII Corps HQ to check the situation. They received no reply. However, at 0840, Corps HQ called to report that there was no change in the situation. Goschen ordered all roadblocks to be manned fully at night but only with a third of the complement during the day.[fn3.71]Ibid.[/fn]

Chatham Area maintained its state of readiness, as determined by “Cromwell”, throughout the day, waiting for the signal “Action Stations”, which would indicate that an invasion had begun. The “Cromwell” alert stayed in place for the next two days but by then it had become obvious that the imminent invasion ‘scare’ was over. In truth, the Luftwaffe had suffered considerable losses inflicted by the RAF during the Battle of Britain and had failed to gain mastery of the skies above England which had been a prerequisite for any invasion. Then, on 17 September Hitler took the decision to postpone the invasion until 1941.

Despite the postponement of “Operation Sealion”, the German bombing campaign continued throughout September into October. In the early hours of 10 October Brompton Barracks was hit by eight high-explosive bombs, killing one Officer and twelve ‘Other Ranks’. That afternoon another wave of bombers dropped several anti-personnel bombs on the Ravelin but without inflicting any casualties. On 17 October a H.E. bomb, dropped near Fort Bridgewoods killed a Sergeant of the East Surrey Regiment, one Home Guard soldier, and three members of the all-female Auxiliary Territorial Service (A.T.S.).[fn3.72]Ibid, Oct 1940.[/fn]

With winter now closing in, the threat of an invasion diminished. On 2 November Chatham Area HQ issued their ‘Operation Instruction No.16.’ which stated:

1. It is considered that an attempt by the enemy to invade this country during the winter months is unlikely and dispositions will be made on the supposition that it will not take place.

2. Raids are, however, likely: such raids will probably take place on the coast line and may be air or sea-borne or both. Airborne raids inland are unlikely owing to the difficulty in withdrawing the raiding party.[fn3.73]Ibid, Nov 1940, Operation Instruction No.16.[/fn]

Although there no localities within the Chatham Sub-Area that were deemed likely targets for a raid, the same could not be said for the coastal districts of the wider Area command such as the Hoo Peninsula where the Admiralty maintained a large fuel storage depot at Grain. In the event of an enemy raid on the depot, any reinforcements to help counter it would need to be rushed from Chatham, across Rochester Bridge. Therefore, the bridge could become a target for saboteurs or aerial bombing. Operation Instruction No.16. set out the details for the defence of the bridge during the winter months:[pg36]The garrison of ROCHESTER BRIDGE will consist of 2 Officers and 38 Other Ranks who will find:

a) an anti-sabotage guard on the railway bridge

b) anti-aircraft posts during the hours of daylight.

1st reinforcements will be prepared to man the defences at 6 hours notice.

2nd reinforcements will be available for the defence of the bridge at 24 hours notice.

It is intended that the Home Guard shall ultimately assume the responsibility for the defence of ROCHESTER BRIDGE. They will take over the bridge defences from the Regular Troops when they have received sufficient training to do so, provided that O. C. Troops, Chatham is satisfied they can be relied upon to turn out in sufficient strength at the required notice.[fn3.74]Ibid.[/fn]

The S.M.E. leaves Chatham

On 16 November the S.M.E and the R.E. Depot Battalions, completed their move to Ripon, As Commandant of the S.M.E., Brigadier Briggs went with them, but without immediately being replaced as either Commander, Chatham Sub-Area or as O.C. Troops, Chatham.[fn3.75]TNA, WO 199/77, Ibid.[/fn] The R.E. Depot remained at Chatham but with a much-reduced complement.

The gap in troop numbers caused by the departures was only partially, and far from satisfactorily, filled the following day by the arrival of five Officers and 225 men of the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps.[fn3.76]TNA, WO 166/1195, Nov 1940.[/fn] The A.M.P.C. had been formed in October 1939 from the merging of the Works Labour Companies, which were all manned by Reservists. During the battle for France in June, many of the A.M.P.C. companies were pressed into action as combat troops before being eventually evacuated back to the U.K. Its recruits included many Jewish and anti-Nazi refugees who had fled from Austria, Germany and Eastern Europe. Although the heavier engineering work had to remain the responsibility of the R.E., the A.M.P.C. were able to undertake some lighter engineering tasks including the construction of anti-aircraft gun emplacements and other defences.[fn3.77]National Army Museum – Royal Pioneer Corps (https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/royal-pioneer-corps).[/fn] On 25 November the A.M.P.C. took over full responsibility for providing guards at Fort Horsted and Fort Bridgewoods, and for providing a quarter of the guard at Rochester Airport.[fn3.78]TNA, WO 166/1195, Ibid.[/fn]

November ended with the appointment of 44-year-old Colonel Robert Perrott, R.E., M.C. as Commandant R.E. Depot, Officer Commanding, Troops Chatham and Commander, Chatham Sub-Area.[fn3.79]TNA, WO 199/77, Ibid.[/fn] During the First World Perrott served with the Royal Engineers in France, Belgium, and Italy, when he was Mentioned in Despatches and awarded the Military Cross for gallantry.[fn3.80]The War Dead of North Down & Ards - Perrott DSO OBE MC, Robert Dermot Barnes (No. 10220), (https://barryniblock.co.uk/world-war-two-war-dead/names-listed-alphabetically-by-surname/partridge-to-quillan/perrott-dso-obe-mc-robert-dermot-barnes-no-10220/).[/fn] A brave and experienced soldier, but junior in rank to his predecessor reflecting the now downgraded and depleted status of his new commands.

Despite numerous ‘alerts’, there were few air-raids in December in the Chatham Area that caused any damage. The attention of the Luftwaffe was now directed on attacking the major port cities such as London, Bristol, and Liverpool, while German plans for any invasion lay in abeyance for re-consideration for the following Spring.[fn3.81]TNA, WO 166/1195, Ibid, Dec 1940[/fn][pg37]

Consolidation (January-July 1941)

Re-organisation

January 1941 saw a major re-organisation of the Army’s Commands. The structure of Aldershot Command was expanded to form South Eastern Command (SECO), under the Command of Lt. Gen Bernard Paget. As a result, Eastern Command was relieved of Kent, Surrey and Sussex which were transferred to SECO. For administrative purposes, Chatham Area and the Kent parts of Home Counties Area were re-organised into Kent Area under the command of Brigadier J.S. Davenport M.C. with its Headquarters in Chatham.[fn3.82]TNA, WO 166/1216, War Office – Home Forces – War Diaries – Kent Area Headquarters, Jan 1941[/fn] On 15 January Maidstone Sub-Area was created incorporating Sheppey Sector, Chatham Sector, Maidstone Sector and Tonbridge Sector. The Maidstone Sub-Area temporarily remained under the direct command of Kent Area HQ pending the appointment of its own commander.[fn3.83]Ibid, Operation Instruction No.2, 15 Jan 1941[/fn] Kent Area would also now be responsible for defensive measures in the rear of XII Corps forward divisions and would have under its command three independent infantry battalions in addition to its Home Defence and Young Soldier battalions. Overall operational and administrative command of the Kent Area became the responsibility of XII Corps H.Q. in Tunbridge Wells.

As a result of this re-organisation, Chatham Area HQ was abolished and Maj-Gen. Goschen retired from the Army. Chatham Sector, which had replaced Chatham Sub-Area, remained under the command of Colonel Perrott with responsibility for the Chatham defences, Rochester Airport, and the Chatham and Rochester battalions of the Kent Home Guard. As Sector Commander, Perrott’s duties would include having full operational control of all troops within his Sector, but not administrative control which would remain with Kent Area HQ. He would also be responsible for the training of, and providing administrative assistance to, all Home Guard units within his Sector.[fn3.84]Ibid.[/fn]

Perrott’s responsibilities at Chatham were short-lived however, for on 5 February he was relieved by a Colonel Shakespeare whom himself only lasted in Command for just over a month. From 7 March Command of Chatham Sector was shared between Colonel Humphreys, the C.O. of the Royal Army Service Corps at Southill Barracks, who was deemed responsible for administration, and Lt. Col. Swire, Officer Commanding Nodal Points at XII Corps HQ in Tunbridge Wells, who in would have operational control of all troops in the Sector.[fn3.85]TNA, WO 199/77, War Office – Home Forces - General Headquarters – Defence of Special Installations – Defence of Naval Establishments (Mar 1941-Jun 1942) – Appendix, Chronological summary of changes in Military Command at Chatham [Aug 1939 – Mar 1941].[/fn]

[pg38]

[fg]Southill Barracks, off the Maidstone Road, demolished c.1970. (KCC Heritage Maps)[/fg]

Concerns Raised

The new command structure was obviously a very unsatisfactory arrangement for such an important Sector and the situation at Chatham now came to the notice of higher authorities. On 17 March, the RN Commander-in-Chief, The Nore, Admiral Sir Reginald Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax, wrote to the Secretary of the Admiralty, Rear-Admiral Arthur Peters, expressing his concern about the level of military protection against an attack by raiding or invading forces against Naval Establishments in the Nore Command. The defences of Chatham were a particular concern:

3. At Chatham the forces available for the defence of the area, which includes H.M. Dockyard, R.N. Barracks, Area Combined Headquarters and Rochester Bridge (over which most of the land lines to the Northward are carried) are as follows:

a) Military. About 46 officers and 1,000 men of whom 3 officers and 120 men of the 1/5 Essex Regiment are the only infantrymen. The remainder consists of units of R.Es, R.A.S.C., R.A.O.C., R. Corps Signals etc.

b) Home Guard. The strength is 3,500 but only two-thirds of this number have rifles at the moment.

c) Royal Marines. The number of men available in R.M. Barracks, Chatham varies from 300 to 1,000 according to drafting requirements.

d) Naval Ratings. There are sufficient rifles in R.N. Barracks to arm about 2,000 men. If the additional rifles that have been applied for are supplied, a total of 4,000 men can be armed for the defence of the R.N. Barracks. Most of these men will know how to fire a rifle but the proportion of trained men is very small.[fn3.84]Ibid.[/fn]

4. The Military scheme for the defence of Chatham aims at holding an outer line based on the old fortifications on the outskirts of the towns of Rochester, Chatham and [pg39]Gillingham. There is an inner line running along the old ditch which surrounds Chatham itself and forms a good anti-tank obstacle. The left sector of the outer line was allocated to the Royal Navy for holding but the provisions of Admiralty letter M.02673./41 of 26th February, 1941 forbid this and the use of naval armed forces has now been limited to the defence of their own establishments.[fn3.85]TNA, WO 199/77, War Office – Home Forces - General Headquarters – Defence of Special Installations – Defence of Naval Establishments (Mar 1941-Jun 1942) – Appendix, Chronological summary of changes in Military Command at Chatham [Aug 1939 – Mar 1941].[/fn] There are, therefore, insufficient troops to hold the outer defence line against armoured mobile columns that may break through from the S.E. or against a strong force of parachutists. The Naval armed forces are confined to the inner line which runs so close to the Dockyard, R.N. Barracks and Area Combined Headquarters that these establishments could not be held in the face of a strong attack supported by artillery.[fn3.86]Ibid, Admiral R.P.E. Drax to Secretary of the Admiralty, 17 Mar 1941.[/fn]

After stating his concerns about the military situation North of the Medway and at Sheerness, Drax went on to say:

8. There is much to recommend the policy of non-evacuation of Nodal Points. It is, however, very desirable that there should be sufficient forces available to hold important positions against attacks behind the main battle front with some hope of success. At the present moment this is not the case at Chatham and Sheerness. While it is confidently expected that the invaders will eventually be thrown back, much damage to Admiralty Establishments will be caused and loss of officers and men required for sea service involved, if the approaches to Chatham and Sheerness are not held in adequate strength.

