The Roman Invasion
Introduction
In the Spring issue 1999 of the Kent Archaeological Review Brian Philp's article entitled the Second battle of the Medway ends with 'watch this space for future developments' (Philp 1999, p.99-101). As many of you know there has already been a conference in Sussex on the route taken by the invading Roman army in AD 43 and it is good to see that there will now be a Kent based conference on the same subject (ed. K.A.R. No. 142, p.44). those who have worked with me or attended my various adult education classes know from experience that I would never be able to resist a debate such as this. As far as other archaeologists in Kent (but not in Sussex) are concerned I shall play devils advocate and put forward some of the factors which may support a route through Sussex rather than farther east.
The debate amongst several members of the archaeological fraternity as to the landing place of the Roman army in AD43 is however, not new and the debate can (and no doubt will - 'groan') continue for years and no conclusion will be any the nearer. However, if the (meagre) evidence is looked at in an objective manner the advocates of a Sussex route have probably been more constructive, or at least have put forward ideas that have not (in my view) been adequately answered by those who support a Kentish route. The present writer is not particularly concerned as to the route of the Roman army, but here attempts to summarise the evidence and to expand on some (but by no means all) of the points debated.
In September 1998 Martin Henig of Wolfson College, Oxford published a short article on the attitude of the indigenous Iron Age tribes to the Roman invasion. Amongst other statements he disputes the traditional interpretation that the Roman army landed in Kent, at that time dominated by the Catuvellauni. Instead he states that the landing was made in the friendly territory of the Atrebates in Sussex and therefore that the two day battle recorded by Dio Cassius at 'a river' was not at the
'traditional' site, the River Medway. Others then joined the debate in a series of short articles and letters within British Archaeology, the Kent Archaeological So. Newsletter and the Kent Archaeological Review. What many readers are probably unaware of is that J.G.F. Hind of the University of Leeds challenged the idea that the Roman army marched through Kent, ten years ago in a superb article within Britannia Volume xx. (Hind 1989, pl-21). This article should be compulsory reading for all who are interested in the subject. As far as the present writer is aware there was no attempt at that time to refute the interpretation offered. Hind points out that that the debate is not new and has been going on since the nineteenth century with Sussex, Essex, Hampshire and Kent, all being suggested as the area of invasion. The latter came to be considered the 'correct' route from the early part of this century and was 'confirmed' by the finding of a Claudian base at Richborough in the 1930's.
One of the excuses for the invasion used by the Roman government was the appeal by Verica, King of the Atrebates for help against his enemies the Catuvellauni or internal claimants to his throne (or both). Whether the aristocracies of the southern tribes were already Romanised and that many welcomed the invasion as suggested by Dr. Henig is of course open to argument. His interpretation of events in northern Britain, whether right or wrong, is a completely different theme and does not form part of this debate. Some, perhaps many, of the British aristocracy in the south do appear to have readily adopted Roman culture within a few years of the invasion although it would appear that others (e.g. Boadicea - 'yes I know its supposed to be Boudicca, but I'am old fashioned') thought otherwise.
The evidence
1. The route: The suggestion that the whole of the invading army landed in Sussex is a development on the idea that part of the army landed near Chichester (Cunliffe 1971, p23; Webster 1980, p95). This latter idea was partly based on the statement by Dio that the Roman army sailed in three divisions, which could be used to imply three separate landing places. A variation on this theme was that the three places were Richborough, Dover and Lymphe, based purely on the fact that the three main Roman roads in Kent start from these places to converge at Canterbury. Other variations have also been suggested (Hind 1989, p.8-19).
