The Dutch in the Medway 1667 Commemoration and Reflection

155 The DuTch in The MeDway 1667: coMMeMoraTion anD reflecTion elizabeth edwards at the end of June 2017 a conference, sponsored inter alia by the Kent archaeological Society, was held in the royal Dockyard church at The historic Dockyard chatham and signalled the end of the commemorations of the Dutch fleet’s daring raid on the Medway in June 1667. The conference followed several weeks’ civic and naval, Dutch and British (English) commemorations of the events and a complementary conference held in Amsterdam the previous weekend. Chatham Historic Dockyard Trust (CHDT) identified the anniversary as a real opportunity to shine a light on what had become part of Medway’s forgotten history. Perhaps one of the most significant historical events to have taken place there, the Dutch attack on the Medway had been largely lost from sight. Heritage Lottery funding enabled Medway Council’s Heritage Services team to renew the permanent interpretation at Upnor Castle and support the development of the Dockyard’s summer exhibition, Breaking the Chain.1 chDT, Medway council and Visit Kent realised that there was an opportunity to encourage modern day Dutch travellers to follow in de Ruyter’s footsteps and to ‘put Medway on the Map’. Medway Unitary Authority was created out of a local government reorganisation in 1997-98 that brought together the five Medway Towns, (Strood, Rochester, Chatham, Gillingham and Rainham) under the name of the river that flows through them. The South-East’s largest conurbation’s national profile remains low, the fate of many former industrial towns, especially one so close to and overshadowed by London. In an echo of the Dutch raid in reverse, the search for objects for the exhibition led to collaboration with the Rijks Museum in Amsterdam and Jeroen van der Vliet, their curator of maritime collections, who gave the introductory plenary lecture at the final conference. For Dutch people celebration of one of the high points of the Dutch Golden Age was clearly an opportunity to have fun with history and follow De ruyter up the Medway, with an organisation of Dutch coastal sailors already planning their own Tocht naar Chatham. As momentum built, state organisations began to get involved and support the commemorations and both The Netherlands Embassy in London and the British Embassy in The Hague became important partners, as did the two country’s navies both of whom played a major role in the events at Chatham. Two fleets of Dutch ships ‘sailed into the Medway’, the second 95 strong, bringing the river alive with traditional and modern boats and yachts and providing a great spectacle together with other events including the commemorative breaking of another chain. In 1667 the symbolism of the attack ELIZABETH EDWARDS 156 on Upnor Castle, breaking through the defensive chain barrier followed by the burning of part of the fleet, and the capture of the flagship, the Royal Charles, reinforced the sense of defeat which was to have significant consequences, both long and short-term. While the civic and naval activities had focussed closely on the actual events of 19-21 June 1667, the conferences aimed to consider the wider political, economic and naval circumstances leading up to the raid, the immediate repercussions and medium to longer-term consequences. They attracted a wide range of specialist historians from Britain and The Netherlands as well as delegates with interests in both local and naval history. By the mid seventeenth century the Dutch had established themselves as the major European trading nation during, and particularly after, their successful eighty-year struggle for independence from Spanish rule, formally achieved at the Treaty of Munster in 1648. However, geographical, financial and demographic advantages in pursuing colonial trade gave the English the stimulus and opportunism to challenge the Dutch and by the end of the century their progress in the Mediterranean, the Baltic and the Far East, as well as the Atlantic, was accelerating faster than that of the Dutch (with the French coming up fast on the rails). Both England and the Dutch republic were Protestant nations, although the difference between Anglicanism and Calvinism had some interesting ramifications as the changing religious enthusiasms of the English monarchy in the seventeenth century and some tensions in the Dutch States led to a frequent transition of religious and political refugees from one to the other, in addition to economic movements of people, and commercial developments. Added to these two important international issues was the close family relationship of the Stuart monarchy and the Princes of orange,2 who, except for the critical period between 1650 and 1672 (‘the first stadholderless period’),3 held