9. It is understood that representations to this effect have been made by the local Military Authorities but, as will be seen from the Appendix, there have been so many changes of command in the Chatham Area that the importance of the matter may not have been sufficiently stressed.

10. It is suggested, therefore, that the War Department might be asked to provide more troops for the defence of areas which contain important Naval Establishments and large numbers of ratings under training for sea service. Special reference has been made to Chatham and Sheerness […]

11. The withdrawal of first line troops from the Field Force is not considered necessary for this purpose; our requirements could be met by using more Home Service battalions, if available.

12. The immediate requirement is for bodies of men more highly trained in land fighting than the Naval ratings in these Establishments, who at present, can only be said to be capable of firing what arms they possess without damage to their own side. When opposed by highly trained parachute troops or tanks these ratings could not be counted on to hold out for more than a few hours.

13. If the Army cannot conveniently spare more troops for static defence of Naval Establishments, it is strongly urged that Naval ratings ashore should be more fully armed and trained than at present.[fn3.87]Ibid.[/fn]

[pg40]

[fg]Admiral Sir Reginald Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax (Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons)[/fg]

SECO Commander, Lt. Gen. Paget, also appears to have raised similar concerns with GHQ Home Forces in a letter dated 14 March. However, the letter seems to have been ‘lost’ before it arrived with no trace being found. Following Rear-Adm. Peters reporting of Adm. Drax’s concerns to the War Office and then to GHQ Home Forces, a copy of Paget’s letter was obtained from SECO on 1 April. In his letter Paget requested either an infantry battalion or a Garrison Commander, with a General Staff Officer, Grade 2 to be appointed to Chatham.[fn3.88]TNA, WO 199/627, War Office – Home Forces – General Headquarters – Defence of Certain Areas – Chatham, BGS (Ops) [Col Nicholson] to General Staff , 1 Apr 1941[/fn] The following day the Deputy Chief of Staff Home Forces, Colonel Cameron Nicholson wrote to Colonel Nevil Brownjohn at the Directorate of Staff Duties for the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, asking if a ’spare’ battalion could be found from anywhere for Chatham and if a Commander could be appointed for the Garrison there.[fn3.89]Ibid, Nicholson to Brownjohn (note), 2 Apr 1941[/fn] Brownjohn replied in a note the next day saying that there were no ‘spare’ battalions that could be sent to Chatham. He suggested instead that the Royal Marines should provide the necessary force from its Chatham Barracks. If the Royal Marines could not supply the necessary troops, then it was a matter for C-in-C Home Forces to decide, from an operational aspect, whether a withdrawal of a battalion from one of his County Brigades was justified. Brownjohn also questioned the need for a specific Garrison Commander and General Staff Officer for Chatham, suggesting instead, if the Royal Marines still maintained a Brigadier at Chatham then he should be the Garrison Commander.[fn3.90]Ibid, Brownjohn to Nicholson (note), 3 Apr 1941.[/fn]

Nicholson consulted with General Brooke who decided that he could not spare a battalion from Home Forces, but he would recommend that a Garrison Commander (a Colonel) be appointed as the Royal Marines’ Brigadier Noyes at Chatham was not available to fill the appointment.[fn3.91]Ibid, Nicholson to Brownjohn (note), , 3 Apr 1941.[/fn][pg41]On 12 April, Lt. Gen. Henry Lloyd, Chief of the General Staff at Home Forces HQ, wrote, on behalf of Gen. Brooke, to the Undersecretary of State at the War Office, Sir P.J. Grigg, requesting authority to appoint a Garrison Commander, with the rank of Colonel, for Chatham along with a General Staff Officer, Grade 3 (GSO 3), to assist him. In addition, Loyd requested two RASC Clerks, One Orderly, and one Driver, together with one car and one bicycle for the Garrison.[fn3.92]Ibid, Loyd to P.U.S., War Office, 12 Apr 1941[/fn]

Meanwhile, the Commander, Kent Area, Brigadier Davenport had been lobbying for the re-instatement of Chatham as a separate Sub-Area, and was concerned that Chatham was still without a Garrison Commander. On 2 May Davenport wrote to SECO HQ, expressing his frustrations:

1. As the position of Chatham, both as a Garrison and a highly important Nodal Point, Class ‘A’ may not be fully realised, I forward brief details to support my constant request that it may be treated as a separate Sub-area, with a small staff.

2. Chatham Garrison comprises the three Medway towns of Chatham, Gillingham and Rochester, and also the Borough of Strood. A marked 1/25000 Map, showing the extent of the Garrison Perimeter, and the general organisation of the defence layout, is attached.

3. The Military Garrison at present contains approximately 1411 all ranks, and 4 large Barrack areas.

The Garrison of the Nodal Point is approximately 5270 all ranks.

No Garrison Commander has, as yet, been appointed, and the duties are being carried out by O.C., R.A.S.C., Chatham, with the Garrison Adjutant and his staff to assist him.

No Military Nodal Point Commander of sufficient seniority is available in the present Garrison, and I have appointed – pro tem – Lt. Col. Swire, (on loan to Kent Operations Area as O.C. Stop, and Grid Lines and Nodal Point Defences) to act in this capacity in an emergency. No Staff Officer for the Defence Scheme has been allowed to me, and I have had to borrow the services of an officer of 1/5 Essex Regt. to act in this capacity, to co-ordinate the various Sub-sector Defence Schemes, but he will have to be replaced on the departure of this Regiment from the Command on or about the 18th May.

4. The present position of both the Garrison and the Nodal Point is a most unsatisfactory one, and as large R.N., R.M., and R.A.F. interests have to be considered in the Defence Plan, I am of the opinion that a Senior Garrison Commander, who will also act as Nodal Point Commander, should be appointed at the earliest possible date. He will require an active Staff Officer graded G.S.O. 111 to assist him. The present Garrison Adjutant with his staff will be able to carry out all the A. [Administration] and Q. [Quartermaster] duties required.

5. I strongly recommend that the Garrison should then become a Sub-area of Kent Area, and the only increases to the present staff allowed to the Garrison staff are :-

1 Garrison Commander – rank of Colonel.

1 G.S.O. 111.

2 Clerks.[fn3.93]Ibid, Davenport to HQ S.E. Command, 2 May 1941.[/fn]

An example of the measure of the delay, confusion and sheer lack of communication between the Army and RN authorities regarding the situation at[pg42]Chatham is evidenced by a letter written by the Secretary of the Admiralty to General Brooke, C-in-C, Home Forces, endorsing the views set out by Admiral Drax about the defence of Naval Establishments in Nore Command and forwarding a copy of Drax’s letter to the Admiralty of 17 March. The letter to Brooke is dated 12 May; almost two months after Drax had raised his concerns, many of which were already being addressed by Brooke. The Admiralty Secretary went on to say that additional arms would be provided for naval personnel, as and when they became available, but even then, armed naval personnel could only be employed in defence of themselves and their local naval establishments and re-iterating Drax’s statement that naval personnel were only trained and equipped to carry out the most elementary military duties onshore.[fn3.94]TNA, WO 199/77, Ibid, Secretary of the Admiralty to The Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, 12 May 1941.[/fn]

On 19 May, the War Office finally gave its approval for the appointment of a Garrison Commander, with the rank of Colonel, along with a G.S.O.3. for Chatham.[fn3.95]TNA, WO 199/627, Ibid, Note 4, Chatham – Garrison Defences, 20 Jun 1941.[/fn] Chatham Garrison’s War Diary re-opens that same day with details of its new Establishment:

(I) Personnel

Garrison Commander (Colonel) 1

Garrison Adjutant. 1

General Staff Officer 3rd Grade 1

Garrison Sergeant Major 1

Clerks, R.A.S.C. (may be A.T.S.) 2

Orderlies (may be A.T.S.) 2

Driver, R.A.S.C. (may be A.T.S.) 1

Clerks civilian 3

---

12

---

(II) Transport

Bicycles 2

Car 4 seater, 4 wheeler 1

(III) Table of Weapons and Ammunition

Detail No. Ammunition on Man Ammunition on Reserve Total

Pistols .38” 2 12 24 72

Rifles .303” 5 20 100

Troops within Garrison

69 C.W. Coy. R.E.

70 C.W. Coy. R.E.

594 Workshop and Park Coy. R.E. (1.O. 48 O.R.)

Trade Training Wing (S.M.E).

R.A.S.C. Southill Barracks.

Military Detention Barracks, Fort Darland.

8th Btn, The East Surrey Regiment (2 Company’s [sic])

838 Company A.M.P.C. (2 sections)[pg43]R.N. Personnel present within Garrison.

R.M. Personnel present within Garrison.

The Home Guard.

Kent Area, No.3. Group, Kent Zone Home Guard is located at Castle Chambers, Rochester. Admiral Sir H.J. Studholme Brownrigg K.B.E. Commands this Group. The Group has two Battalions within the Garrison, to wit, 12th Battalion Kent Home Guard, and 13th Battalion Kent Home Guard, under the Command of Lieut. Colonel Evans and Lieut. Colonel Picking respectively.

In addition to the above, there are various detachments of Home Guard Utility Battalions of personnel of the Post Office, Southern Railway, and industrial undertakings.[fn3.96]TNA, WO 166/1338, War Office - Home Forces – War Diaries – Chatham Garrison Headquarters, May 1941.[/fn]

Depending on R.M. Drafting arrangements, the strength of the Garrison totalled between 9,500 and 11,500 men, of which about 5,000 – 7,000 were armed.[fn3.97]TNA, WO 199/77, Ibid, G. (Ops) to Brigadier (General Staff) – Defence of Chatham, Shotley, Lowestoft and Skegness, 18 May 1941.[/fn]

Despite having obtained the War Office’s approval for the changes to the Garrison, General Brooke still shared the Admiralty’s concerns about the situation regarding the defence of Chatham. In his reply (dated 29 May) to the Secretary of the Admiralty’s letter of 12 May, Brooke detailed the present strength of the Chatham Garrison. He then admitted that he had been concerned for some time about the defences of Chatham, particularly since the departure of the S.M.E. and the R.E. Depot Battalions, and about the frequent changes of Command that had left the Garrison in the hands of inexperienced officers. He told the Secretary that he had received approval to appoint a Garrison Commander, with the rank of Colonel, together with a small staff, which should ensure a reasonable continuity of Command. Although he was unable to spare any extra troops for the defence of Chatham, he had arranged in the event of an invasion for No.5. Commando, to move from Falmouth to Chatham. He also pointed out that although there were 4,000 Naval ratings based at Chatham, they only had enough rifles to arm half of them. He suggested that early provision of 2,000 extra rifles would greatly increase the strength of the Garrison.[fn3.98]Ibid, Gen. Brooke to the Secretary of the Admiralty – Defence of Naval Establishments, 29 May 1941.[/fn]

It was yet another three weeks before the Admiralty responded to Brooke regarding the extra rifles for Chatham. In a note dated 21 June the Secretary informed Brooke that ‘action is being taken by the Admiralty’ to provide the 2,000 rifles and ammunition, but blaming the poor rate of provision on the Ministry of Supply, who were prioritising Army requirements over those of the R.N.[fn3.99]Ibid, Admiralty to C-in-C, Home Forces, 21 June 1941.[/fn]