The Roman high command would have known of the problems that Julius Caesar had in 55 and 54 BC when attempting ( and failing) to find a safe harbour. Even Richborough might not have been as safe as is usually thought for it may have been dilficult of access and subject to strong tidal flows both up and down the Wansum Channel. The lack of a safe harbour, the opposition that had occurred on Caesar's first raid and the harrying that he received on his second may all have suggested to the Roman high command that they should opt for an easier and safer anchorage further west within friendly territory. The advocates of a Sussex landing place have made much of the latter point; the Atrebates proved the excuse for intervention and would provide supplies, manpower and a safe base from which to operate. All of which are valid points. However, the Roman army was an offensive army and would probably want to bring the enemy to battle as quickly as possible. A more direct route to the north of the Thames through Kent, especially if supported by the fleet, might therefore be more applicable than one through modern Sussex, Hampshire and Surrey. The obvious counter argument to this is that eventually the enemy would have to seek battle anyway and therefore it was better, to be in friendly territory with guides and helpers.
It has been assumed since the early twentieth century that the two day battle between the Roman army and the native British tribesmen in AD43 described by the classical historian Dio Cassius took place on the banks of the River Medway either at, or to the south west of Rochester. If this "traditional" view is correct, one of the routes suggested for the Roman army has been regarded as the prehistoric trackway (Webster 1980, p.98) now known (incorrectly) as the Pilgrim's Way. There has been a recent attempt to position the site of the battle in the area of Halling close to this route (Nicolson 1998a, p.4-7; 1998b,p. 1-2). However, the suggestion that the route could have followed the more open country on or near the line of the present Watling Street and that the battle was fought closer to Rochester has much to commend it (Detsicas 1987, p.14). In 1976 Patrick Thornhill had also suggested a crossing at Upnor which, to the present writer, seems just as likely as the Halling crossing (Thornhill 1976, p.126). A route nearer the coast, along the so called "Lower Road", would certainly keep the army in contact with the fleet. Large quantities of equipment were presumably being shipped across the Channel and there seems little point in unloading all the supplies at Richborough to be then brought over land. Safe harbours to provide forward supply bases may have meant that the river in the area of Rochester was a military priority. This lack of naval support may be one of the weaknesses in the argument of the advocates of the Sussex route. However, if looked at on the wider scale, support by the fleet may be an irrelevance. Where was the fleet when the Roman army was marching through the forests of Germany, the Balkan mountains or the deserts of Syria?
The advocates of a Kent landing place have pointed out that beyond Chichester there was the Forest of the Weald and that this would hamper Roman operation. However, this pre-supposes there were no route-ways through the Weald. Even if we assume that the forest was as dense as we suppose (of which I am doubtfuJ) the Roman army and their allies (the Atrebates) could cut swathes through this forest. How many trees can 10,000, 30,000 or 50,000 (or more) men cut down in a day? Such terrain has not stopped the Roman army in other areas although occasionally, as in Germany in AD9, disaster ensued.
2. Documentary sources: The work of Dio Cassius is the only source, which gives any real detail about the Roman invasion. The statement by Suetonius is very short and what, no doubt, would have been our main source, the appropriate book of Tacitus' Annals is lost for this particular campaign. We have to remember that Dio is writing a hundred and fifty years after the event. This is as far removed as we are from the Crimean War, but there were no newspapers, no photographs, merely official announcements. Some of the propaganda would be recorded by (the very few) contemporary historians who might then ask for more information from friends and relatives taking part in the campaign. Dio's account has been translated and edited by S. Ireland (1986, p.45) from which the following applicable extracts are taken:
a. "they (the Romans) made the crossing in three divisions so as not to be hampered in landing, as a single force might be". (H.ind's translation reads ".... to avoid having an opposed landing, which might hold up a single force").
This statement could be used to support an argument either for three separate sailings to the same spot or three separate locations. The phrase "as a single force", could (arguably) be used to favour the former theory. W hatever it means, it is little use to us because it does not identify the landing place/ s. H.ind's translation could be used to support three different places, but this does not prevent an opposed landing and they also c_reate strategic, communication and logistical problems. In my view the word "hampered", and consequently one landing place is to be preferred. The statement is ambiguous and can mean whatever the reader wants it to mean.
b. ".... they (the Romans) were at first disheartened by being driven back in their course. Subsequently, though they recovered their spirits when a bolt of lightning (Hind "shooting star") shot from east to west the direction they were sailing".