the post of stadholder in five of the seven provinces, including the strongest and wealthiest, Holland (Fig. 1). within this stadholderless period england went to war three times with the Dutch Republic, (1652-4, 1665-7 and 1672-4), the first time under the republican government of Cromwell, which the new Dutch administration had recognised in January 1651. However, recognition did not imply unqualified approval of regicide, nor did english assertion of rights of trade and shipping embodied in the Navigation Act of October in the same year endear them to the Dutch merchant interest. Mutual interest, arising from common religious and republican cause, counted for little as relations deteriorated into war in May 1652, and yet the peace treaty which the english forced on the Dutch at westminster in april 1654 was underlined by Cromwell’s motives for keeping the House of Stuart, through its connections and refuge in The netherlands, in a powerless position and of establishing a common Protestant cause. The repercussions of this treaty were to be far-reaching beyond the lifetime of the first stadholderless period. The Restoration of Charles II in England in 1660 effectively weakened the English hold over the Dutch Republic. The King’s lack of sympathy for the aims of the Dutch republican regime removed most of what friendly feelings it had towards the English and provided the opportunity for the economic tensions already existing between the two countries to resurface. THE DUTCH IN THE MEDWAY 1667: COMMEMORATION AND REFLECTION 157 The gradual further deterioration of relations between england and the Dutch republic has generally been ascribed to the resurgence of economic warfare, the renewal of the Navigation Acts and the introduction of a ten-mile fishing limit around the coast of England. This consensus by historians naturally has its nuances, but whether it was primarily caused by the machinations of the newly appointed ambassador to The Hague, Sir George Downing, the negotiations by the Grand Pensionary, De witt, with the french or the colonial struggles across the atlantic, the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-67) can justifiably be described as a trade Fig. 1. The provinces of the Dutch Republic. Map reproduced from M. Prak, 2005, The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century, The Golden Age, Cambridge University Press (by kind permission of CUP). ELIZABETH EDWARDS 158 war. Only Baxter in his study, strongly underpinned by the importance of dynastic conflict, saw the war as a direct result of the purely personal/political breakdown between Charles II and De Witt.4 and although Pincus denies economic causes for the war he argues that to the english, Dutch trading practices were another manifestation of the republicanism which was a threat to the restored monarchy.5 However, before the deterioration in relations finally led to war in 1665 the Dutch continued to strive for working alliances with both the English and the French. With England the negotiations were mainly over trading disputes often dating back to the Commonwealth period and earlier. A treaty was finally signed in September 1662. In April of the same year De Witt had succeeded in making a treaty with the French which included terms for military support in the event of threat from England and an agreement on satisfactory tariff policy.6 By 1664 the relations between the Dutch and the English had reached such a low point and the increase in english attacks on Dutch shipping were so great that war, declared by Charles II in March 1665, could be seen to be inevitable. As Paul Seaward pointed out in his paper ‘the House of Commons inquiry into the state of trade, and the resolution of april 1664 blamed the Dutch for english economic stagnation, [and] … unprecedented sums were granted, seen as overwhelming political support for the war. Nevertheless, after two years in which the opposing navies fought each other to a standstill, the English government were unable to gather together the resources to sustain a third campaigning season; the major capital ships of the navy were laid up at Chatham instead of being sent out as a fleet’. Thus the early English ascendancy was overcome in 1667 as the Dutch achieved a superiority at sea through their privateering activities and the attack on the Medway. The Peace was signed at Breda in July 1667. The elements of victory by the Dutch, which were in the long run to be tainted by the agreement to concede the acquisitions of the English during the early stages of the war, particularly the transformation of new amsterdam to new york, were in the short term offset by the acquisition of Surinam by the Dutch (modern day Suriname). historians agree broadly, while differing considerably on the nuances, that the main causes of the