Meanwhile, the unsatisfactory situation at Chatham had not improved: no Officer had been found to fill the vacancy of Garrison Commander, and the armed strength of the Garrison was now estimated to be just 5,270 men of which 2,500 were R.N. Ratings and Royal Marines who were either raw recruits still undergoing training or men awaiting Drafts to ships or stations.[fn3.100]TNA, WO 199/627, Ibid, Note 4 – Chatham Garrison Defences, 20 Jun 1941.[/fn]

The lack of urgency shown by the higher commands in resolving the problems at Chatham could, in part, be attributed to events in Eastern Europe. Back in[pg44]April Hitler had opened a campaign in the Balkans with an invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece, culminating in a large expenditure of trained airborne forces in the capture of Crete in May, making an invasion of the UK before the end of the summer less likely. Then, with the start of Operation Barbarossa, the German offensive against the Soviet Union on 22 June, the likelihood of an imminent invasion diminished even more.[fn3.101]Wynne, Capt. G.C. – Stopping Hitler: an official account of how Britain planned to defend itself in the Second World War, (Frontline Books, 2017).[/fn]

However, one problem was finally resolved on 25 June when Colonel C.W. Swire was transferred from XII Corps HQ to assume duty as Commander, Chatham Garrison. This was followed five days later with the appointment of Captain J.M. Trumper of the Royal West Kent Regiment as G.S.O. 3, Chatham Garrison.[fn3.102]TNA, WO 166/1338, Ibid, Jun 1941.[/fn]

Planning for Defence

In early July the new Garrison Commander received a visit from Lt. Gen. Loyd, Chief of the General Staff at GHQ Home Forces. Swire told Loyd that he was working on a Defence Plan for Chatham ready to submit for General Brooke’s approval. However, he had also been instructed to produce an estimate of costs for the Plan, which would inevitably cause a delay in the submission of the plan. Swire asked if he could have the ammunition held on reserve for his Home Guard units as they were ‘extremely short of rounds per rifle actually with the man’. Loyd thought there was ‘some points in this suggestion’ which he would put in his report to Lt. Gen. Paget the SECO C-in-C. Swire also told Loyd that, in view of the lessons learned from the operations in Crete, he was very anxious to have some troops, provided with motorbikes and some armoured vehicles for extra mobility, ready to confront enemy parachutists. Loyd agreed with Swire’s proposal which he would put to Lt Gen Paget. Loyd also gave Swire the welcome news that SECO would shortly be providing labour to commence the construction of some extra defences at Chatham, ‘… which apparently at this moment are practically non-existent’.[fn3.103]TNA, WO 199/627. Ibid, Note 10A, Lt. Gen. H.C. Loyd to Lt. Gen. B.C.T. Paget, 4 Jul 1941.[/fn]

During his visit to Chatham, Loyd also met with Admiral Sir George Lyon, who had recently taken over from Admiral Drax as C-in-C, The Nore, with whom he discussed the use of Naval Ratings in the defence of Chatham. Lyon told Loyd that his sailors would need to undergo an intensive course of training before they could take up any defensive positions and instead asked if extra troops could be provided for the defence of the Naval Establishments, but Loyd held out ‘no hope’ for that, at least in the short-term.[fn3.104]Ibid.[/fn]

A few days later, on 7 July, Swire received another visitor in the person of Brigadier J.S. Davenport, Commander, Kent Area.[fn3.105]TNA, WO 166/1216, Ibid, Jul 1941.[/fn] Swire discussed his proposal for a ‘Mobile Force’ to counter enemy parachutists with the Brigadier and then, on 10 July, submitted his proposal to him in writing:

2. At present there is no organised Mobile Force available for operations against Parachute Troops in the vicinity of Chatham.[pg45]The role of such a force would be to;-

a) Deal immediately with parachute landings in the open country on the outskirts of CHATHAM.

b) Destroy small parties before the[y] can reach the neighbouring woods.

c) To prevent parachute troops from seizing Broome Hill.

d) To locate and report on any particular landings within five miles of the NODAL POINT.

3. The ROYAL MARINES can earmark a nucleus of 2 Officers and 30 O.Rs. to form a cadre for this force, and be trained now in their role.

This Cadre will be supplemented, on ACTION STATIONS by trained recruits and brought up to a strength of 2 Officers and 100 O.Rs.[fn3.106]TNA, WO 166/1338, Jul 1941 - Appendix I [/fn]

To transport this force, Swire proposed using: two ‘Malcolm Campbell’ type armoured cars*, three ‘Bren’ Carriers, one 15-cwt pick-up truck, and six motorcycle. In addition, to arm the force, he would need to procure: one mobile naval ‘sawn-off’ 6-pounder gun, sixteen Bren guns, three anti-tank rifles with ammunition, and nine ‘Tommy’ guns with ammunition.[fn3.107]Ibid.[/fn]

[fg]‘Malcolm Campbell’ Dodge armoured car (https://www.bluebird-electric.net/malcolm_campbell.htm)[/fg]

Meanwhile, work on improving Chatham’s fixed defences began with the arrival of four Sections of 91 Coy, Pioneer Corps between 19 and 25 July.[fn3.108]Ibid, Jul 1941.[/fn] They were in Chatham for a month and their work would have included the construction of emplacements for the recently introduced ‘Blacker Bombard’ spigot mortar anti-tank weapon, and ‘flame fougasse’ batteries which were

* When Sir Malcolm Campbell, the legendary Land Speed World Record holder, was the Provost Company commander of the 56th London Division, Home Defence Force, he designed and then built the prototype of the Dodge armoured car which was unofficially known as the "Malcolm Campbell" car. Seventy of these were built by Briggs Motor Bodies of Dagenham and were ready by the end of August 1940. To increase the firepower of these cars and trucks, the Home Guard would often fit captured German machine-guns from crashed bombers to their vehicles, the only problem being fresh supplies of ammunition! Some units managed to get hold of a few World War I 6pdr tank guns and fitted them to the Malcolm Campbell cars. (https://www.bluebird-electric.net/malcolm_campbell.htm).[pg46]designed to spray devastating showers of a burning mixture of petrol and gas oil over approaching enemy vehicles.

[fg]A demonstration of Fougasse, ‘somewhere in Britain’ (IWM D24854)[/fg]

On 21 July, Major A.E. Wilson, G.S.O. 2 at Kent Area HQ, called on Swire to discuss the latter’s Defence Plan which he then took on to SECO HQ at Tunbridge Wells for the final approval of the Army Commander, LT. Gen. Paget.[fn3.109]TNA, WO 166/1216, Ibid.[/fn] Having gained Paget’s approval, three days later Wilson issued “Kent Area Operation Instruction Number 15” to the Commander, Chatham Garrison:

1. The Army Commander had approved the proposed lay-out for the defence of CHATHAM […]. Platoon localities are based throughout on a strength of 30 all ranks.

2. Plan “A” indicates the defence localities which can be manned with the Garrison known to be definitely available.

Estimated requirements of personnel are :-

61 Platoon Localities - 1830

Naval Sector - 1000

Garrison Reserve - 250

H.Q. Personnel (say) - 200

------

Total 3280

3. Plan “B” indicates the completed defence layout, which will be manned partly or fully, in accordance with personnel available on “ACTION STATIONS” over and above the TOTAL figure shown in paragraph 2. above.

Estimated requirements of personnel to implement this complete scheme are :-[pg47]115 Platoon Localities - 3450

Naval Sector - 1000

Garrison Reserve - 250

H.Q. Personnel (say) - 300

------

Total 5000

4. WORK.

Work on the defences will proceed in accordance with the following order of priority:-

a) Naval RED Line and Localities.

b) Bridgehead RED Line and Localities.

c) Remaining Localities under Plan “A”.

d) Remaining Localities under Plan “B”.

Within the limits laid down above, priority for individual localities will be decided by Commander CHATHAM Garrison in accordance with the tactical importance of the locality concerned.

In order that work can proceed progressively, a complete priority list, based on the above instructions, will be decided now. Detailed reconnaissance on the ground being carried out in accordance with this priority.

5. ANTI-TANK OBSTACLES.

Both Naval and Bridgehead RED Lines will be made complete Anti-tank obstacles supplemented by Anti-tank minefields where necessary. In addition all Platoon Localities will be made tank proof by the use of existing buildings, concrete pimples and road blocks. In the case of Localities in the open country, such as BROOM HILL, the Coy. Area will be made tank proof.

In all cases, locality Garrisons must be able to cover tank obstacles, or minefields, by fire.

6. SUB_UNIT ORGANISATION.

To implement this scheme, it will be necessary for Commander CHATHAM Garrison, to undertake a re-organisation of the existing sub-unit organisation of the Home Guard forming part of the Garrison. This must be based on Coys. of three Platoons, each Platoon to contain 30 all ranks; the R.N. should be asked to organise on similar lines, any personnel they are able to make available.

7. OPERATIONAL COMMAND.

Commanders for defence sectors will be selected by Commander, CHATHAM Garrison and their names submitted to the Area Commander for approval. After appointment, these officers will be completely responsible for the defence of their Sector.

8. ROLE OF RESERVES.

a) Reserve Platoons will be utilised for launching immediate counter-attacks within their Coy. area only.

b) Reserve Coys. will be used for counter-attack purpose within their defence Sector.

[pg48] c) Garrison Reserve will be given the role of preventing enemy penetration between localities from reaching either the NAVAL or Bridgehead RED Lines.

9. ADMINISTRATIVE.

Instructions will follow.

10. INTERCOMMUNICATION.

Signalmaster, KENT Area, will prepare a signal plan to ensure communication between Headquarters, CHATHAM Garrison, and Headquarters, Defence Sectors by Wireless, Line, D/R [Despatch Rider], and/or bicycle orderly. Visual Stations to be manned by Naval personnel should be established where possible.[fn3.110]Ibid - Appendix ‘D’, 24 Jul 1941.[/fn][pg49]

The Plan (August – October 1941)

The issuing of Major Wilson’s Instructions was followed, on 2 August, by the issuing of “Chatham Garrison – Operation Instruction No. 1”, by the Garrison’s G.S.O. 3 Capt. Trumper, to the various Commands within the Chatham Nodal Point:

1. GENERAL.

a) Until such time as the new defences are completed the existing Defence Scheme will remain in operation.

b) The attached trace [not found in file] shows the new layout for the CHATHAM GROUP NODAL POINT. Platoon localities are based throughout on a strength of 30 all ranks.

2. OBJECT.

To deny to the enemy any infiltration either by Infantry or tanks into the Royal Naval Dockyard or Rochester Bridge.

3. TROOPS AVAILABLE.

The plan of defence is based on the Garrison which is definitely existent, but in addition it is possible that some 2,000 to 3,000 Naval and Military personnel might become available.

4. PLAN.

a) Red Line – as shown on the trace.

A strong Cordon round ROYAL NAVAL DOCKYARD and ROCHESTER BRIDGE will be held as a complete anti-tank obstacle, supplemented by mine fields where necessary and covered by fire from strongly defended localities. This Cordon will be prepared for strongest possible resistance against vehicles or personnel.

b) Battle Zone – marked with Blue Circle on trace.