This implies that the whole of the invasion fleet was at this time together, but whether they were driven back by the wind or the tide we have no way of knowing. All writers seem to agree that the invasion fleet set out from Boulogne (Frere 1978, p.78; Webster 1980 p.94; Detsicas 1983, p.11). The phrase "east to west" seems to argue in favour of a Sussex beachhead, such a direction hardly matches a course from Boulogne to Richborough. However, it is always possible the Roman fleet sa.iled north and once opposite the Isle of Thanet turned west. The statement is ambiguous and can mean whatever the reader wants it to mean.
c. "On putting into the island they met no resistance, since the Britons, from what they had learned, had not expected them to come, and had not assembledbeforehand". The initial response is to say that this must mean Kent, for this was dominated by the Catuvellauni and therefore this is where they would have assembled. Unfortunately the Catuvellauni also seem to have dominated Sussex for Berikos " had been driven out of the
....._
island as a result of an uprising". Berikos is regarded as being the same individual as Verica. Presumably name specialists have f".,,een able to make the connection surely enough for this identification to be accepted, although, on the information easily available, I personally am not totally convinced. The statement is ambiguous and can mean whatever the reader wants it to
mean.
".... surrender on terms of part of the Bodunni "
The Bodunni are usually equated with the Dobunni of Gloucestershire and hence it has been suggested that Kent would be too far away from their home territory for them to be operating. Two counter points can however, be raised. First, (importantly) the tribe may be some small, unknown, group from Kent (the Cantiaci are not mentioned by Caesar and are almost certainly a Roman administrative creation). Secondly the Dobunni as subjects of the Catuvellauni would (presumably) have to have no say on where they were to operate and they may have been brought over to Kent or Sussex. This statement is ambiguous and can read whatever the reader wants it to mean.
�".... (the Romans) came to a river. The Barbarians thought the Romans would not be able to cross without a bridge."
This statement implies that the river in question is wide, deep and/ or swiftly flowing. Again, initially the statement would tend to support the Medway rather than any of the Sussex rivers. Such a description of the River Medway is (today) true for the whole length from Gillingham to Aylesford. However, we should remember that Dio is writing about what the Britons thought (or -to make it confusing - what he (or his informant) thought they thought). To the Catuvellauni the River Arun would probably look just as formidable as the Medway. In the area of Arundel itself, the river is in the region of 30 metres wide, is just as muddy as the Medway and has vertical banks. Its flood plain, as far north as Coldwalthan, is for the most part three quarters of a mile wide and tidal. There are many steams, marshy areas and water meadows, although the latter would normally be dry in summer. The Arun may be "minor" to us and "no more than a few yards wide", (Philp 1999, p.100), but it is not our view which matters, it is the view of the Catuvellauni. Furthermore, the description that Dio does give of the river is very limited. He implies that it is wide, but if looked at
objectively he merely states there was no bridge. He also states German auxiliaries were sent across "who were quite used to swimming easily even in full armour across the swiftest currents". Note the phraseology. He does not actually say that this river was swiftly flowing merely that the auxiliaries could cross such rivers. A legion then "got across the river somehow"; 5500 heavy infantry were able to cross the river, followed by at least one more legion that night or the following day. No hint of a problem is stated by Dio. This latter factor could be used to suggest that the river was not such an obstacle as is usually thought. Again the statement is ambiguous and can read whatever the reader wants it to mean.
"from there (the river) the Britons withdrew to the Thames, at a point where itflows into the sea and at high tide forms a lake .... This they crossed with ease since they knew precisely where the ground was firm and the way passable."