first two Anglo-Dutch wars were economic, but influenced by political motives. The Third War was a more overtly political and less overtly, religious, affair, orchestrated by Louis XIV through the (Secret) Treaty of Dover in 1670.7 in the aftermath of their celebrations of the 1667 raid the Dutch were very quickly brought down to earth by their own internal political differences, the continued struggle with France, the difficulties of accurately interpreting the diplomacy of Charles II and his government, and the critical interests of their trade. The abortive attempt to establish a workable opposition to France in the Triple Alliance (England, Sweden and the Dutch Republic) of 1668 and the invasion of the inland provinces by France and others, together with renewed naval warfare with England in 1672 led to the downfall of their government, the murder of De Witt and the reinstatement of the Prince of Orange as stadholder. in england the immediate impact of the raid on the Medway highlighted the lack of a clear naval command structure,8 showing how Peter Pett, resident commissioner at chatham, allegedly failed in his duties to defend the dockyards at chatham and the new limb at Sheerness, leaving the English fleet idle in the Chatham Dockyard. THE DUTCH IN THE MEDWAY 1667: COMMEMORATION AND REFLECTION 159 He was arrested and held in the Tower of London under a Bill of Impeachment for his supposed inaction, but in the end he was not prosecuted. The raid on the Medway was essentially a Dutch success and it was therefore fitting that the opening plenary public lecture was given by Jeroen van der Vliet of the Rijks Museum in Amsterdam. Using the art of the period and particularly the numerous celebratory paintings of the raid, van der Vliet brought to life the land and seascapes of the Medway, showing the daring of the Dutch naval enterprise. Later in the conference Pepijn Brandon (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) demonstrated how the Dutch administration had been stimulated by their failure in the First Anglo- Dutch War, 1652-54, to develop a new approach to naval expenditure. This led to professionalisation of naval warfare through increasing bureaucratisation within the Admiralty Boards while retaining the practice of contracting out and brokerage through merchant companies and private contractors for supplies and support services. In a similar way the shock and humiliation of the Medway raid and the effective loss of prestige after the rapidly concluded Peace of Breda two weeks later in July 1667, stimulated the English to pour resources into the development and restructuring of the naval system echoed in the expansion of the Dockyard where many of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century buildings provided the venue and backdrop for the conference and commemorations. Van der Vliet’s illustrated lecture followed, on screen, the route of the Dutch with an on board view of their approach to Upnor and the defensive chain which broke so feebly to let them through towards the dockyard and the idle English fleet. While almost all the contemporary paintings show the raid from the viewpoint of the Dutch navy, John Evelyn’s account of the raid in his diary as he sat watching the Dutch fleet approaching towards the port, from his vantage point on a hill above Gillingham: a dreadful spectacle as ever any English men saw, and a dishonour never to be wiped off 9 and Willem Schellinks’s retrospective painting showing the view of the raid from behind Sheerness (Fig. 2),10 at least give a sense of what the raid, the ‘dreadful spectacle’, must have looked like to those watching from shore. Every year contains the potential to remember earlier formative events in the lives of individuals, families, and societies. For the historian, interest in public commemorations connects with the social scientists’ theories of collective memory and national identity. What do we choose to remember and what do we try to forget? and in what ways do we celebrate or bury certain fragments of the past? The 1667 Dutch Attack on the Medway arguably constituted a significant step, albeit involving catastrophe for the English, along the road to the Glorious Revolution and Empire. But significantly it formed no part of the story historians told in 1988-9 when the Tercentenary of the Glorious Revolution was celebrated, providing a reminder, if one were needed, of the highly selective character of collective memory, and the agency of historians in shaping it. We prefer to celebrate success rather than catastrophe, victory rather than defeat. In 1988-9 modern historical approaches came face to face with the traditional Whig interpretations of democracy and religious toleration. When it came to ELIZABETH EDWARDS 160 Fig. 2 Burning of the English Fleet near Chatham, 