The Battle Zone will consist of localities strongly held to deny access to any of the main arteries of communications to the objectives i.e. DOCKYARD or BRIDGE. These localities are organised as far as possible according to the existing positions of Home Guard and Regular Troops.

c) Independent Localities and Forts. – marked with Black circle on trace.

The independent localities and Forts in front of the Battle Zone, will be held and they will prevent access to the main arteries which they cover. Where these independent localities are garrisoned by Regular Troops they will, where necessary, be supplemented by Home Guard personnel.

d) Localities Garrisoned by Home Guard Static Units – marked with blocked blue circle on trace.

Localities manned by Units from Home Guard Utility Battalions such as detachments of Southern Railway Home Guard and Kent Power Company, who defend certain points on the Railway and their own Factories, Works etc., will come under the Commander in whose Sub-Sector they are operating.[pg50]

e) Reinforcing Personnel. – marked with a Brown Circle on trace.

In the event of further Naval or Military personnel becoming available they will be utilized :-

(i) To reinforce existing Company Localities.

(ii) As a Reserve in Sub-Sector.

(iii) In depth in the Battle Zone in previously prepared localities.

5. COMMAND.

The Battle Zone will be divided into Sectors and Sub-Sectors (i.e. Two Sub-Sectors to each Sector) in which each Company will have its own plan for Counter Attack. Each Sub-Sector Commander will have a reserve under his own command.

Sector Commanders have been appointed as under and those Officers concerned will take over command forthwith:-

DOCKYARD RED LINE. (Naval Sector. Lt. Cmdr. Barlow R.N., D.S.O.

(Military Sector. Major Hext R.E.

Rochester Bridge Sector. Captain Davies E.S.R.

Gillingham Sector. Lt, Co. Evans

(12th Bn. Home Guard)

Chatham & Rochester

Sector. Major Deane R.M.

Strood Sector. Lt. Col. Picking

(13th Bn. Home Guard)

The names of Officers recommended as Sub-Sector Commanderswill be forwarded to this Office for approval, by 4th August, 1941.

6. DEFENDED VILLAGES.

RAINHAM, HEMPSTEAD, WIGMORE, WALDERSLADE, WOULDHAM, ECCLES and BURHAM. These villages will be defended by the Home Guard living in the district and commanded by the Senior Officer of the detachment.

Home Guard Battalion Commanders will forward their plan for village defences to reach this Headquarters not later than 8th August, 1941.

7. DEFENDED LOCALITIES.

Sector Commanders will ensure that the following points are adhered to when siting platoon localities:-

a) All round defence in all cases.

b) A complete all round anti-tank obstacle using existing buildings, concrete pimples and road blocks. In the case of localities in the open country such as BROOM HILL the Company Area will be made tank proof.

c) Wire will be sited in rear, as well as in front of Anti-Tank Obstacles where possible.

d) In all areas locality Garrisons will be able to cover Anti-Tank Obstacles ore mine fields by fire.

e) The Commander of each locality must be able to command his men by voice control.

f) Slit trenches will be dug where possible in preference to using windows of houses.[pg51]8.

RECONNAISSANCE REPORTS.

Sectors will be reconnoitred forthwith, priority being given to the forward Battle Zone Localities. Plans for detailed defence of these localities will be submitted to these headquarters not later than 8th August, 1941.

6” to 1 mile Maps are not yet available. Allocation of Company areas can be seen by Sector Commanders at Garrison Headquarters pending the issue of large scale maps.

9. BOUNDARY.

Sector Commanders will co-ordinate the defences of Independent Localities and A.A. Ground Defences forward of their Sub-Sector areas. The dividing line between Chatham and Gillingham Sectors for this purpose will be marked on the trace.

10. INTERCOMMUNICATION.

A Signal Plan will be prepared by the Signal Master Kent Area between Garrison Headquarters and Sector Headquarters by wireless and/or Line, D.R. and/or bicycle orderly service supplementary to the above will be organised by Sector Commanders. Royal Navy have been requested to locate and man Visual Stations where possible.[fn4.1]TNA, WO 166/1338, War Office - Home Forces – War Diaries – Chatham Garrison Headquarters - Chatham Garrison Operation Instruction No.1, 2 Aug 1941.[/fn]

Colonel Swire’s brief time at Chatham came to an end on 14 August when he was replaced as Commander, Chatham Garrison by 41-year-old Colonel Godfrey ‘Reggie’ Palmer of The Queen’s Royal Regiment.[fn4.2]Ibid, Aug 1941.[/fn]

Palmer had just missed the First World War having been commissioned from Sandhurst in December 1918 but had served in Ireland in the early 1920’s before resigning his commission in 1928 to take up a career in the City. The day after resigning he joined the Territorial Army as a Lieutenant in the 5th Battalion, Queen’s Royal Regiment, his old Regiment’s Territorial battalion. On 24 December 1928 he was promoted to Captain and assumed command of ‘A’ Company, which was based at Reigate and Dorking. Palmer then settled into his new routine combining his job in London with his duties as a Territorial Army Officer. He was promoted to Major in 1933 and two years later he was appointed second-in command of his battalion and taking over full command as a Lieutenant-Colonel in 1937.

After the outbreak of the Second World War, Palmer served with his battalion in France which formed part of 131 Brigade of the 44th Infantry Division. Palmer saw action during the German invasions of Belgium and France for which he was Mentioned in Dispatches. Following the evacuation of Dunkirk in May 1940, Palmer and his battalion returned to the UK where they re-equipped as part of the re-formed 131 Brigade based around Oxford.[fn4.3]Palmer, Robert – A Concise Biography of Brigadier G.V. Palmer, 16 Jun 2020. (https://www.britishmilitaryhistory.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/124/2020/06/PALMER-Brigadier-Godfrey-Vaughan-V1_1.pdf).[/fn]

Further promotion for Godfrey Palmer came on 14 August 1941 when he was promoted to the rank of Acting Colonel on appointment as the Garrison Commander for Chatham. With his new appointment came the responsibility for finalising the new defence plans for Chatham which he was able to discuss with Brigadier Davenport when the Kent Area Commander visited Chatham the following day.[fn4.4]TNA, WO 166/1338, Ibid.[/fn][pg52]The next two weeks saw Palmer attending meetings with the Civil Defence Medway Group Control, the South-East Regional Commissioner, the Mayor of Rochester and the Superintendent of the Chatham Division of Kent County Constabulary, all of which to discuss the civilian aspects of the defence plan. Then, on 25 August the Garrison Commander played host to the SECO Army Commander, General Paget on his visit to Chatham to tour the Garrison defences.[fn4.5]Ibid.[/fn]

Work on the defences continued through September, and by the end of the month, the work had taken on a new urgency. On 30 September German troops entered the outskirts of Moscow and it only seemed a matter of a short time before the Soviet Union would sue for peace and Hitler’s attention would be directed once more towards an invasion of Britain. By mid-October the first detailed defence plan for Chatham was ready to be issued. Since April 1941 XII Corps had been under the command of Lt. Gen. Bernard Law Montgomery who had a contempt for ‘Defence Plans’, believing that plans with such a title induced a ‘defensive mentality’. He preferred the term ‘Plan to Defeat Invasion’, which he thought sounded more aggressive and which he used for his own XII Corps ‘Plan to Defeat Invasion’, issued in May 1941.[fn4.6]TNA, WO 166/344, War Office – Home Forces – War Diaries – XII Corps – General Staff, 12 Corps Plan to Defeat Invasion, 16 May 1941.[/fn] Montgomery’s attitude had obviously filtered down to the lower levels of Command, with Col. Palmer issuing Chatham Garrison’s ‘Plan to Defeat Invasion’ on 14 October.[fn4.7]TNA, WO 166/1338, Ibid, Oct 1941.[/fn] [fn4.8]All the following details are condensed from an original copy of the Plan held in Keith Gulvin’s private collection.[/fn]

The Plan’s stated intention was for the troops of Chatham Garrison to ‘hold their allotted localities and destroy the enemy in and around them’.

The Plan divided the Garrison Area, with its HQ at Amherst Caves, up into five operational Localities: Rochester, Chatham, Gillingham, Dockyard, and Rochester Airport.

Rochester Locality, with its HQ at Rochester Police Station, was sub-divided into:

I. Frindsbury Sub-Locality.

II. Strood Sub-Locality.

III. Bridge Sub-Locality.

IV. Fort Pitt Sub-Locality.

Chatham Locality, with its HQ at Southill Barracks, was sub-divided into:

I. Southill Sub-Locality.

II. Chatham Hill Sub-Locality.

Gillingham Locality, with its HQ at the Embassy Cinema, was sub-divided into:

I. Gillingham Park Sub-Locality.

II. Woodlands Sub-Locality.

III. Gadshill Sub-Locality.[pg53]The ‘Dockyard’ Locality, comprising the Military and Naval sectors behind the old Chatham Lines ditch fortifications, came under direct Command of the Garrison HQ, and was sub-divided into:

I. Kitchener Sub-Locality, with its HQ at Kitchener Barracks

II. Brompton Sub-Locality, with its HQ at Brompton Barracks.

III. R.N. Sub-Locality, with its HQ at St Mary’s Barracks

IV. Dockyard Sub-Locality, with its HQ in an air-raid shelter near the Dockyard’s power station.

[fg]The Dockyard Locality[/fg]

Rochester Airport was a ‘stand-alone’ Locality also incorporating Fort Bridgewoods and Fort Horsted, with its HQ based at the latter.

Each Sub-locality had its own HQ and allocation of troop units. The three town Sub-Localities were organised into a total of thirty-seven ‘Platoon Areas’ for all-round defence against troops and armoured vehicles. In the event of the enemy trying to bypass these positions they were to be ‘sought out and killed’.

As previously instigated by Col. Swire, a Mobile Force of Royal Marines, known as “MYFORCE”, would be available to deal with any airborne troop landings in the outskirts of the Garrison Area. This force would also have use of[pg54]an armoured train which would be under the command of the R.N. Sub-Locality HQ.

With no regular infantry battalion spare to assist, Col. Palmer would have to rely on other resources for the manning of his defence positions. The only Army forces at his disposal were some training units of Royal Engineers, the Royal Artillery crews of locally based anti-aircraft batteries and RASC and Pioneer Corps troops that could be spared from their regular duties. In addition, the Royal Navy had formed an ‘infantry’ battalion from Officers and Ratings at the RN barracks.

Given the shortage of regular troops, the Home Guard would have to play a major part in Palmer’s Plan. His plan envisaged deploying several Companies of Home Guard troops from the following local Battalions:

13th (Rochester) Bn. K.H.G. – to defend areas in the Frindsbury, Strood, Bridge and Fort Pitt Sub-Localities, and Rochester Airport

12th (Chatham) Bn. K.H.G. – to defend areas in Southill, Chatham Hill, Gillingham Park and Woodlands Sub-Localities.

27th (Kent Electric Power) Bn. K.H.G. – to defend areas in the Fort Pitt, and Southill Sub-Localities.

25th (G.P.O.) Bn. K.H.G. – to defend areas in the Fort Pitt, Southill and Woodlands Sub-Localities.

26th (Kent Bus) Bn. K.H.G. – to areas in the Woodlands Sub-Locality.

28th (1st Southern Railway) Bn. K.H.G. – to defend areas in the Woodlands and Gadshill Sub-Localities.

31st (Dockyard) Bn. K.H.G. – to defend areas in the Dockyard Sub-Locality.