The statement in italics implies somewhere near the Thames estuary. A line of retreat from the Arun to the estuary makes no sense and this part of Dio's text definitely favours a Kent landing. However;
"The Romans .... got into difficulties while others crossed
by a bridge a little way upstream "
There is no way the Britons (or the Romans) could have built a permanent bridge anywhere near the Thames estuary. Two possibilities seem to arise:
Either the action was taking place at a narrower point to the west of London and there was a bridge nearby, in which case Dio's reference to the sea has to be interpreted in some other way. The statement may mean the limit of the tidal river where it might overflow its banks at high tide. Alternatively, the Romans constructed a pontoon bridge, which would then imply close liaison with the fleet, in which case a Kent invasion route is assured. However, whilst a route to the west of London is the long way around to reach Camulodunum (Colchester) the initial military target, it is not as implausible as it first appears. The area around Verularnium (St Albans) saw one of the earliest towns and was shown favour by the Roman authorities. Although within the kingdom of the Catuvellauni the nobles of this area may have made overtures to the Roman army and offered no resistance thereby preserving their own wealth and opening up Camulodunurn to an advance from the west. This then implies previous contact perhaps via messengers to and from Adminius, the exiled brother of Caratacus and Togodumnus joint kings of the Catuvellauni.
The statement taken as a whole, rather than its separate components (f and g) is ambiguous and can read whatever the reader wants it to mean; neither route has the advantage.
From the above comments it can be seen that all of the statements are ambiguous one (b) perhaps favours Sussex and one (f) perhaps Kent. What surprises the present writer is that with the exception of the Thames (and later in the text Camulodunurn) Dio Cassius writing (c. AD 200) long after the event fails to name a single place. By this time he would (or should) have known about Richborough, London, Chichester, etc, even if he did not know exactly where they were. A statement along the lines "the army landed at the place we now call ", might be expected. Also, perhaps importantly, he fails
to mention Julius Caesar's invasion, with a phrase along the lines "The army landed in the same area as that used by the deified Julius Caesar". Perhaps this is missed out due to the very fact that they did not land in the same area, and they did
3
not follow Cnesnr's route because they knew of the problems he had encountered in trying to protect his ships.
3. The archaeology: To say the archaeological evidence for one of the more momentous events in our history is a disappointment is an understatement (only beaten by the total dearth of archaeological evidence for the events of 1066). There is evidence at both Richborough and in the Chichester harbour area for a very early Roman military presence, probably datable to AD 43 or 44.
The area enclosed by the early ditches at Richborough seems to the present writer to be largely irrelevant to the debate (Manly 1999, p.14; Philp 1998, p.14; 1999 a, p.14; 1999 b, p.100). Due to
the erosion which has taken place, we have no way of checking how large this area actua.lly was. It may have covered 90 to 100 acres in a square of 600 to 650m or it may have covered an unknown area (but greater than 10 acres) in the form of an elongated rectangle as found at the early fort at Waddon Hill, Dorset (measuring c.200 x 75m.; Webster and Dudley 1965, p.105 and Fig.23). Also if we assume that the whole Roman army landed at Richborough in three separate divisions over a few hours or days. Part might always be moving forward to provide room for those behind (Detsicas 1983, p.12-13). If this were the case, the whole of the army would never have been brigaded together. Each legion, or any combination, may have had separate marching camps and the ditches found at Richborough may merely have been brigade headquarters and a storage area. Certainly they seem (to the present writer) to have far more in common with a permanent fort than a temporary marching camp.
Although early military style buildings have been found near Chichester (as far as the present writer is aware) there is no sign of fortification. Even assuming this was friendly territory, a marching camp or camps would be likely, but this apparent lack of evidence may merely be a reflection on the area excavated.
If it could be shown that marching camps and early forts were constructed along what was to become Watling Street, a Kent landing would possibly be more secure. Certainly a fort existed at Richborough, but others at this date are more problematical. The fortlet at Reculver can be dated to the "opening phases of the Conquest of Britain" (Philp c.1970 p.3) with mid-first century pottery in the infill of the ditches (Philp 1986 p.4). In the latter article, the actual context of the mint condition coins of Tiberius and Nero found in the eighteenth century are not known, and are therefore not relevant to the dating of the fortlet. Indeed the coins of Tiberius and British coins may indicate a later Iron Age prestige site, which itself could have been a military target. If we accept that the Reculver fortlet does date as early as AD 43 it merely shows that both ends of the Wansum Channel were guarded, it does not help us pinpoint the campaign route.