19-24 June 1667 by Willem Schellinks, in the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam (detail reproduced with kind permission). devising a William and Mary programme for Kent, the travelling exhibition focused mainly on the cultural and economic contributions of Dutch immigrant communities in Kent, Protestant refugees mainly, in Sandwich, Dover, Canterbury and Maidstone. Nevertheless, numerous ambiguities remain surrounding the local history of the events of 1688-9 which don’t quite square with traditional history. In Kent, for example, the reluctance of the county gentry to declare their allegiance to william iii, as they waited for news from Sir John Knatchbull to see which way the wind was blowing. Or the deep respect, even homage, paid to James II at the quayside when he was famously captured at Faversham by local fishermen. Nearly thirty years later we have been commemorating a Dutch victory and an English embarrassment and it is worth noting that the Dutch ‘celebrated’ on a national scale, while the British concentrated their commemorations on the location and institutions most affected by the raid in the Medway towns. The conference provided the opportunity to explore the importance of the event and its place in the twenty-year naval struggles between the two strong merchant states. Much of the subsequent foreign policy of both states and their internal political upheavals were directly or indirectly influenced by the events and outcomes of the Anglo-Dutch THE DUTCH IN THE MEDWAY 1667: COMMEMORATION AND REFLECTION 161 Wars, culminating in the Glorious Revolution of 1688/9 and the elevation of the Prince of Orange to the status of King and Stadholder.11 Paul Seaward (History of Parliament Trust) opened the second day of the conference with a discussion of english politics in the months before the war and its popularity with anglican royalists, noting the role of James Duke of york as ‘a destructive force in English politics’, twenty years before his own disastrous reign as James II (1685-88). The second part of the conference also explored some of these wider ramifications, setting a very local event within the wider European context (Gijs Rommelse, crone fellow at the Maritime Museum, amsterdam) to which it was both a response and an important motivator for the dynamic of further naval and international developments. Nuala Zahedieh (University of Edinburgh) and Martine van Ittersum (University of Dundee) then explored the influence and importance of the Navigation Acts, the ‘Atlantic system’ and the interpretations of international law in relation to Anglo-Dutch rivalry in the North Sea and the Atlantic. Thus a colourful, dramatic event in the Medway, lasting only a few days, has provided the basis for interpretation and re-interpretation of a critical period in the emergence of modern Britain and Europe. acknowledgements The author’s thanks to Richard Holdsworth and David Ormrod for their contributions. endnotes 1 A temporary exhibition at The Historic Dockyard Chatham from 8 June to 3 September 2017 telling the story of the Battle of Medway through Dutch and British contemporary art, literature, historic manuscripts and extraordinary objects, on loan from national and international museums. http://www.visitmedway.org/events/226278/ 2 William III’s mother, Mary Stuart, was the sister of Charles II. 3 william iii was born a few days after the death of his father who had antagonised many of the Dutch and particularly the city of Amsterdam and the post of stadholder was not filled. 4 S. Baxter, 1966, William III and the Defense of European Liberty 1650-1702, pp. 32-3; J.I. Israel, 1995, The Dutch Republic, its Rise, Greatness and Fall 1477-1806, p. 753; J.R. Jones, 1996, The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century, pp. 145-150; H.H. Rowen, 1978, John De Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, pp. 449-50; P. Geyl, 1969, Orange and Stuart 1641-72 (transl.), pp. 192-93. 5 Steven C.A. Pincus, 1996, Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy 1650-1668, pp. 441 and 443. 6 rowen, De Witt, p. 469. 7 Although there is still no real consensus about Charles II’s religious motivations there is agreement that for his own political purposes he needed a source of finance which did not require the approval of Parliament. See for example, P. Sonino, 1988, Louis XIV and the origins of the Dutch War (Cambridge), pp. 59-63. 8 Discussed in a paper by Chris Ware (University of Greenwich). 9 Schama, Simon, 1987, The Embarrassment of Riches (London), p. 234. 10 Burning of the English Fleet near Chatham (19-24 June 1667), by Willem Schellinks, 1667- 1678. 11 See Tony claydon, William III (2002) and William III and the Godly Revolution (2003); and wout Troost, 2005, William III, the Stadholder-King: A Political Biography.