Other Companies of the 12th & 13th Battalions would be deployed to the ‘Defended Villages’ outside the Nodal Point but within the Garrison Area:

Wouldham, Eccles, Burham, Blue Bell Hill, Walderslade, Hempstead, Wigmore, Rainham, and East Rainham.

A Battalion of Royal Marines would act as a general Garrison Reserve, while five Companies of men made up from staff and inmates from 14 Military Detention Camp (14 MDC) at Fort Darland would provide the Reserve for the Rochester, Chatham, and Gillingham Localities.

The Plan allowed for two States of Readiness. “Stand To”: ordered when were deemed particularly favourable for invasion, and would apply to all units other than the Garrison H.Q. On receipt of the order all defences would be manned 100% at night, and 30% by day when all other troops would be held at one hour’s notice. “Action Stations” would be ordered when it was considered that an invasion was imminent and would be the signal for the Garrison H.Q. to be called-out and fully manned, while all other units took action as in “Stand To”.

The Plan detailed the construction of numerous ‘fixed’ defences comprising artillery positions, ‘Flame Fougasse’ batteries, spigot mortar emplacements, roadblocks, ‘Fortified Houses’ and minefields.[pg55]The artillery component of the plan was comprised of Field and Medium artillery manned by R.N. gun crews, anti-tank guns, manned by the R.N. and Home Guard, anti-aircraft batteries used in their secondary role against ground targets, and Smith Guns, a ‘makeshift’ anti-tank weapon used by Home Guard.

[fg]The Smith Gun in the firing position (IWM H 18832)[/fg]

Forty-five sites were chosen for Flame Fougasse batteries, with their firing points safely located in buildings about 100 yards distant, but within line-of-sight of their respective batteries.

108 Blacker Bombard spigot mortars would be deployed throughout the Garrison Area. The majority of these would be mounted on concrete pedestals in purpose-built emplacements, while a few would operate from earth weapons pits or be mounted on legs inside large concrete drainage ‘spun’ pipes.

585 roadblocks would be set up on roads within the Nodal point. Most sited on minor roads would be of a ‘temporary’ nature using concrete cylinders or buoys which could be easily rolled in and out of position to allow for the passage of legitimate traffic. Some large gaps between buildings would also be filled using concrete cylinders too prevent vehicles using them. Roadblocks on major or wider roads would have rigid steel joists, often sections of cut up railway track, fixed into slots cut into the road surface. Gaps would be left between the joists to enable the passage of cars and smaller commercial vehicles while still acting as an effective barrier to enemy armoured fighting vehicles. The joists could also be removed to allow for the passage of friendly AFV’s. Any large open spaces to the sides of the roadblocks would be filled with either[pg56]large concrete blocks or concrete ‘pimples’ set into the ground, to prevent enemy vehicles ‘bypassing’ the roadblocks. All roadblocks would be covered by fire on “Action Stations”. They would be permanently manned, and partially closed to form single line traffic only. Orders to close the blocks would be issued by Garrison H.Q. although subordinate officers could order closure if they saw the enemy approaching.

Several buildings were identified for use as ‘Fortified Houses’ with their upper windows acting as firing positions. Some buildings would be strengthened internally and have firing ‘loopholes’ cut into the walls. Four buildings in Rochester High Street also had their walls strengthened to serve as emplacements for light machine guns (LMG’s) and Northover Projectors. The latter was another ‘makeshift’ anti-tank weapon developed for use by the Home Guard.

Mines would also play an important part in the defence scheme. A ‘Standing Minefield’ consisting of 420 anti-personnel beach mines had already been laid in the area around the underground Combined AHQ. Another 8,000 anti-tank mines were available to be laid as required for operational purposes throughout the Garrison Area.

Various sites were earmarked for use as signal posts and stations. Although modern signalling techniques using wireless transmitters and telephones would be the preferred method of communication, more ‘old-fashioned’ methods would also be employed. Several tall buildings and locations on high ground would become ‘Visual Stations’, operated by R.N. personnel using hand flag and lamp signals. Each Visual Station would be manned by two R.N. Signallers, equipped with one pair of Hand Flags, one Morse flag, one Aldis lamp and one night-signalling lamp. Each station would also have two cyclists and two Orderlies detailed to it (usually from the Home Guard) by the Sub-Locality Commander.

All medical resources within the Nodal Point; Army, R.N., R.A.F. and civilian, would be pooled and at the signal “Stand To”, First Aid Posts and Casualty Collecting Stations would be established in buildings throughout the area. All casualties, Military or otherwise, would be evacuated to the nearest post, whatever service was manning it.

One reason for the swift advance of German armoured forces through France in 1940 had been the ready availability of fuel. Most of their armoured vehicles ran on petrol, as opposed to diesel, so all they had to do if they were running low on fuel was to pull in at the nearest French roadside petrol station and fill-up, with the added bonus of not having to pay! This situation also had the benefit of the tanks not having to wait for fuel supplies to catch up with the advance. The French authorities had made no arrangements to prevent roadside petrol supplies falling into the hands of the enemy and suffered the consequences. The British would not be making the same mistakes in the event of an invasion of the UK. Colonel Palmer’s plan listed every petrol pump, and[pg57]holders of diesel oil and derv within the Garrison Area. In the event of an invasion all petrol and oil would be denied to the enemy. Garrison H.Q. would issue the orders for denial of civilian fuel resources to the police and the Petroleum Board to carry out while taking direct responsibility for ordering the destruction of A,R.P., A.F.S., Police, and Public Utility fuel supplies.

Colonel Palmer’s ‘Plan to Defeat Invasion’, stayed in place, with some later minor revisions, until July 1943, by which time the threat of a German invasion was deemed to have passed. However, surprise airborne raids against specific military targets remained a possibility to counter which a new plan was devised and published as Chatham Garrison’s ‘Plan for Defence of Vulnerable Points against Raids’, on 29 July 19439, replacing all previous plans.

Fortunately, some copies of Colonel Palmer’s original 1941 ‘Plan to Defeat Invasion’ survived being destroyed and one of these copies became the basis for the K.D.R.G.’s survey project.[pg58]

Part 2 - Fieldwork

Methodology

The first step in the process was to form a core team of research volunteers, in this instance five in total. Their roles would include both desk-based evidencing and field trips and collating the findings into the final report. Each member has expertise and knowledge in the local area which forms the geography of the document on which the final output is based.

The base document which formed the basis of the final report it titled “Chatham Garrison Plan to Defeat Invasion” dated October 1941. This document is a comprehensive catalogue of the types and position of various defence structures within the Medway towns at the time. In total over 1000 sites are identified.

The focus was on any surviving physical evidence which could be recorded and photographed to form the final gazetteer of surviving sites.

The types of sites that were to be investigated were Fougasse, Roadblocks, Artillery and anti-aircraft positions, Fortified houses, Railway blocks, Spigot mortar, Mines, and other defensive structures for example Pillboxes where surviving physical evidence could be located.

The evaluation of the main base document gives listings for each site category a geographic location and a military map reference based on the Cassini format (which must be converted into Ordnance Survey coordinates via a formula). This was supplemented by using aerial mapping and Google Earth overlays to assist in site identification and to narrow down potential locations for site visits. In addition, the Defence of Britain database project was used to identify any additional or missing sites from the list and provide further guidance where required.

Regular pre site visit meetings were held with the research team to evaluate the desk-based information gathering to identify areas and locations. This led to the Medway towns being divided into sections which could be visited on each occasion with a pre-planned agenda to maximise the use of time and resources. The plan was to visit every existing defence structure as identified where possible (some may be on private land so permission would have to be sought).

The planned site visits were made based on both known structure existence and the opportunity to discover maybe unknown sites based on the report. The format of the site visits was based on a walkover study of the site recording the actual location map reference, photographic evidence, and any salient observations.

The recording of the site visits and gathered information is to be collated onto a spreadsheet with NGR reference and a Google map link in addition a Google Earth overlay. The photographic evidence would be in digital format.[pg59]In addition, we have also recorded some defensive structures that were extant but not referenced in the Plan (Fieldworks such as trenches and anti-tank ditches although forming an integral part of the defence system are not specifically referenced in the Plan) and some structures that had been recorded on previous occasions but did not form part of any of the project field trips.

Field Trips

The Chatham Garrison Plan to Defeat Invasion covered an extensive area making it impossible to cover in its entirety within the time we had allowed for the project. Also, much of the area has undergone significant redevelopment since the Second World War destroying much evidence of the wartime defences. With these constraints in mind, we chose to concentrate our investigations on those areas which we knew, from our previous experiences, to be most likely to contain extant defensive structures.

The structures we recorded from our field trips and other investigations were each given their own unique Project Reference number (P-) which are mentioned in the following text and in the Register of Recorded Features.

The field trips were conducted by KDRG members Jay Curtis, Keith Gulvin, Clive Holden and Andy Kershaw, together with local historian Martin Laws. Most of the team have had a long association with the Medway area and their combined local knowledge proved an invaluable asset during the field trips.

1) Fort Amherst and the Inner Lines 16-07-2022

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[pg60]This area was well known to us and contained many previously identified wartime structures.

The first feature we looked at was a communications trench (P1) which ran to the south of the Barrier Ditch. Due to the dense summer vegetation little detail could be seen but its general outline was quite clear. We then looked at the site of a Bofors LAA gun emplacement on the Belvedere Battery (P2). The emplacement was demolished in 1983/84 and no trace of it remains now. At the South point of the Belvedere Battery looked down at the site of a spigot mortar emplacement on the Spur Battery (P3). The emplacement was demolished in the 1980’s but it was referenced in Appendix “M” of the Garrison Plan as Serial No.5. From Prince Williams Battery we looked across at the site of an anti-tank ditch (P4), now completely infilled. From Prince William’s Bastion we were able to access our first extant referenced structure: an anti-tank gun emplacement (P5) stated in Appendix “B” of the Garrison Plan as housing a 6-pounder gun, manned by the R.N. The emplacement is of reinforced concrete construction with some evidence of brick shuttering. It appeared to be in very good condition but very overgrown. There were some metal loops fixed into the top of one of the walls, the purpose of which is unknown.

We then moved onto the Spur Battery where we looked at what is believed to have been, a weapons pit (P6), but again, dense vegetation made it impossible to examine it in any detail, but we could see some strands of very old, barbed wire amongst the overgrowth. On the South-East point of the Spur Battery, after cutting back much vegetation, we found a spigot mortar emplacement (P7), referenced in Appendix “M” of the Garrison Plan as Serial No. 6 ‘firing South’. Despite being very overgrown, the emplacement with its concrete ‘ready-use’ ammunition lockers, pedestal, and stainless steel pivot appeared to be in very good condition.

From Fort Amherst, we walked out onto the Inner Lines to the Garrison Tennis Courts. Here, on the ramparts behind the 18th C. ‘moat’ which formed part of the anti-tank ditch we found two spigot mortar emplacements. The first emplacement (P8), referenced in Appendix “M” of the Garrison Plan as Serial No. 8, ‘firing East’, was enclosed behind a steel fence, making examination and photography very difficult. However, we could see that most of the emplacement was overgrown with only the top of the concrete pedestal with its stainless-steel pivot, and part of one of the ammunition lockers clearly visible. The second emplacement (P9), referenced as Serial No.9. ‘firing East’, was not fenced off but again, was heavily overgrown with just the top of the pedestal, the pivot and parts of two ammunition lockers visible.[pg61]We then moved onto the Couvre Porte, a defended gateway that was built as part of the 18th Century fortifications. Here we recorded a single, but very large concrete anti-tank block (P10) that was put in place to block the gateway during the wartime period. Unfortunately, the block had been badly defaced with modern graffiti but is otherwise in good condition.