At Canterbury there are two phases of "possible military occupation". However, the dating evidence is not good enough to definitely argue for an AD 43/ 44 date for the earliest phase. It might be as late as 60 with the second phase dating to 61 (Bennett et al 1982, p.30). On the other hand if London, and by implication Watling Street as a main routeway, begin c.AD 50 (Bird 1999, see below) then this might be the date of the ("possible") phase 1 Canterbury fort.
For Rochester there is no evidence for a fort other than the place names Durobrivae (the Dura element can apparently be used to identify the existence of a fortification) and until recently the same was also true of Ospringe (probably the site of D11rolev11m). In recent excavations however, Paul Wilkinson has dated the known earthworks there to the early Roman period (Lyne 2000, p.9). The pottery within the primary silts of the dit0 could be dated only to within the range AD 43-70. Whilst these fortifications on the evidence produced probably belong to the reign of Claudius (41-54) it does n�t mean the fort was constructed in AD 43/ 44 it could, as with Canterbury, be later.
_ _ _
1?'
For Springhead the present writer has seen (and helped excavate) a "military style" ditch and a fort IS implied (Burnha and Wacher 1990, p.192 and fig.59). However, whether there 1s enough evidence that can be used to support an AD 43 date is more problematic and the ditch may be that of a pre-Roman religious enclosure (ibid). On the archaeological "grapevine" there are rumours of early Roman military style, V shaped
ditches near Halling and Broadstairs. However, the pres�nt writer has helped excavate such ditches which enclosed nothing
To add to the problem such a series of forts only becomes �alid
if it can be shown that a fort existed at London.
There 1s no
known early fort at London and all the evidence points to a
purely civilian settlement created after c. AD 50. There has been
more than a farmstead; unless the excavations have been extensive and/ relevant artifacts recovered the evidence will be ambiguous.
an unsatisfactory attempt to locate a fort at Hyde Park (Sole 1993, p.122-126), but this is based purely on the ev1dence of the road system at least part of which now appears to be incorrect (Sloane and Thomas 1995, p369-370; Bird 1999, p.331). However
London covers a large area and future excavations may o.
course alter the picture.
However, on the Medway an "inscription recently found carved on a rock near the site must surely prove" that this is where the battle took place (Philp 1998, p.14). This evidence will obviously solve the problem and we look forward to the publication of this data (one carmot help but think however, it may be very similar to a certain modern inscription).
t,
The fort at Richborough is the most important piece of evidence to support a Kentish landing for the main invading force. A.LI would agree that the fort is early, almost certainly 43 but perhaps 44. Unfortunately, due to the lack of supporting evidence for an early date for the other suggested Kent forts, the apparent absence of military occupation at London and, most important of all, the absence of temporary marching camps, other interpretations can be put forward. (On the "grapevine" one marching camp has apparently been found, but on the evidence known to the present writer this is an unsafe interpretation).