From the Couvre Porte we moved onto King’s Bastion where we found a spigot mortar emplacement (P11), referenced in Appendix “M” of the Garrison Plan as Serial No.11., ‘firing East’. The concrete pedestal and stainless steel pivot could clearly be seen and were in very good condition. However, the ammunition lockers were very overgrown and least two of them appeared to have suffered some damage.

We then walked to the North of the King’s Bastion where it ends above the Sally Porte. Here we saw the anti-tank gun pillbox, (P12) referenced in Appendix “B” of the Garrison Plan as a ‘3-pdr’ gun, manned by the R.N. An internal examination of the pillbox was not possible, but it appears to be a variant of the Type FW3/28A pillbox, usually built to house either a 2-pounder or 6-pounder A/T gun. The pillbox also has an ‘infantry chamber’ with a firing loophole for a Bren light machine-gun. Although heavily overgrown, the pillbox seems to be in good condition with its brick shuttering intact.

That concluded our field trip for the day, however there were other structures and features in the area, that were referenced in the Garrison Plan that we overlooked recording on the day but that had been recorded previously.

At Fort Amherst, the Caveyard tunnels (P13), referred to in Appendix “A” (Order of Battle) of the plan as ‘Caves, Kitchener Barracks’, housed the Garrison HQ and signals hub with three W/T sets and several telephones.

The high point of Fort Amherst is just above Prince William’s Battery which had long served as an Observation Point, providing officers with a clear view across the Great Lines ‘field of fire’. During the Second World War it provided the ideal site for a Visual Signal Station (P14), referenced in Appendix “J” of the Garrison Plan as being visible to and from several other V/S Stations, including those at Fort Pitt, Rochester Castle, Fort Clarence and the Embassy Cinema at Gillingham.

Just above where the Lower Barrier Ditch meets Dock Road there is an anti-tank gun emplacement (P15). It is referenced in Appendix “B” of the Garrison Plan as being on Church Hill (which is what this stretch of the road was then known as) and housing a ‘3-pdr’ gun, manned by the R.N. The emplacement is visible from Dock Road, but it has been enclosed by a metal security fence and sealed-up so no close examination is possible.[pg62]On the King’s Bastion there is a second spigot mortar emplacement (P16) referenced in Appendix “M” of the Garrison Plan as Serial No.10. ‘firing East’. We overlooked recording this on our field trip but it had been seen on previous occasions. Only the concrete pedestal with its stainless-steel pivot appears to have survived.

2) Chatham and Rochester 29-10-2022

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We commenced this field trip by walking around the outskirts of Fort Pitt. The military hospital had closed in 1922 and most of the 18th Century fortifications demolished. The site was then sold to the Board of Education for the construction of a girls’ technical school. However, it still served a military purpose in the Second World War when it was chosen as the site for a Visual Signal Station (P17). The precise location of the V/S Station has not been recorded but we can presume it would have been somewhere towards the summit of Fort Pitt Hill, close to where the college stands today. The station is referenced in Appendix “J” of the Garrison Plan as being visible to V/S stations at Fort Amherst, Fort Clarence, Palace Cinema Gillingham, Broomhill, and Kent Electric Power at Strood.

We then walked along City Way, into Rochester where we stopped at the former ‘Star Inn’ pub (P18), which is now a private residence. The pub is referenced in Appendix “G” of the Garrison Plan as a Fortified House, with its[pg63]front walls strengthened and being the site of a Northover Projector emplacement. Only an external examination of the building was possible, and no positive evidence of its wartime use could be seen, although we did debate whether the small slit windows in the toilet extension could have been firing loopholes. Also looking back on photos of the pub in 1927, the two large bay windows on the ground floor were a later addition which may be linked to having the front walls strengthened in 1941. However, this is just speculation. There is also a spigot mortar emplacement referenced in Appendix “M” of the Plan as being located ‘above the Star Inn’ on Star Hill but we could find no surviving evidence of it.

From City Way we entered Rochester High Street. No.196. High Street (P19), which is now a dentistry practice, is referenced in Appendix “G” of the Garrison Plan as a Fortified House, with strengthened walls and being the site of a Northover Projector emplacement. No. 186 High Street, Berkeley House (P20) is likewise referenced. Neither building shows any external signs of wartime modifications. There is two other Fortified Houses referenced at 179 and 191, High Street but these buildings appear to have been demolished.

178-184 High Street is a single building known in 1941 as ‘County House’ (P21) and was then the Head Office of the Kent Electric Power Company and the Headquarters of the 27th (Kent Electric) Battalion, Kent Home Guard. The building is also referenced in Appendix “A” of the Garrison Plan with a ‘Dug out behind’ as the HQ of the Fort Pitt Sub-Locality. It was not possible to access the rear of the building to see if the dug-out still exists and, from the front there is no evidence of its wartime use.

We then drove to St Margaret’s Street where we looked around Fort Clarence. The Fort is recorded in Appendix “J” of the Garrison Plan as a Visual Signal Station (P22), viewable to and from V/S Stations at Fort Amherst, Broomhill, Fort Pitt, and Rochester Castle. The precise location of the V/S Station is not recorded in the plan, but we can presume it was in the roof of the gun tower which is now residential apartments. Also, there are two flame fougasse batteries referenced in Appendix “C” of the Plan as being located on Borstal Road to the South-West of Fort Clarence. We walked the area but could find no surviving signs of either of them.

We then moved across the road to the memorial gardens opposite the fort which was the location of a spigot mortar emplacement referenced in Appendix “M” of the Garrison Plan as Serial No.86. (P23). Although we could find no surviving evidence of the emplacement, it is clearly visible on the 1946 RAF aerial survey images of the area. We did find a raised circular concrete platform (P24) in the gardens that we first thought may be part of the SM emplacement, but later examination of the aerial images put it in the wrong location, so we discounted that theory. However, there is speculation that it may have been a platform for a light anti-aircraft gun mounting.[pg64]

3) Lower Gillingham 03-12-2022

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This field trip commenced with a brief look for the site of a First World War-era pillbox that guarded the old RN Victualling Depot at the end of Bridge Road and which would have still been in use in 1941. Following the Dockyard’s closure, the Victualling Depot was demolished in the 1990’s and the site made ready for later redevelopment. The pillbox was still there in 1996 when it was recorded by Victor Smith but no trace of it remains now. We then moved onto Pier Approach Road where we searched for evidence of an anti-tank wall, visible in the 1946 RAF aerial survey images, that had been recorded in the 1990’s by Victor Smith. The wall was located in the Southern Water pumping station yard at the junction with Pier Road but it does not appear to have survived the widening of the road junction here. Also from the 1946 aerial views there appears to be two rows of anti-tank obstacles running along the length of Pier Approach Road, in front of the Dockyard boundary wall. No trace of these can be seen today.

We then moved back across Pier Road into Leslie Road. Appendix “G” of the Garrison Plan to Defeat Invasion identifies the top floors of five houses here (Nos. 4, 6, 22, 24, and 34’) as being Fortified Houses (P25). Viewing the front elevations offered no evidence or reason for these houses to have been ‘fortified’. However, when viewed from Pier Road, it became obvious that the top floors of the rear elevations had a commanding view across Pier Road at its approach to the Dockyard and would have provided ideal firing positions. We then went to look at No.18. Milner Road, another referenced Fortified House[pg65](P26). The Plan states that it was the ‘Top back room’ that was fortified, and we were only able to view the front of the house.

Whilst we were in the area we took a brief look at the surviving wartime civilian air-raid shelter (P27) behind the Gillingham Laundry on Richmond Road. It appears that the shelter now serves as some kind of storeroom and has a modern metal staircase to the front leading to a ‘Community Garden’.

4) Gillingham – The Lower Lines 04-02-2023

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This field trip began with viewing the rows of concrete anti-tank ‘Pimples’ (P28) running along Medway Road, at its junction with Cumberland Road, along the boundary of the Lower Lines Park. About twelve Pimples were visible amidst the undergrowth, some of which were damaged. Although not specifically referenced in the Garrison Plan, these obstacles may have supplemented a ‘RSJ’ roadblock that is referenced in Appendix “E” of the Plan, Serial No. 567, as being sited at the Medway Road end of Cumberland Road. This roadblock would have protected the approach to the RN Commander-in-Chief, The Nore’s Official Residence and the RN Gas School that once stood along Cumberland Road.

We then entered the Lower Lines Park and walked along the ramparts of the Napoleonic-era fortifications which were repurposed to become part of the Second World War anti-tank defences (P29) forming the inner defence line protecting Chatham’s main naval and military areas.[pg66]During the 1890’s the Royal Engineers constructed two prototype searchlight emplacements on the Lower Lines as part of a series of experiments with searchlight technology. In the first of these emplacements that we came to (P30), we could see that a concrete block retaining wall had been constructed within the emplacement. This appeared to us to be a later addition to the original construction and closer inspection revealed some graffiti carved into one of the concrete blocks with a name possibly ‘P.O. WIDLEY’ and a clear date ‘DEC 1941’. It was difficult to tell if this graffiti was carved when the concrete was still wet. If it was then it would date the wall as a wartime addition and indicate that the emplacement was in use then for some purpose as yet unknown. We did speculate that it could have housed a gun, possibly a LAA, gun but we found no firm evidence to support this.

In the late 18th Century, a casemated barracks was built on the Lower Lines. Known as St Mary’s Barracks. The barracks had been occupied by the Royal Engineers from 1893 until November 1941 when the R.E. Depot moved to Ripon and the R.N. took over the barracks. The barracks formed an integral part of the Lower Lines fortifications and two gun emplacements were built on the ramparts in 1940. Although all the barrack casemates were demolished in the 1960’s the ramparts and gun emplacements remained in place. These emplacements are referenced in Appendix “B” of the Garrison Plan to Defeat Invasion. Both housed 12-pounder naval deck guns, manned by Royal Navy gun crews. In the Eastern emplacement (P31) we could see the concrete gun platform and metal holdfast ring. Parts of the concrete parapet were also visible but most of it had been destroyed. We also found the remains of what appeared to be a concrete ready-use ammunition locker. There is an information board located by the emplacement explaining its use. The Western emplacement (P32) was built behind the 19th Century firing step and was more intact than its neighbour. It also had re-purposed steel ship’s lockers set into the brick walls of the firing step for ammunition storage. An iron plate was set into the floor of the emplacement which was presumably part of the gun mount.

Set into the brick revetments of the ditch are the secondary entrance and emergency exit of the wartime Chatham Area Combined HQ bunker (P33). Both doorways are now very well sealed-up to prevent any unauthorised access. The bunker still exists intact, although fire-damaged in places, as modified in the 1960’s when it became the Chatham RN Reserve HQ. HMS Wildfire, remaining in use until 1984.

During the war a hutted accomodation camp was built just off Medway Road to house members of the Women’s Royal Naval Service (WRNS) who worked in the nearby Area Combined HQ bunker. Although most of the camp has long been demolished, an air-raid shelter remains (P34). It is now sealed-up but has a metal grill fixed at the top of its entrance allowing access for bats.[pg67]

5) Strood 25-02-2023

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We began this field trip in Canal Road to try and locate the anti-tank ‘Pimples’ (P35) that supplemented a RSJ roadblock referenced in Appendix “E” of the Garrison Plan to Defeat Invasion as Serial No.164.. According to the Plan, these Pimples ran both sides of the road and were still in place along the river side until a few years ago when they were removed during work to heighten the river wall and realign the road. However, we had heard that they were still located somewhere nearby, and we eventually found them stacked behind the fence of a derelict site opposite the railway station.

We then oved onto Goddington Road to look for a spigot mortar emplacement (P36) in the garden of No. 84, referenced in Appendix “M” of the Garrison Plan as Serial No.75.. No sign of any emplacement could be seen from the road but later examination of the 1946 RAF aerial survey images of the area revealed it to have been located in the rear garden of the house. Most recent aerial images show that no trace of the emplacement survives.

We drove onto Broomhill Park to look for the three spigot mortar emplacement that were referenced there in the Garrison Plan but, despite extensive searching, we could find no evidence remaining of any of the emplacements. Unfortunately, the 1946 aerial survey images are missing for this area so we could not use these to help find the emplacements.

Our final ‘port of call’ for this field trip was Cuxton Road in Strood where we found an anti-tank ‘Pimple’ (P37) in the front garden of No. 130 which was[pg68]referenced in Appendix “E” of the Garrison Plan as part of roadblock Serial No.79.

6) Upper Gillingham 15-07-2023

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This field trip focussed on the Darland and Darland Banks area of Upper Gillingham.

Fort Darland was demolished in the 1960’s but its outline can still be understood from current aerial photographs. We walked around the housing estate that replaced the fort to see if we could find any trace of it on the ground but nothing could be seen.

There were several roadblocks in the area referenced in the Garrison Plan to Defeat Invasion, but we could find no trace of any of these. Likewise, we had no success locating any sign of the spigot mortar emplacements referenced in the Plan, two of which were located on the Darland Banks, another outside the entrance of the Chatham Grammar School in Ash Tree Lane and another in the grounds of the ‘Star’ pub on Watling Street.

We did find on Watling Street, by the William Adams memorial clock, evidence of a possible ‘Loopholed Wall’ (P38). We could see that several embrasures had obviously been cut into the brick wall at some time and later filled in. Cross-checking with the 1946 RAF aerial survey images of the area we could see what appeared to be a roadblock running across the road from what is now a filling station, with rows of anti-tank obstacles on the opposite side, close to the Adams memorial. In Appendix “E” of the Garrison Plan there is a RSJ[pg69]roadblock, referenced as Serial No. 364, located at ‘Watling St, nr Star Hotel’. The loopholed wall could have provided firing cover for this roadblock.

Finally, we visited the old ‘Palace Cinema’ (P39) on Watling Steet, which is now a ‘Camping International’ store. The cinema is referenced in Appendix “A” of the Garrison Plan as the HQ of the Gillingham Park Sub-Locality, under the command of Major W.G Stevens of 12th (Chatham) Bn. Kent Home Guard. The building’s tall tower was also an ideal location for a Visual Signal Station, as referenced in Appendix “J” of the Plan, with views to and from V/S Stations at Blue Bell Hill, Broomhill, the ‘Embassy Cinema’, St Mary’s Barracks, and Rainham Church. We entered the store and asked the staff for permission to go access the tower. Unfortunately, the store manager was not available to allow this, but the staff suggested we contact him by email for access at a future date.

7) Chatham and Rochester 30-03-2024

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Our final field trip took us first to Chalk Pit Hill in Chatham where there were two flame fougasse batteries referenced in Appendix “C” of the Garrison Plan to Defeat Invasion: Serial No.20. ‘NE of railway bridge’ (P40) and Serial No.21. ’SW of railway bridge’ (P41). Although we could find no trace of either battery we established a good sense of where they may have bee located and photographed each site. We then looked for the site of two other, nearby, fougasse batteries: at Jenkins Dale, Serial No.22. ‘NE of railway bridge’ (P42), and at Skinner Street, Serial No.24.‘NE of railway bridge’ (P43). Again, no trace of either battery could be found but we photographed the presumed locations.

We then moved onto the site of the old Royal Army Service Corps, Southill Barracks, just off Maidstone Road, in Chatham. The barracks were demolished in the 1960’s and the site redeveloped for housing. We looked for any remaining traces of the three spigot mortar emplacements that were referenced here in the Garrison Plan but we nothing appears to have survived.

We moved out onto Maidstone Road and looked at the site of a flame fougasse battery, referenced in the Garrison Plan as Serial No.26., located behind an advertising hoarding on the West side of the road (P44). The hoarding is still there but nothing appears to remain of the battery. The firing point for this battery was on the opposite side of the road in the North-West corner of Southill Barracks (P45). Nothing could be seen from Maidstone Road due to the location being hidden behind a high solid fence. We also looked around the rear of the site, in Port Rise but access was not possible due to a locked gate.[pg71]However, Keith Gulvin did visit the site back in 2007 and saw the remains of the firing point then and there is good reason to believe they are still there now.

We drove onto St Margaret’s Cemetery in Maidstone Road, Rochester where we located the site of a flame fougasse battery firing point (P46), referenced in the Garrison Plan as Serial No.36.. We did not identify the exact location of the battery, but the firing point was the huge memorial to Henry Burrell that stands outside the entrance to the cemetery chapel. No trace of the firing point could be found.

We then moved into Rochester City Centre and looked at a building we suspected to be a Fortified House (P47), referenced in Appendix “G” of the Garrison Plan as ‘Canon Ward’s garage’ with its ‘walls strengthened and loopholed’. The building, on the corner of The Precinct and St Margaret’s Street, looked like a former stable block and appeared to have loopholes cut into one of its walls but we could not be certain this was the ‘Fortified House’ referenced in the Plan. However later research discovered that the Rev. Arthur Evelyn Ward was Canon of Rochester Cathedral from 1940 until his death in 1944 and according to his entry in ‘Who was Who’ he lived at Prior’s Gate House, Rochester. Locating the house on Google maps and then comparing it with the 1946 RAF aerial survey of the area we could see in the latter that there was then a path leading direct from the rear of Prior’s Gate House to the building we had looked at which confirmed that it was connected to the house and could well have been the Canon’s ‘garage’.

Beyond The Precinct, the medieval form of Rochester Castle’s Keep tower dominates the skyline over the city centre. The tower provided an ideal location for a Visual Signal Station (P48), referenced in Appendix “J” of the Garrison Plan with views to and from several other V/S Stations including those at Fort Amherst, Broomhill, Fort Clarence and Fort Pitt.

As we walked into the High Street, we passed the ‘King’s Head Hotel’ which was referenced in Appendix “G” of the Plan as a Fortified House (P49). On the opposite side of the High Street, No.45., now ‘Cheldgate House’, was another Fortified House (P50). Unfortunately, we had run out of time to look more closely at these last two buildings but as they are extant they have been recorded.

Other Recorded Structures

The May 2024 field trip was to be our last, as work needed to proceed on compiling and writing up the project report if it was to be completed in the projected time. However, there were some structures, not covered by the field trips, that had been recorded by the team on other occasions which we felt should also be included in the report. Details of these can be found in the Register of Recorded Features (P51 onwards) in Appendix II of this report.

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Appendix I – Extracts from the Chatham Garrison Plan to Defeat Invasion

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Appendix II - Register of Recorded Features

Project Ref: P1

Plan Ref: N/A

Feature: Communications trench

Location: Fort Amherst – South of Barrier Ditch (TQ 75938 68280)

Date Recorded: 16-07-2022

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Project Ref: P2

Plan Ref: N/A

Feature: Bofors LAA gun emplacement (removed)

Location: Fort Amherst – Belvedere Battery (TQ 76027 68254)

Date Recorded: 16-07-2022[pg96]Project Ref: P3

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Plan Ref: Appendix M, Serial No. 5

Feature: Spigot mortar emplacement (removed)

Location: Fort Amherst – Belvedere Battery (TQ 76025 68239)

Date Recorded: 16-07-2022

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Project Ref: P4

Plan Ref: N/A

Feature: Anti-tank ditch (site of)

Location: Fort Amherst – Prince William’s Battery (TQ 76030 68222)

Date Recorded: 16-07-2022

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[pg97]Project Ref: P5

Plan Ref: Appendix B

Feature: Anti-tank gun emplacement

Location: Fort Amherst – Prince William’s Bastion (TQ 76122 68164)

Date Recorded: 16-07-2022

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P6

Plan Ref: N/A

Feature: Weapons Pit

Location: Fort Amherst – Spur Battery (TQ 76210 68257)

Date Recorded: 16-07-2022

[fg][/fg]

[pg98]Project Ref: P7

Plan Ref: Appendix M, Serial No. 6

Feature: Spigot mortar emplacement

Location: Fort Amherst – Spur Battery (TQ 76214 68212)

Date Recorded: 16-07-2022

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P8

Plan Ref: Appendix M, Serial No. 8

Feature: Spigot mortar emplacement.

Location: Inner Lines- Garrison Tennis Courts (TQ 76257 68381)

Date Recorded: 16-07-2022

[fg][/fg]

[pg99]Project Ref: P9

Plan Ref: Appendix M, Serial No.9.

Feature: Spigot mortar emplacement

Location: Inner Lines – Garrison Tennis Courts (TQ 76258 68398)

Date Recorded: 16-07-2022

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P10

Plan Ref: N/A

Feature: Anti-tank block

Location: Inner Lines – Couvre Porte (TQ 76247 68483)

Date Recorded: 16-07-2022

[fg][/fg]

[pg100]Project Ref: P11

Plan Ref: Appendix M, Serial No.11.

Feature: Spigot mortar emplacement

Location: Inner Lines – King’s Bastion (TQ 76330 68527))

Date Recorded: 16-07-2022

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P12

Plan Ref: Appendix B

Feature: Anti-tank gun pillbox (Type FW3/28A)

Location: Inner Lines – Sally Porte (TQ 76367 68635)

Date recorded: 16-07-2022

[fg][/fg]

[pg101]Project Ref: P13

Plan Ref: Appendix A (Order of Battle) & Appendix J (Signals Communications)

Feature: Garrison HQ & Signals

Location: Fort Amherst – Caveyard Tunnels (TQ 75887 68380)

Date Recorded: 16-07-2022

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P14

Plan Ref: Appendix J

Feature: Visual Signals Station

Location: Fort Amherst – Prince William’s Saluting Battery (TQ 76124 68195)

Date Recorded: 08-09-2020.

[fg][/fg]

[pg102]Project Ref: P15

Plan Ref: Appendix B

Feature: Anti-tank gun emplacement

Location: Fort Amherst – Lower Barrier Ditch (TQ 75792 68258))

Date Recorded: 03-07-2020

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P16

Plan Ref: Appendix M, Serial No.10.