The first alternative interpretation is that Richborough may have been constructed to guard the entourage and the elephants of the Emperor Claudius when he landed for his brief visit (Bird 1999). The need to bring elephants over by the shortest sea route is, for obvious reasons, very likely. The need to take 5,000 horses (Feakes 1999, p.8), by such a route is not so obvious. If hooded and hobbled they would probably be (relatively) docile whether the journey took (say) twelve hours across the shortest route or (say) twenty four from Boulogne to Sussex. Although William, Duke of Normandy's expedition of 1066 was not on the same scale, the horses on board the ships depicted in the Bayeux Tapestry seem however, not to be constrained, and indeed they seem to be rather enjoying the voyage. The journey from the Somme to Pevensey (William's route) is about 100 kilometres, and that from Boulogne to Chichester Harbour about 175 kilometres. The English expeditions to France of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries with admittedly relatively small numbers of horses travelled distances between these two figures, but as far as I am aware, never more. Distances of these lengths do not appear to be too much of a problem. In addition, an area where
4
Feakes. L. | 1999. | Letter in l<Lnt Archaeological Nnoslelltr, No.43. |
Frere. S.S. | 1978. | Britannia:A History of Roman Britain |
(2nd Edition). | ||
Hanson. W.S. | 1998. | Roman Conquest, letter in British Ard,at!Ology. |
No. 40. | ||
Henig.M. | 1998. | Togidubinus and the Roman Liberation, British |
Archaeology, No. 37. | ||
Henig.M. | 1999. | Roman Invasion, letter in British Archaeology, |
No. 41. | ||
Hind.J.G.F. | 1989. | The Invasion of Britain inA.D. 43-An |
AlternativeStrategy forAulus Plautius, Britannia | ||
Vol.xx, p. 1-21. | ||
Ireland.S. | 1986. | Roman Britain:ASourcebook. |
Lyne.M. | 2000. | A Roman Fort near Faversham, Kent, Practical Archaeology No. 2, p. 8-10. |
Manley.J. | 1999. | Roman Invasion, letter in British Archaeology, |
No. 41. | ||
Moore. D. J. | 1999. | Roman Invasion, letter in British Archaeology, |
No.42. | ||
Nicolson. N. | 1998a | The Battle of theMedwayA.O. 43, Current |
Archaeology, No. 157. | ||
Nicolson. N. | 1998b. | The Battle of theMedway, A.O. 43, Ke11/ Archaeological Society Newsletter, No. 42. |
Philp.B. | c. 1970. | The Roman Fort at Rerulver (7th edition). |
Philp. B. | 1986. | The Roman Fort at Recu1ver (8th edition). |
Philp. B. | 1998. | Roman Conquest, letter in British Archaeology, |
No.37. | ||
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Philp.B. | 1999b. | TheSecond Battle of theMedway, Kent Archaeological Review, No. 135, p 99-101. |
the landing would be less likely to be opposed would of course be beneficial to the unloading and exercise of the horses. The problem with the Solent tides is of course a valid argument against the longer routes, but in itself not an insurmountable one.
The second alternative interpretation is that Richborough may have provided a secure position from which the military could dominate the rich agricultural land of East Kent (Bird 1999). The construction of military style storage buildings (possibly granaries) very soon after the infilling of the ditches may indicate that this domination was exactly why the fort was built in the first place. Supplies (i.e. grain) would be collected and then shipped out, either to the west for the campaigns of Vespasian or to the north for the army consolidating Essex and perhaps along the Thames and into the Southern Midlands.
Conclusion:
Both the historical and archaeological evidence is ambiguous; only the latter may (although the present writer thinks it very unlikely) clarify the position. Advocates will read into the evidence what they want to believe. Archaeologists who advocate a Kent invasion route may have held their own with the arguments recently put forward, although for all the points
"'raised in defence of a Kent invasion route alternative interpretations can be suggested. More importantly, defenders
of the Kent route have singularly failed to argue against most of the deductive and logical points raised ten years ago by Hind. The advantage seems to be with the advocates of a Sussex route; we will see if the Council for Kentish Archaeological Spring Conference alters this position.
When I was a student at King Alfred's College, Winchester, for the first (and only) time I was warned about historical and archaeological bias and the way certain aspects of evidence will be emphasised. All my own students are now warned about bias. In this case we have to contend with:
The bias of the victorious Romans; the bias of the classical writers, the bias of documentary survival; the bias of archaeological survival; the bias of where archaeologists have excavated; the bias within archaeological reports and the bias of where advocates actually live. This debate will no doubt continue for many years.
Alan Ward (part time archaeological lecturer at Christ Church
University College, Canterbury). (May 1999 with revisions November 2000).
References and Bibliography
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