Feature: Spigot mortar emplacement

Location: Inner Lines – Kings Bastion (TQ 76252 68478)

Date Recorded: 27-03-2016

[fg][/fg]

[pg103]Project Ref: P17

Plan Ref: Appendix J

Feature: Visual Signal Station (site of)

Location: Fort Pitt – Fort Pitt Hill (TQ 75108 67697)

Date Recorded: 29-10-2022

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P18

Plan Ref: Appendix G

Feature: Fortified House

Location: Former “Star Inn”, Star Hill, Rochester (TQ 74594 68147)

Date Recorded: 29-10-2022

[fg][/fg]

[pg104]Project Ref: P19

Plan Ref: Appendix G

Feature: Fortified House

Location: 196, High Street, Rochester (TQ 74570 68174)

Date Recorded: 29-10-2022

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P20

Plan Ref: Appendix G

Feature: Fortified House

Location: 186, High Street, Rochester (TQ 74548 68194)

Date Recorded: 29-10-2024

[fg][/fg]

[pg105]Project Ref: P21

Plan Ref: Appendix A, Fort Pitt Sub-Locality HQ (‘Dug out’ at rear)

Feature: Headquarters

Location: 178-184, High Street Rochester (TQ 74538 68220)

Date Recorded: 29-10-2021

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P22

Plan Ref: Appendix J

Feature: Visual Signal Station

Location: Fort Clarence, St Margaret’s Street, Rochester (TQ 73905 67688)

Date Recorded: 29-10-2022

[fg][/fg]

[pg106]Project Ref: P23

Plan Ref: Appendix M, Serial No.86.

Feature: Spigot mortar emplacement (removed)

Location: Memorial Gardens, Borstal Road, Rochester (TQ 73859 67716)

Date recorded: 29-10-2022

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P24

Plan Ref: N/A

Feature: Possible LAA gun platform

Location: Memorial Gardens, Borstal Road, Rochester (TQ 73841 67722)

Date Recorded: 29-10-2022

[fg][/fg]

[pg107]Project Ref: P25

Plan Ref: Appendix G

Feature: Fortified Houses (top floors)

Location: Nos, 4, 6, 22, 24, & 34 Leslie Road, Gillingham (TQ 77840 69279)

Date Recorded: 03-12-2022

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P26

Plan Ref: Appendix G

Feature: Fortified House (Top back room)

Location: 18 Milner Road, Gillingham (TQ 77900 69223)

Date Recorded: 03-12-2022

[fg][/fg]

[pg108]Project Ref: P27

Plan Ref: N/A

Feature: Air-raid shelter

Location: Sunlight Laundry, Richmond Road, Gillingham (TQ 77549 69095)

Date Recorded: 03-12-2022

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P28

Plan Ref: N/A

Feature: Anti-tank Pimples (approx. 12)

Location: Medway Road, Gillingham (TQ 77159 69219)

Date Recorded: 04-02-2023

[fg][/fg]

[pg109]Project Ref: P29

Plan Ref: N/A

Feature: Anti-Tank Ditch

Location: Gillingham – Lower Lines (TQ 77075 69446)

Date Recorded: 04-02-2023

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P30

Plan Ref: N/A

Feature: Possible gun emplacement (ex-searchlight emplacement)

Location: Gillingham – Lower Lines (TQ 77017 69324)

Date Recorded: 04-02-2023

[fg][/fg]

[pg110]Project Ref: P31

Plan Ref: Appendix B

Feature: 12-pounder gun emplacement

Location: Gillingham – Lower Lines (TQ 76968 69309)

Date Recorded: 04-02-2023

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P32

Plan Ref: Appendix B

Feature: 12-pounder gun emplacement

Location: Gillingham – Lower Lines (TQ 76859 69198)

Date Recorded: 04-02-2023

[fg][/fg]

[pg111]Project Ref: P33

Plan Ref: N/A

Feature: Chatham Area Combined HQ Bunker

Location: Gillingham – Lower Lines (TQ 76989 69276)

Date Recorded: 04-02-2023

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P34

Plan Ref: N/A

Feature: WRNS air-raid shelter

Location: Gillingham – Medway Road (TQ 77112 69292)

Date Recorded: 04-02-2023

[fg][/fg]

[pg112]Project Ref: P35

Plan Ref: Appendix E, Serial No.164.

Feature: Anti-tank Pimples

Location: Canal Road, Strood (TQ 74100 69243)

Date Recorded: 25-02-2023

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P36

Plan Ref: Appendix M. Serial No.75.

Feature: Spigot mortar emplacement (removed)

Location: 84, Goddington Road, Strood (TQ 73636 70071)

Date Recorded: 25-02-2023

[fg][/fg]

[pg113]Project Ref: P37

Plan Ref: Appendix E, Serial No.79.

Feature: Anti-tank Pimple

Location: 130, Cuxton Road, Strood (TQ 73059 68848)

Date Recorded: 25-02-2023

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P38

Plan Ref: N/A

Feature: Loopholed Wall

Location: Watling Steet, Gillingham (TQ 78360 66808)

Date Recorded: 15-07-2023

[fg][/fg]

[pg114]Project Ref: P39

Plan Ref: Appendix A / Appendix J

Feature: Sub-Locality Headquarters / Visual Signal Station

Location: Former ‘Palace Cinema’ (Camping Int.), Watling Street, Gillingham (TQ 74139 68570)

Date Recorded: 15-07-2023

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P40

Plan Ref: Appendix C, Serial No.20.

Feature: Flame fougasse battery (removed)

Location: Chalk Pit Hill, Chatham (TQ 76039 67358)

Date Recorded: 30-03-2024

[fg][/fg]

[pg115]Project Ref: P41

Plan Ref: Appendix C, Serial No.21.

Feature: Flame fougasse battery (removed)

Location: Chalk Pit Hill, Chatham (TQ 76016 67357)

Date Recorded: 30-03-2024

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P42

Plan Ref: Appendix C, Serial No.22.

Feature: Flame fougasse battery (removed)

Location: Jenkins Dale, Chatham (TQ 75992 67369)}

Date Recorded: 30-03-2024

[fg][/fg]

[pg116]Project Ref: P43

Plan Ref: Appendix C, Serial No.24.

Feature: Flame fougasse battery (removed)

Location: Skinner Street, Chatham (TQ 75973 67395)

Date Recorded: 30-03-2024

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P44

Plan Ref: Appendix C, Serial No.26.

Feature: Flame fougasse battery (removed)

Location: Maidstone Road, Chatham (TQ 75619 67511)

Date Recorded: 30-03-2024

[fg][/fg]

[pg117]Project Ref P45

Plan Ref: Appendix C, Serial No.26.

Feature: Flame fougasse firing point

Location: Maidstone Road, Chatham (TQ 75648 67450)

Date Recorded: 18-02-2007

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P46

Plan Ref: Appendix C, Serial No.36.

Feature Flame fougasse firing point.

Location: Henry Burrel memorial, St Margaret’s Cemetery, Maidstone Road, Rochester (TQ 74204 67223)

Date Recorded: 30-03-2024

[fg][/fg]

[pg118]Project Ref: P47

Plan Ref: Appendix G

Feature: Fortified House

Location: The Precinct, Rochester (TQ 74185 68443)

Date Recorded: 30-03-2024

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P48

Plan Ref: Appendix J

Feature: Visual Signal Station

Location: Rochester Castle (TQ 74139 68570)

Date Recorded: 30-03-2024

[fg][/fg]

[pg119]Project Ref: P49

Plan Ref: Appendix G

Feature: Fortified House (first floor back windows)

Location: ‘King’s Head Hotel’, High Street, Rochester (TQ 74282 68616)

Date Recorded: 30-03-2024

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P50

Plan Ref: Appendix G

Feature: Fortified House (First and ground floor windows, NW side)

Location: 45 High Street, Rochester (TQ 74283 68655)

Date Recorded: 30-03-2024

[fg][/fg]

[pg120]Project Ref: P51

Plan Ref: N/A

Feature: Loopholed Wall (reinforced)

Location: Manor Road, Chatham (TQ 75492 67836)

Date Recorded: 12-02-2024

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P52

Plan Ref: N/A

Feature: Loopholed Wall

Location: The Cut, Chatham (TQ 76037 68846)

Date Recorded: 05-03-2019

[fg][/fg]

[pg121]Project Ref: P53

Plan Ref: N/A

Feature: Loopholed Wall

Location: Chatham Dockyard – Boundary Wall / Dock Road (South) -

(TQ 75843 68753)

Date Recorded: 25-07-2023

[fg][/fg]

Project Ref: P54

Plan Ref: N/A

Feature: Loopholed Wall

Location: Chatham Dockyard – Boundary Wall / Dock Road (North) -

(TQ 76191 69273)

Date Recorded: 10-03-2017

[fg][/fg]

[pg122]Project Ref: P55

Plan Ref: Appendix E, Serial No.572.

Feature: Anti-tank Pimples

Location: Royal Engineers Museum, Brompton (West side) (TQ 76583 68979)

Date Recorded: 12-04-2023

[fg][/fg]

[pg123]

Appendix III – Additional Digital Downloads

1. Recorded features – high resolution and additional images (to be viewed in conjunction with Appendix II): https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1-6PDAtsnEcRxTEzUPowgKOubvCGDgqNr?usp=sharing

2. Recorded features – spreadsheet (two tabs) with links to locations on Google Maps: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/158IGC8bxkF061jujZDl0KeiMK-sAdbup/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=101812040446479403601&rtpof=true&sd=true

3. Recorded features - KMZ file with map pins for use as an overlay with the desktop version of Google Earth: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1vhQJ1BkWo9FLSN2H64h-UuAeLfewOvpJ/view?usp=sharing [pg124]

References

Bibliography

Dobinson, Colin – AA Command, (Methuen, 2001)

Gulvin, K.R. – Kent Home Guard, (North Kent Books, 1980)

Holden, C. R. – Chatham’s Military Heritage, (Amberley Publishing, 2018)

Holman, J. & Kendall, P. – The Lower Lines, (Canterbury Archaeological Trust, 2023)

Kendall, P. – The Royal Engineers in Chatham, 1750-2012, (English Heritage, 2012)

MacKenzie, S.P. - The Home Guard: A Military and Political History, (Oxford University Press, 1995

Macleod, Col. R. & Kelly, Dennis – The Ironside Diaries 1937-1940, (Constable & Co. Ltd, 1962)

Wynne, Capt. G.C. – Stopping Hitler: an official account of how Britain planned to defend itself in the Second World War, (Frontline Books, 2017).

The National Archives (TNA)

ADM 1/10956 Admiralty – Chatham Area Combined Headquarters: estimate of costs

WO 166/344, War Office – Home Forces – War Diaries – XII Corps – General Staff, 1940-41

WO 166/1195, War Office – Home Forces- War Diaries – Chatham Area Headquarters, 1939-40

WO 166/1214, War Office, Home Forces – War Diaries – Home Counties Area Headquarters, 1939-40

WO 166/1338, War Office – Home Forces – War Diaries – Chatham Garrison Headquarters, 1940-41

WO 166/3655, War Office - Home Forces – War Diaries – Royal Engineers – 179 Tunnelling Company, Jul - Aug 1940.

WO 166/11034, War Office – Home Forces – War Diaries – Chatham Garrison Headquarters, 1943

WO 199/77, War Office – Home Forces - General Headquarters – Defence of Special Installations – Defence of Naval Establishments, Mar 1941-Jun 1942

WO 199/544. War Office – Home Forces – General Headquarters – Keeps and Fortified Villages, Nodal Points, Anti-Tank Islands.

WO 199/627, War Office – Home Forces – General Headquarters – Defence of Certain Areas – Chatham, 1941

Research Papers

Discovering and Recording Kent’s 20th Century Military and Civil Defences – Medway District, Medway Military Research Group, 2008

Kent's Twentieth Century Military and Civil Defences. Part 2 – Medway, Victor Smith (Archaeologia Cantiana - Vol. 131 2011)